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The Impact of Regulation on Market Quality
by Sean Foley
This dissertation studies the impact of market structure changes on market efficiency and
integrity. Thematically, it is concerned with the actual behaviour of market participants
and their associated impact on key market variables such as the degree of liquidity, the
size of trading costs, the quality of price discovery and the integrity of the market itself.
The fundamental changes to the trading landscape brought about by fragmentation have
significantly changed the way that many traders execute transactions. In light of the
vast and complex changes that have recently occurred in markets, this thesis conducts
an empirical investigation of these microstructure issues. These studies contribute to
the understanding of modern markets, the health of which is integral for effective price
discovery and liquidity provision.
The four studies in this dissertation examine several key market microstructure issues,
including: causes of the pre-bid price run-up ahead of takeover announcements; the
impact high frequency trading has on market efficiency and integrity; and the effect of
both the introduction and regulation of dark trading. The outcomes of these studies are
comprehensively discussed and their contributions to the field are duly noted. Given
the significant and rapid change occurring in current equity markets, the findings in this
dissertation are relevant for market practitioners, exchange venue designers, and market
regulators.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Regulators internationally are charged with ensuring that equity markets are both fair
and efficient. Over the last decade, rapid technological change has revolutionised the
way modern equity trading is conducted. Such rapid changes may have unintended
consequences for market quality, and it is within the ambit of regulators to ensure that
these changes do not have a negative impact. To achieve this goal, it is imperative that
empirical evidence is sought to answer these questions. Current evidence on the impact
of new trading practices, such as high-frequency and dark trading are inconclusive, with
findings indicating the practices are both beneficial and detrimental for market quality.
Even older questions of regulatory importance, such as the link between pre-bid run-
up and insider trading still do not have conclusive explanations. This lack of evidence
hampers the ability of regulators to make informed decisions on any new regulatory
initiatives. This thesis empirically analyses three core issues; whether insider trading
contributes to the run-up in prices prior to takeover events; the impact of high-frequency
trading (HFT) on market quality; and the effect of dark trading on lit markets. The
examination of these questions provides evidence that can be used to inform debate
about regulatory policy to ensure that regulatory practices are focused on improving
both the efficiency and integrity of the market.
Both legislative change and significant technological progress have together enabled the
creation of new exchanges that are able to compete effectively against the incumbent
12
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listing exchanges. The creation of these alternative trading venues encourages competi-
tion for liquidity provision. This has lead to “maker-taker” exchange pricing models and
the rise of high-frequency trading which takes advantage of new inverted pricing models.
The growth in high-frequency trading has been rapid, with the Tabb Forum estimating
that high-frequency trading is responsible for over 60% of the value traded in the US
in 2012. To accommodate for this new breed of high speed traders, exchanges have
introduced a wide range of new innovations, including direct market access, co-location,
and ongoing investment in new technology to ensure that their platforms are fast and
capable of handling ever-increasing volumes of orders. Amid this environment of rapid
fragmentation, innovative types of venues have developed to take advantage of the new
opportunities high-frequency trading offers.
One of the most prevalent of these new types of venues is the “dark pool”. This venue
offers traders the ability to both hide the size of their order, and to execute trades at
prices between the best bid and ask quoted in traditional markets. This allows traders to
minimise their price impact and information transmission. By providing superior prices,
dark pools are able to receive price priority, allowing them to execute orders in preference
to the lit market. Innovations such as these have proven to be very popular, both with
traders trying to avoid being “picked off” by front-runners, and with high-frequency
traders keen to receive preferential execution.
It is not clear whether the legislation that regulates high-frequency trading, dark trad-
ing, and insider trading is promoting efficiency and integrity for the market as a whole.
The combination of market fragmentation and innovation is rapidly creating a trading
environment that is segmented into the “haves” and “have nots”. That is, there is a
growing distinction between those who are able to access and profit from innovations
like dark pools and high-frequency trading, such as large institutional traders, and those
who cannot, such as traditional retail investors. Regulators appear to be struggling
to keep up with the increasing avenues for manipulation that such innovations create.
Misconduct such as layering, quote stuffing, closing price manipulation, lit-dark ramp-
ing and phantom liquidity all pose significant risks to the integrity of the market. In
response to these risks, many regulators have begun instituting regulations designed to
limit the practices of high-frequency and dark trading. Such regulations vary between
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jurisdictions. Among the changes are the introduction of transactions taxes, messaging
taxes, minimum price improvement regulations and minimum quantities for dark trades.
Despite a lack of empirical evidence, a raft of regulatory changes aimed at improving the
fairness and efficiency of markets have been implemented without sufficient due diligence.
In light of this, the first part of this thesis is dedicated to not only analysing the integrity
of the market, but also the interplay between integrity and efficiency, particularly with
respect to high-frequency trading, and the apparent effect that insider trading has on
pre-bid run-up in takeover targets. The second half of this thesis focuses on the effects
of dark market fragmentation, by providing evidence on the impact of the introduction
and subsequent regulation of dark pools. Taken as a whole, this thesis presents empirical
research into the market quality impacts of equity market regulation. New evidence is
provided on the problem of insider trading, the relative merits of high-frequency and
dark trading, all with an eye towards improving the efficiency and integrity of the market
through evidence based regulation.
1.1 Does insider trading explain price run-up?
Insider trading is a breach of market integrity, and despite extensive study, its impacts
on the market remain difficult to identify, study, and regulate against. The potential
for sizeable gains based on snippets of undisclosed and price sensitive information fuels
the public’s fascination with this issue. Due to such potential for inequitable gain and
negative impact on market quality, insider trading is a criminal act that regulators are
charged with identifying and eliminating. Due to its surreptitious nature , however,
identifying insider trading remains a challenging task. For this reason, many academics
(and regulators) have conducted research aimed at identifying the “footprints” of this
illegal conduct.
Empirical researchers over several decades have focused on takeover events to identify
evidence of insider trading. With large premiums, a high degree of information asym-
metry, and a large number of individuals working on the deal prior to announcement,
takeovers provide a fertile field within which insiders may profit.Indeed, such suspicions
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would appear vindicated, as international evidence has identified a persistent and sub-
stantial target stock price run-up prior to the announcement of takeover bids. Various
papers, including Dodd (1980), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Betton and Eckbo (2000),
and Bris (2005), have identified and documented pre-bid price run-up across different
time periods and financial market structures.
While considerable empirical evidence substantiates this pre-bid run-up, the cause of
its existence is the subject of much debate. Potential causes covered in the literature
include illegal insider trading (Meulbroek, 1992); market speculation of industry dy-
namics (Jensen and Ruback, 1983); and rumours of an impending takeover based on
market information, such as those related to toehold acquisitions (Jarrell and Poulson,
1989). This chapter accounts for all of these sources, and focuses on the potential impact
toehold purchases have in signalling an impending bid.
Previous theoretical (Bris, 2002) and empirical (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Aitken and
Czernkowski, 1992, Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008b) works suggest that toehold
stakes acquired prior to takeovers may have the capacity to generate pre-bid run-up.
Primarily owing to a lack of data, prior studies have found conflicting evidence for any
link between toeholds and pre-bid run-ups. Betton and Eckbo (2000) report that the
existence of toeholds reduces the magnitude of price run-up, while Jarrell and Poul-
son (1989) identify that as toeholds increase so to does the size of the pre-bid run-up.
This lack of consensus is likely driven by the absence of information regarding the ac-
cumulation of target shares by the bidder, a problem acknowledged in these previous
studies.
These mixed findings, as well as the availability of information regarding toehold pur-
chases, have shaped the direction of the essay contained in Chapter 3, wherein the causes
of the pre-bid price run-up are examined, drawing on data that includes the bidders toe-
hold purchases, rumours in the news media and price sensitive announcements. This
analysis of the pre-bid price run-up provides two main contributions. Firstly, it pro-
vides a framework within which to measure the level of information leakage in a market,
which will be of interest to both market operators and regulators. Secondly, this study
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also reveals the potential impacts of toehold acquisition timing for market participants,
especially bidders considering acquiring a pre-announcement stake in a target company.
1.2 The Impact of HFT on Market Efficiency and Integrity
High-frequency trading has grown in recent years to represent over 50% of trading volume
in the US, with estimates for markets in Asia and Europe ranging between 20% and
30%. Despite such a sizeable proportion of trading being executed by high-frequency
participants, its implications for market quality are not well understood. While high-
frequency trading was once designed to more efficiently execute strategies already in use
by human traders, it is now used for a range of purposes including principal trading.
Much criticism has been levelled against high-frequency traders, with specific concerns
including: that it magnifies the potential for market volatility (such as during the 2010
“Flash Crash”); that “rogue” algorithms have the ability to cause market disruption by
erroneously trading billions in hours without human intervention (such as the Knight
Capital episode); and that the liquidity that appears to be generated by high-frequency
traders is not actually accessible - it evaporates as soon as traders try to act on posted
orders.
Recent academic literature has provided new evidence on the impact of HFT on market
quality. The theoretical findings of Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) suggest that HFT
participants may generate welfare gains, increasing efficiency through the reduction of
the bid-ask spread. The authors argue that this is because HFT participants are able
to update their information set faster than a traditional market maker, hence increasing
their ability to avoid adverse selection, and thus reducing the cost of liquidity provi-
sion. On the other hand, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) warn that the ability of HFT
participants to update their information set faster than human traders may reduce the
willingness of human participants to enter the market for fear of trading with a better
informed HFT participant.
One of the principal limitations in conducting empirical studies on HFT involves estab-
lishing and maintaining an adequate, standardised definition of the practice. Existing
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studies have proxied this using measures such as the order-trade ratio ( Jovanovic and
Menkveld (2011), Malinova, Park and Riordan (2013)), cancel-trade ratio (McInish and
Upson (2012)), and exchange-identified accounts (Jarnecic and Snape (2010), Brogaard
(2010) and Groth (2011)). This variation in techniques for identifying the exact level of
HFT participation has resulted in significant disagreement in the empirical literature.
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), present evidence that high-frequency trading is benefi-
cial for market efficiency and their findings are consistent with studies such as Jarnecic
and Snape (2010), Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011), Brogaard (2010)and Has-
brouck and Saar (2013).
Despite the positive associations linked to high-frequency trading, a large body of liter-
ature suggests significant adverse effects associated with this activity. Kirilenko, Kyle,
Samadi and Tuzun (2011) show that HFT participants played a big part in causing the
May 6th 2010 “Flash Crash” in e-mini futures. McInish and Upson (2012) find that
HFT participants are able to use their superior speed of execution to extract rents from
“slower” traders, implying HFT participants are intermediating between “true” market
participants. Anand and Venkataraman (2012) examine HFT market makers and find
that these traders cease trading when markets become unprofitable (due to increased
volatility or asymmetric information), exacerbating volatility and reducing depth at the
time it is most required.
Keeping these conflicting findings in mind, Chapter 4 examines how HFT impacts the
efficiency and integrity of the LSE and NYSE-Euronext Markets (Paris). Using data
from 2003 to 2011, a unique three-stage least squares framework is used that captures
the interrelationship between market efficiency, market integrity, and high-frequency
trading. The results from this study add to the regulatory debate on high-frequency
trading by showing that market design changes, such as the introduction of HFT, have
positive implications for market efficiency and integrity. In meeting their mandate of
ensuring that markets are kept fair and efficient, it is important that any assessment of
a market design change such as the introduction of HFT assesses not only the impact
on each of these individual elements of market quality, but also the interplay between
its many dimensions.
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1.3 The Market Quality Impacts of Dark Trading
The final two chapters of this dissertation are concerned with the market quality impacts
of dark trading. Dark trading refers to trades that are executed without pre-trade
transparency. These venues allow trades to be executed at prices within the best bid
and ask in the underlying lit markets; in this way, these dark trades avoid generating
an explicit impact on price. While this kind of trading has occurred for many years in
the form of upstairs block trades, the recent move to introduce dark pools of liquidity
(continuously matching buyers and sellers) has raised concern amongst regulators and
market participants worldwide.1
Proponents of dark trading argue that the hidden nature of dark pools makes them an
ideal mechanism for large traders. As their orders are not displayed, they cannot be
front-run. Hence, such a mechanism has the capacity to encourage latent liquidity to be
expressed on-market without alerting the market to the trading intentions of the users
of the dark pool. Furthermore, dark pools may have advantages for market makers who
are informed about the true value of traded assets, and would normally have to reveal
this information through price impact if aggressive provision of liquidity is pursued.
The addition of dark orders allows them to compete with each other more aggressively
without displaying their private information. Such a situation could lead to tighter
spreads and more efficient prices - an overall improvement in market quality.
Opponents of dark trading, however, argue that informed traders may utilise dark pools
to avoid disclosing their information to the market. This has the capacity to reduce the
efficiency of the market, as the information contained within the trades does not become
part of the price discovery process. Taken to the extreme, if all traders should choose
to trade in the dark then the lit market would no longer generate prices, resulting in
market failure.
The existence of potential benefits of accessible latent liquidity and more competitive
liquidity providers, contrasted against potential adverse effects emanating from the price
1See, for example, The U.S. Securities Exchange Commission proposed “Regulation of non-public
trading venues” in 2009, the Committee of European Securities Regulators review of dark trading 10-394
in 2010, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada 2012 “HOT” study and the 2013
Australian Securities Investment Commission report 331 “Dark Trading and High Frequency Trading”.
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discovery process, suggests there could be an optimum level of dark trading, a theoretical
“tipping point”, at which the benefits of dark trading are maximised with respect to the
costs.
The level of dark trading has risen rapidly since its introduction in the last decade. By
2012, dark trading was responsible for upwards of 15% of US consolidated volume, 14%
in Australia and 10% in Canada.2 Concern about the rapid rise of dark trading has
led the Australian and Canadian regulators to introduce measures to ensure that the
practice remains fair and in the best interest of the investing community. Minimum
price improvement regulations are one example of such an initiative, aiming to avoid the
situation that has evolved in the U.S., where orders with no economic price improvement
take precedence over existing limit order book orders. Unsubstantial price improvement
allows orders to receive price priority, so that they are executed before the best priced
orders in the lit market. This has the effect of creating a two-tiered market, whereby
those who have access to dark pools are able to “skip” the lit market queue, thus gaining
an unfair competitive advantage.
Recent theoretical papers have provided conflicting evidence on the impact of dark pool
trading. Zhu (2012) models the choice between lit and dark venues - as a problem of
execution probability. As informed traders are likely to cluster on the same side of the
market, their execution probability in the dark will be lower than that of uninformed
traders. As such, informed traders will prefer to trade in the lit market, resulting in
a higher risk of adverse selection, consequently improving price discovery, but also in-
creasing spreads and price impact, hence reducing market quality. Using a Kyle (1985)
framework, Ye (2012) produces conflicting results, finding that informed traders use both
lit and dark venues, reducing their aggressiveness in lit venues so as to improve the prof-
itability of their contemporaneously submitted dark orders. Such reduced aggressiveness
in the lit market, however, is found to hamper the price discovery process.
In a related study, Boulatov and George (2013) argue that informed traders face a
tradeoff in lit markets: if they submit aggressive limit orders they may earn a profit
2The US estimate is from Rosenblatt Securities for April 2013. The Australian estimate is from
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Report 331 for the September quarter 2012 and
includes some internalization. The Canadian estimate combines statistics from the Investment Industry
Regulatory Organization of Canada
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from providing liquidity but will also give away some of their private information. In
equilibrium, while some informed traders will use aggressive market orders, others will
use limit orders with low levels of aggressiveness, in order to limit the information
revealed. With the addition of a dark venue, the authors find that these informed traders
can now profit without revealing their private information. This results in more traders
using (non-displayed) limit orders, which allows them to profit from their information
without revealing it to the market. This leads to increased competition between market
makers for liquidity provision, improving both liquidity and informational efficiency.
As yet, empirical analyses of dark pools have not provided any definitive insight as to
their impact on market quality. One of the main hindrances in conducting research on
dark pools is the opacity of the data. As there is no pre-trade transparency, participants
in dark pools (and hence their operators) are understandably reluctant to provide trading
data for academic research. This has made it necessary for authors to find dark pool data
from proprietary sources, limiting generalisations that can be made from such research.
Empirical studies of dark pools have been hampered by a number of issues. These
include the potential endogeneity of market quality and dark trading, the need for many
participants to engage with dark order types before the introduction of dark venues will
have a meaningful impact, and the difficulty of acquiring complete dark market data.
Keeping these limitations in mind, a number of these empirical studies find results
consistent with the theoretical works of Zhu (2012) - that dark pools result in a higher
concentration of informed trading on the lit market, hence increasing quoted spreads,
effective spreads and price impact. These studies include: Degryse, de Jong and Van
Kervel (2011) who use data from the Dutch market; Weaver (2011), who uses data from
the US trade reporting facility; and Nimalendran and Ray (2013) who use proprietary
data from a US dark pool. In addition, Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2013) examine
the Australian market, finding that orders executed in the dark are less informed than
those on the lit market. Importantly, the authors estimate the tipping point at which
dark trading becomes detrimental, finding that as dark volume exceeds 10% of total
trading, informational efficiency is reduced.
Other previous empirical literature has shown that dark trading may be beneficial for
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market quality. Buti, Rindi and Werner (2011) use voluntarily reported data in the US
to show that high levels of dark trading are associated with reduced spreads, increased
depth and reduced volatility. Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2011) use an experimental
framework to determine that the addition of dark order types increases depth without
adversely affecting spreads.
The final two essays presented in this dissertation provide empirical evidence on the
market quality impacts of dark trading. These studies use careful empirical design and
unique Canadian data to overcome many of the problems previously mentioned. Thus,
Chapter 5 in this dissertation analyses the impact of the introduction of dark trading
on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) in 2011. This introduction of dark orders was
conducted in a staggered way, providing a set of control stocks that help to overcome
the issue of endogeneity. On the 1st of April 2011 dark trading was introduced for the
constituents of the TSX60 (the main index). On the 20th of May 2011 dark trading was
activated for the remaining stocks. The TSX is the primary venue for trading in Canada,
and the dark order types that were introduced directly interacted with marketable lit
orders. The staggered introduction of dark orders combined with the necessity of all
market participants to interact with dark orders allows for the construction of an event
study that overcomes many of the empirical issues faced by research into dark pools.
This thesis finds that the introduction of dark trading initially causes traders to become
more cautious, reducing the aggressiveness of their orders and hence increasing both
quoted and effective spreads. As dark trading becomes established in the market and
participants are more comfortable with its’ operation, dark trading is found to encourage
more aggressive quoting behaviour as traders try to interact with observed dark liquidity.
This results in a more competitive environment for liquidity suppliers, narrowing both
quoted and effective spreads. The increased competition between liquidity suppliers and
the existence of dark mid-point orders reduces volatility and price impact on the lit
market.
The final essay of this dissertation, as presented in Chapter 6, consists of an analytical
study of the minimum price improvement regulation which was introduced in Canada
during October 2012. This regulation change made it infeasible to conduct dark market
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making, and made it more costly to send liquidity-taking retail orders to the dark market.
As a result this caused a sudden drop in the market wide level of dark trading. The
findings of this study indicate that dark trading encourages more aggressive competition
between market makers, overall resulting in lower quoted, effective and realised spreads,
and hence reflecting the reduced returns to liquidity provision. Similarly, measures of
efficiency including volatility, midpoint autocorrelation and the incorporation of market-
wide information are all improved by dark trading.
The introduction of the minimum price improvement regulation by the Canadian reg-
ulator was a world first. Subsequent to the introduction, similar regulations have been
implemented by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission, with European
and US regulators also debating the regulation of dark pools. As such, the evidence on
the impact of this regulation is topical for both regulators and market participants, as
well as providing an opportunity to gather evidence on the desirability or otherwise of
dark trading as a whole.
1.4 Summary
The four essays that comprise this dissertation examine issues relating to the regulation
of equity markets. The issues explicitly analysed focus on shifts in the trading landscape,
and their potential impact on market quality. As changes are brought about through
regulation or technological change, it is important to understand what impacts these
changes have on trading costs, the price discovery process and the integrity of equity
capital markets. Such research is motivated by a number of factors, including the lack
of consensus in the extant literature regarding the impact of the analysed changes, as
well as the desire to ensure that market regulators and practitioners are able to make
informed decisions that deliver greater fairness, efficiency, liquidity and integrity for all
market participants. This thesis is therefore concerned with the promotion of equity
capital markets that are both fair and efficient.
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The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows. Following this introduction,
Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of relevant prior literature. The analytical Chap-
ters 3, 4, 5 and 6 examine the specific issues outlined above, with particular focus on
the efficiency and integrity of the market. Each chapter contains sections that describe
the data, sample, research design, empirical results, robustness tests and the conclusions
reached. Chapter 7 concludes by highlighting how the evidence presented in this disser-
tation can be used by academics, practitioners and regulators to help organise better and
more efficient responses to the new challenges posed by technology and fragmentation,
and to generally ensure the efficiency and integrity of the market.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Literature Review
This dissertation consists of multiple empirical studies of the impact of market design
changes on the efficiency and integrity of the financial equities markets. This chapter
analyses the literature central to the four essays presented in this dissertation, and
critically discusses the motivation for the empirical analyses of the subsequent chapters.
Section 2.2 of this chapter reviews the literature related to insider trading, and the
potential explanations for price run-ups prior to takeover events. Section 2.3 explores
the emerging literature related to high-frequency trading behaviour. Section 2.4 reviews
the literature concerning market manipulation, specifically end-of-day manipulation.
Finally, section 2.5 discusses the literature related to market transparency and the
emergence of dark pools.
2.2 Pre-Bid Run-up and Insider Trading
A considerable body of empirical evidence has accumulated over the last few decades
showing a persistent and substantial target stock price run-up prior to the announce-
ment of a takeover bid. Table 2.1 reports how this effect is robust to different time
periods and financial market structures, with the average pre-bid run-up found to be
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Table 2.1: Insider Trading Literature Summary
between 4 and 24 per cent. Although there is considerable consensus regarding the na-
ture and magnitude of the run-up, the reasons for its existence are less clear. While
anecdotal evidence suggests that unchecked illegal insider trading is the cause, there
have been several explanations suggested in the academic literature. Whilst these ex-
planations do include the actions of illegal insider traders (Meulbroek, 1992), it has also
been suggested that the run-up is based on market speculation of industry dynamics,
and therefore perpetuated by market anticipators (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), or that it
reflects takeover rumours based on market information such as those related to toehold
acquisitions (Jarrell and Poulson, 1989). The stock price run-up effect observed in target
firms prior to takeover announcements has been documented across a range of differ-
ent market structures through time. A survey by Bris (2005) reports an average price
run-up of between 4 and 17 per cent for 4,500 deals across 52 countries. Unfortunately,
studies of the cause of this pre-bid run-up have been unable to conclusively explain the
reason for this observed phenomenon. The possibilities explored in the current literature
include the insider trading hypothesis first posited by Keown and Pinkerton (1981) that
the trading of insiders’ will generate these returns; rumours in the news media ( Pound
and Zeckhauser (1990), Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992)) and the market anticipation
hypothesis first proposed by Jensen and Ruback (1983), where the analysis of public
information leads traders to identify takeover targets.
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2.2.1 Insider Trading
Insider trading was formally provided as an explanation for abnormal pre-bid price
movements by Keown and Pinkerton (1981). The authors, observing average pre-bid
run-ups of 13% for over 200 US takeovers, argue that the evidence is symptomatic of
widespread illegal trading on inside information. This conclusion is supported by studies
of prosecuted insider trading episodes undertaken by Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and
Sirri (1992) and Chakravarty and McConnell (1999).
While Keown and Pinkerton (1981) rely on the extent to which share prices move ahead
of public takeover announcements to form this opinion, Meulbroek (1992) identifies the
specific days on which insiders traded in a study of 183 episodes of insider trading during
the 1980’s. The author documents that almost half of the observed pre-bid run-up is
experienced on days in which insiders traded, concluding that the trading of insiders
provided information to the market.
Subsequent to Meulbroek’s (1992) study, further studies of insider trading and pre-
bid price run up subsequent to Meulbroek’s (1992) examine cases of illegal prosecuted
insider trading, particularly in two infamous 1980’s takeover deals. Cornell and Sirri
(1992) were the first to obtain the daily volumes of prosecuted insider traders. They
examine the impact of insider’s trading volume on the daily return of Campbell-Taggart
stock and find a positive correlation between the amount of insider trading and positive
price increases. Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) analyse the trades of infamous
insider Ivan Boesky in the Nestle takeover bid for Carnation. The detailed trade-by-
trade nature of the data used in the prosecution enables the authors to conduct the first
hourly, intraday analysis of an insiders trades. The authors find a positive correlation
between the hourly portion of insiders’ trades and significant contemporaneous increases
in the stock price of the target firm, supporting the insider trading hypothesis of Keown
and Pinkerton (1981).
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2.2.2 Market Anticipation from Public Information
Jensen and Ruback (1983) propose an alternative explanation for the abnormal price
movements observed prior to takeover events, suggesting that the pre-bid run-up is a
function of market anticipation derived from public information. The authors reason
that public rumours of impending takeovers are traded upon by speculators, which is
ultimately being reflected in share price movements prior to the official announcement.
Anticipation can be more than just deal specific, however, with takeovers shown to be
clustered through time, further facilitating takeover target prediction.3
Although Jensen and Ruback (1983) do not specifically address the mechanisms by
which market anticipation of takeovers is translated into prices, Jarrell and Poulsen
(1989), formally examine the contribution of different types of publicly available in-
formation to the share price run-up. In a study of 172 US takeovers provided by the
SEC, the authors show that the pre-bid price run-up in takeover targets was not signif-
icantly different between those firms that experienced prosecuted illegal insider trading
and those that did not. This evidence runs contrary to the arguments put forward by
Keown and Pinkerton (1981). Instead, the authors find that the primary predictors of
pre-bid run-up are news-media rumours and the existence of toeholds greater than 50%.
The importance of the news-media speculation as a mechanism by which private infor-
mation becomes public is similarly shown in studies such as Sanders and Zdanowicz
(1992), Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) and Aitken and Czernkowski (1992).
Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) identify 30 takeovers from 1978 to 1986 where the news
of the takeover appeared prior to the public announcement. The authors find evidence
for both the insider trading hypothesis of Keown and Pinkerton (1981) and the market
anticipation hypothesis of Jensen and Ruback (1983), with one quarter of the pre-bid
run-up attributable to insiders and a further half of the pre-bid run-up explained by the
news announcement of the firm being “in play”.
Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) find evidence for the market anticipation hypothesis
by analysing rumours of takeovers rather than takeovers themselves. They find that
3Merger waves or “bubbles of financial activity” as referred to by Brealey and Myers (1996) are de-
picted in a broad sample of studies across different regions. This can be a source of profit for arbitrageurs
and other sophisticated investors if there are perceived trends ( Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)).
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such rumours are preceded by significant pre-announcement run-up. The authors also
find no significant causal link between these rumours and actual takeover activity, with
18 out of the 42 firms receiving takeover bids in the twelve months subsequent to the
takeover rumour. They identify this evidence as consistent with the collection and
analysis of publicly available information, as they surmise that rumours based on private
information would be shortly followed by takeovers.
Aitken and Czernkowski (1992) examine the impact of news-adjusting the announce-
ment date of the takeover. This involves identifying the first news-media speculation of
the target and bidder as a potential combination - the news-adjusted date is then taken
as the earlier of the speculation and public announcement date. By reconstructing the
abnormal returns over the period, the authors find that rumours in the news media
account for over 30% of the documented pre-bid run-up.
2.2.3 Toe-Hold Acquisitions
Previous theoretical (Bris, 2002) and empirical (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Aitken and
Czernkowski, 1992, Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008b) studies suggest that toehold
acquisitions prior to takeovers may have the capacity to generate pre-bid run-up. To
date, however, there has been little success in documenting this effect. Preliminary
efforts have found conflicting evidence. Betton and Eckbo (2000) construct and test
a theoretical model of the outcomes of sequential bidding for targets. They find that
greater pre-bid toeholds reduce the probability of competition and target resistance,
lowering both bid premiums and price run-ups. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), however,
examine the determinants of the pre-bid price run-up prior to 172 tender offers in the
1980’s and show a significant and positive relationship between toeholds and the price
run-up. They examine five “large” toeholds (in excess of 40%) that have been held
for greater than six months separately, and find these have no impact on the run-
up. The authors argue that the increased run-up is a result of sophisticated informed
traders identifying the purchasing activity and trading on this information. The lack of
consensus regarding the impact of toeholds on pre-bid run-up is driven by the absence
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of information regarding the accumulation of target shares by the bidder, a problem
acknowledged in both these previous studies.
Further empirical evidence supporting the market anticipation theory is provided by
Barclay and Holderness (1991) and Akhigbe et al. (2007), who find significant positive
abnormal returns around the purchase of toehold stakes greater than 5%. These positive
returns are found to be greater in firms for whom the ex-ante probability of a takeover
is larger.4 Bris (2002) provides theoretical evidence that the acquisition of a toehold
stake produces an information flow that can result in share price movements ahead
of takeover announcements. This is consistent with the theoretical model of Ravid
and Spiegel (1999) which shows that toehold purchases create rumours of an imminent
takeover bid, resulting in run-up in the targets share price.
One potential reason for the inconsistencies observed around the impact of toehold
acquisitions on pre-bid run-up is the lack of attention drawn to the timing of these
toehold acquisitions. Previous studies have not differentiated between toeholds held
for significant periods of time and those established shortly prior to the acquisition.
Differences in the mix of both short and long-term toeholds could result in the differences
in the findings on the impact of toeholds on run-up, as noted in a recent study by Betton
et al. (2008). This study analyses the implications on the price paid by the acquirer for
toeholds taken within 40 days of the bid, with the authors finding that targets receiving
bids in this short pre-period experience a run-up of 15%, significantly higher than the
5% for all other takeovers.
If Bris’ (2002) argument that toeholds signal an increased probability of receiving a
takeover bid to the market is to hold, then the timing of such an acquisition will be a
significant determinant of the run-up. The literature contains several explanations for
this. Stulz (1988) argues that the upward sloping supply curve for target shares will
result in an increase in the targets share price due to the purchasing pressure of the
bidder. This effect will be especially pronounced for less liquid targets. Evidence from
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and Aitken and Czernkowski (1992) indicate that rumours
4The ex-ante probability of a takeover is constructed using a probit model including information
known about the bidders stake (type of bidder, proportion of targets shares acquired in this block, total
portion owned by bidder) as well as financial information about the target (including stock-price return,
cash-flow and leverage ratios, firm-size and institutional ownership levels).
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have a significant impact on the pre-bid run-up. Betton et al. (2008) argue that one
explanation for this is that large unexplained trades trigger speculation that the firm will
soon become a takeover target. Furthermore, the information contained in substantial
shareholder notices may also signal the intentions of the bidder to the market, triggering
buying in anticipation of a takeover premium (Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985; Holderness
and Sheehan, 1985; Choi, 1991). Akhigbe et al. (2007) argue that toeholds bought
immediately prior to the bid should have a larger signalling impact on the pre-bid run-
up as compared to those toeholds which have been held for a longer period of time.
These long-term toeholds will have incorporated information about the probability of
a future takeover at the time of the toehold acquisition. As such it is expected that
the price run-up immediately prior to the announcement will be insignificantly different
from the case where the acquirer chooses not to purchase a toehold.
The current literature offers a range of competing explanations for the well-documented
abnormal price reactions to takeover announcements: insider trading, market anticipa-
tion and the existence of rumours. Chapter 3 combines the news-adjustment criteria
developed by Aitken and Czernkowski (1992) and the toehold ideas of Akhigbe et al.
(2007) and Betton et al. (2008) to examine whether pre-bid acquisition stakes help to
explain target stock price run-ups in an informationally transparent market framework.
By utilising a unique database containing changes in substantial shareholdings prior to
the takeover event, this dissertation seeks to shed empirical light on the causes of the
run-up witnessed in the lead up to a takeover.
2.3 High-Frequency Trading
There is a growing body of literature on the influence of high-frequency trading (HFT)
in the global marketplace. The literature to date has had to grapple with the difficulties
of defining and identifying high-frequency traders, as well as teasing out the potentially
endogenous nature of their conduct on the efficiency of the market. For example, high-
frequency traders prefer more liquid securities, making their impact on market quality
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difficult to disentangle. The distinction between algorithmic traders, news traders, sta-
tistical arbitrageurs and market makers is also blurred by the aggregated nature of
the data that is presently available. These difficulties have hindered efforts to provide
evidence on how the increase in the speed of trading has impacted the efficiency and
integrity of global securities markets. Contrasting conclusions from a range of theoreti-
cal and empirical works leave open the current debate as to the relative desirability or
otherwise of high-frequency trading.
Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) provide some of the earliest theoretical work on HFT. The
authors argue that the introduction of HFT reduces the average trade value and dampens
fluctuations in prices, resulting in reduced volatility as market-making algorithms update
their information in response to news announcements. Their model incorporates an
electronic limit order book in which both high- and low-frequency (human) traders
participate.
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) construct and test a theoretical model that does not as-
sume a Kyle (1985) style market maker, in which high-frequency traders are uninformed.
Rather, they model high-frequency traders as both faster and more informed than their
counterparts, and with these assumptions their findings for market efficiency are mixed.
Their theoretical model suggests that high-frequency traders may cause welfare gains, as
they are able to update their information faster than a traditional market maker. This
allows the high-frequency market makers to reduce their exposure to adverse selection,
consequently increasing efficiency through reduced spreads. Furthermore, the ability
of the average high-frequency trader to dynamically update their information set min-
imises the inventory holding costs, reducing the total cost for the provision of liquidity,
reducing spreads and avoiding stale orders. The overall result of this is increased market
efficiency.
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), on the other hand, warn that if no adverse selection
problem exists to begin with, the ability of high-frequency traders to update their infor-
mation set faster than human traders may cause new adverse selection problems. These
problems would stem from their ability to react to rapidly changing limit order infor-
mation, reducing the willingness of human participants to enter the market for fear of
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trading with a better informed high-frequency trader. The authors theorise that such
a situation could widen spreads and thereby reduce market efficiency.In their empirical
analysis, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) investigate the introduction of Chi-X, which
they use as an instrument for the escalation of HFT. Examining 77 trading days of Dutch
index stocks between 2007 and 2008, Jovanovic et al. (2010) find that high-frequency
traders are better informed about news and the state of the limit order book than the
average trader, making them better able to avoid adverse selection, reduce spreads and
overall effect a marginal increase in total welfare.
These largely positive theoretical market quality findings are supported by the majority
of empirical papers that deal with HFT, finding a predominantly positive overall impact
of the practice. The predictions made by Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) of reductions
in volatility, trade value, and trade volume are empirically supported by the work of a
number of studies, as documented in Table 2.2.
Jarnecic and Snape (2010) examine the equity market in the UK, using proprietary
data provided by the LSE. They find that high-frequency traders contribute and demand
liquidity in almost even proportions, and that their activity is more likely to dampen
rather than increase volatility.
The question as to how HFT impacts on informational asymmetry costs, as modelled
theoretically and empirically by Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), is also empirically
addressed by Hendershott et al. (2011). These authors use the volume of message
traffic, normalised by the number of trades, as a proxy for HFT. Their five year sample
period straddles the staggered introduction of the automation of quote dissemination on
the NYSE in 2003. The authors show that algorithmic trading, of which HFT is a subset,
significantly reduces both quoted and effective spreads finding that this narrowing of the
spreads is the result of a decline in adverse selection. Their results also show that the
presence of HFT has resulted in more of the permanent price discovery information being
disseminated through quotes as opposed to trades. Hendershott et al. (2011) also find
that the introduction of algorithmic trading increases the profits to liquidity providers
through increased realised spreads consistent with the results of McInish and Upson
(2012).
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Table 2.2: High-Frequency Trading Literature Summary
Using a data set provided by NASDAQ that directly identifies 26 HFT traders over
periods during 2008, 2009 and 2010, Brogaard (2010) investigates the trading patterns
of high-frequency traders during times of heightened volatility. To identify these periods
of high volatility, he divides the trading day into 15-minute intervals and finds that
when prices fluctuate more than normal, high-frequency traders supply more liquidity
and thus demand less liquidity. Brogaard (2010) concludes that high-frequency traders
are unlikely to exacerbate volatility, consistent with the findings of Jarnecic and Snape
(2010). Brogaard (2010) also analyses the liquidity provision of high-frequency traders
by looking at the depth and time spent by each trader type at the national best bid and
offer (NBBO). His findings indicate that while high-frequency traders spend more time
at the NBBO, they provide less depth than their non-high-frequency trader counterparts.
Additionally, high-frequency traders are found to be better able to avoid trading with
insiders than non high-frequency traders, consistent with the theoretical findings of
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011).
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One of the most comprehensive data sets analysed to date is that compiled by Groth
(2011). The data set covers trading in German stocks on Xetra. Due to a rebate scheme
applied to algorithmic traders, a flag is applied to every trade identifying whether it arises
from a human or an algorithmic source. Groth (2011) takes data from four trading days
during 2007 and analyses the conduct of high-frequency traders during times of high and
low volatility, splitting the days into 5 minute intervals and then identifying the level
of volatility in each. His findings indicate that high-frequency traders are not sensitive
to changes in volatility and do not alter their trading patterns in response to shifts in
such criteria. Groth (2011) also finds that there is no evidence of market withdrawal
by high-frequency traders during periods of increased volatility.
One of the more unique proxies for HFT used in the literature is described by Has-
brouck and Saar (2013), where the authors use trade and quote data in a millisecond
environment to identify strategic runs of trades, observing interactions between traders
separated by as little as three milliseconds. These strategic runs are used to create a
proxy for the level of HFT. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) analyse the trading activity on
the NASDAQ for one month chosen from 2007 and one from 2008, which unlike studies
such as Groth (2011) and Jarnecic and Snape (2010), allows them to analyse HFT
during a period of high market stress. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) divide the day into
10 minute intervals and uniquely apply a two-stage simultaneous equation for each mar-
ket quality metric, allowing for a potentially endogenous relationship between HFT and
their market quality indicators of volatility, depth, and spreads. Their findings show
that higher levels of HFT increase the quoted depth, narrow quoted bid-ask spreads,
and reduce volatility, even during periods of market stress.
While the proxies for HFT differ, all but one of these empirical studies document a
positive impact on market efficiency. Overall, the evidence provided suggests that in-
creased levels of HFT specifically result in narrower bid-ask spreads, increased depth
and reduced volatility.
The empirical evidence on the prevalence of HFT in the market is relatively sparse and
relies primarily on noisy proxies. Perhaps, as a result, the estimates that have been
provided in the literature for the proportion of HFT in the market vary widely. Using a
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2009 sample for LSE, Jarnecic and Snape (2010) find that 40%-64% of trades included
a high-frequency trader on at least one side. In their 2010 response to the Committee
of European Securities Regulators (CESR) call for evidence, the LSE gave their internal
estimates of HFT as between 32%-33% of total UK equities trading for 2010. In a similar
submission, NYSE Euronext calculated that in the overall European market there was
a 5% market share for high-frequency traders in the first quarter of 2007, increasing to
23% of total traded value in the first quarter of 2010.
Empirical studies of the US market support these findings. Brogaard’s (2010) analysis,
which focuses on U.S equities, finds that 60%-80% of all NASDAQ trades involve a high-
frequency trader on at least one side. Ito and Lyden (2012) construct an undisclosed
measure of HFT for the largest 15 stocks traded on NASDAQ, NYSE and BATS in
the US and show that high-frequency traders participate on one side of trades between
87%-92% of the time.
Several studies, including Brogaard (2010), Jarnecic and Snape (2010) and Ito and
Lyden (2012) find that high-frequency traders are more active in larger stocks than
smaller stocks, and are comparatively more active towards the end of the day. These
results are found to be indicative of the market making nature of the high-frequency
traders, seeking to close the day with zero inventory positions.
Kirilenko et al. (2011) provide one of the few papers that is critical of the role of
HFT in the market. The authors analyse a set of metrics including holding periods,
inventories and trade directions around the May 6th, 2010 “Flash Crash”. The authors
find that high-frequency traders, after providing some initial liquidity to fundamental
sellers, contributed to the significant selling pressure that precipitated the flash crash.
While Kirilenko et al. (2011) do not go so far as to blame this incident on high-frequency
traders, they determine that their presence in the market exacerbated the volatility
present during this period of extreme market stress. The authors use audit trail data
for the E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts on the day of the flash crash to identify
high-frequency traders. Their designation relies on trade frequency and size, which the
authors use to determine that 16 accounts out of a total of 15,422 belonged to high-
frequency traders on that day.
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Brogaard (2010) takes a different approach to the identification of HFT participants,
examining the actual trades of high-frequency traders during the four days in Septem-
ber 2008 on which the news regarding the collapse of Lehman brothers became public.
Brogaard (2010) finds that high-frequency traders did not significantly increase their
demand for liquidity during this period, but significantly increased their liquidity sup-
ply. This analysis, and an examination of HFT following earnings announcements with
similar findings, leads Brogaard (2010) to conclude that high-frequency traders do not
remove liquidity from the market, even in times of severe market stress.
Malinova et al. (2013) analyse the impact of the introduction of the IIROC messaging
tax in the Canadian market. This cost recovery program allocated IIROC’s infrastruc-
ture costs amongst brokers proportional to their fraction of messaging traffic. As HFT
participants typically have high order-to-trade ratios (See Hendershott et al., 2011), Ma-
linova et al. (2013) argue that this messaging tax will increase the cost of HFT strategies.
As a result, the tax is expected to result in a significant reduction in the number of or-
ders being entered to the Canadian market. The authors address this question using a
proprietary TSX order-level data set to identify high-frequency traders, marking them
as those traders whose order-to-trade ratio and absolute number of submitted messages
are both in the top 5% of traders. They find that as HFT activity reduces, spreads
widen and depth narrows. This reduction in liquidity is found to increase the execution
costs of retail participants, showing that HFT may provide a valuable service to “slow”
traders.
The current literature on high-frequency trading is analytical in nature and focuses on
the implications for market efficiency. The findings suggest that HFT participants make
better market makers, by providing liquidity quickly and in smaller buckets. In doing
so, they are less prone to adverse selection than existing liquidity providers, and are, in
aggregate, therefore able to quote narrower spreads. Contrary to popular belief, it does
not appear that these HFT participants “flee” the market during periods of heightened
volatility. This dissertation tests the assertions of the literature over a much longer time
frame, across multiple markets. Additionally, instead of focusing only on efficiency, the
interaction between efficiency and integrity is examined, allowing for the possibility that
there is an endogenous relationship between the two elements of market quality.
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2.4 Market Manipulation
Closing price manipulation is a concern for both regulators and market participants, as
it affects pricing accuracy and liquidity. Empirical evidence from Comerton-Forde and
Putnins (2011) and Hillion (2004) has demonstrated that closing price manipulation
is associated with increases in bid-ask spreads, reductions in depth, and mispricings.
These mispricings occur both at the close of the day of manipulation and on the open
the following day. Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2011) argue that these impact nega-
tively on markets increasing the costs of trading for market participants and potentially
increasing the cost of capital for firms. This may lead to capital flight away from markets
that are perceived to have high levels of closing price manipulation.
The widespread use of closing prices to value portfolios and close out financial contracts
such as options and futures contracts makes closing prices a particularly attractive target
for manipulators. For example, a mutual fund’s net asset values and performance are
typically measured based on closing prices. Since the performance of a fund determines
both its rankings compared to other funds and manager remuneration, it is unsurprising
that studies such as Carhart et al. (2002) and Bernhardt and Davies (2009) find that
returns are significantly positively skewed on the last days of reporting periods (such
as month- and quarter-end). This type of stock price clustering is also documented by
Ni, Xiaoyan Ni et al. (2005) around options expiry dates. The authors argue such
clustering is evidence of the manipulation of closing prices for profit. Kumar and Seppi
(1992) describe in detail the process by which profit can be made through closing price
manipulation.
Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2011) provide the first examination of prosecuted cases
of closing price manipulations. Analysing 184 instances of closing price manipulation
that occurred on the NYSE, AMEX TSX and TSX-V between 1997 and 2009, the
authors develop an index for identifying the closing price manipulation. The authors
document that closing price manipulation results in increased returns in the last minutes
of trading, followed by price reversals at the open on the following trading day. Closing
price manipulation is also associated with more frequent trades in the final minutes of
trading, tighter spreads and larger trades.
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Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2013) use this index to estimate the level of closing price
manipulation in the presence of undetected, unobservable manipulation. They document
that approximately one percent of closing prices are manipulated, with manipulation
more likely in stocks with high levels of information asymmetry and mid-to-low levels
of liquidity. Consistent with the findings of Carhart et al (2001) and Bernhardt and
Davies (2009), these manipulations are more frequent amongst stocks with higher levels
of institutional ownership and on month/quarter end days. This dissertation combines
measures of insider trading and market manipulation to analyse the joint impact of
high-frequency trading on both efficiency and integrity.
2.5 Dark Pools
The emergence of dark pools, which allow trading without pre-trade transparency, has
been met with much scepticism. While dark pool operators argue that their venues
provide protection for large traders from front-running and price impact, opponents
argue that they create a two-tiered market and damage the price discovery process.5
As trade activity on dark pools has increased, both regulators and market participants
have become concerned about their impact.
The recent emergence of this type of trading combined with the necessary lack of trans-
parency has hindered the study of the market quality impacts of dark pools. This
relatively underdeveloped area of literature has resulted in a lack of consensus regarding
the desirability of dark trading. This dissertation sheds light on the impact of dark pools
using unique natural experiments and data sets.
2.5.1 Theoretical Evidence on the Introduction of Dark Pools
Several theoretical papers have assessed the impact of the introduction of a dark trading
venue alongside a traditional “lit” marketplace. These theoretical works primarily focus
on how informed traders will use these new non-transparent venues for trade execution,
5For a more detailed discussion of the pros and cons of dark pools see the comments received in
response to the Dark Pool regulations proposed by IIROC at
www.iiroc.ca/SitePages/Comments-Received.aspx?linkid=794
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as it is the informed trader that generates price discovery, while also focussing on the
impact that the introduction of the dark venue will have on market makers, spreads, the
selection of order-types, and the price discovery process. The varying assumptions of
these models have led to a range of contradictory findings indicating that the addition
of dark pools is both beneficial or detrimental to market quality.
Degryse et al. (2009) develop a theoretical model that seeks to explain the impact of
a crossing network (a particular type of dark pool) on order flow. In their model, a
crossing network competes with a traditional dealer market for order flow in a simplified
two period consumption trading situation. This crossing network has only time priority
and takes its price as the midpoint of the current bid and ask in the underlying dealer
market (assumed to be competitively priced at one tick). They analyse both order
submission strategies and overall trader (and dealer) welfare in situations where the
traders are able to observe quotes on either; both venues, only the dealer market, or
on neither venue. They find that regardless of opacity, the introduction of a crossing
network alongside a dealer market generates additional orders, as price sensitive traders
who would refrain from trading in a dealer market are attracted to the lower spreads on
the new venue.
Whilst the addition of a crossing network increases total liquidity, there are two opposing
effects impacting on crossing network traders. The addition of liquidity on one side
of the orderbook increases the probability of execution on the contra side. Such an
addition of crossing network liquidity encourages new traders to the market. At the
same time, however, as the crossing network uses only time priority, it is possible that
“low-willingness” traders (those who are less eager to transact) submitting earlier in the
day can crowd out “high-willingness” traders (those who must receive an execution on
that day), such that the increased liquidity in the crossing network actually reduces the
overall execution probability.
Analysing total trader and dealer welfare, Degryse et al. (2009) find that the addition of
a transparent crossing network improves welfare as additional trade is generated. This
welfare benefit is reduced, however, as markets become more opaque and uncertainty
regarding execution increases. Degryse et al. (2009) also offer two empirically testable
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hypotheses. The first is that the probability of observing a crossing network order at
the same side of the market will be smallest after such an order has just been executed.
They also predict directional informational flows between the markets, with a buy order
on the crossing network lowering the probability of a dealer selling and increasing the
probability that the dealer will also buy. As the order flow of the crossing network
becomes less transparent, however, these information flows are reversed, with the dealers’
trades influencing the order imbalance in the dark. These informational flows between
the dark pool and the lit market are found to be one way that dark pools may contribute
to the price discovery process, especially in situations of partial transparency, where
executed orders are visible but unexecuted orders remain opaque.
While Degryse et al. (2009) provide insight into how the opacity of a dark pool may
affect order flow and trader welfare, the authors do so in an environment that is quite
different to that of current equities markets. Ye (2011) uses an extension of the Kyle
(1985) model which more closely resembles current equity market trading conditions.
The author models a market where a crossing network sits beside the traditional ex-
change and informed traders have the choice of either sending their order to the tradi-
tional exchange, the opaque crossing network, or splitting their orders between the two.
Ye (2011) proposes a two-period model in which there are three agents: an informed
trader; liquidity traders whose trading decision is exogenous; and a designated market
maker who sets prices at the exchange. In the first period, the market maker observes
the combined order flow on the exchange which has come from both informed and liq-
uidity traders. Based on this order flow and his belief regarding the informed trader’s
strategic choice between the exchange and the crossing network, he sets his price on the
exchange. In the second period, orders which have been placed in the crossing network
are executed based on the price determined in the exchange in the first period. If an
order imbalance exists on the crossing network, orders on the more populous side are
only partially filled. The informed trader in this model is now forced to trade-off the
cost of non-execution against the risk of generating a price impact. While execution is
guaranteed on the exchange, the informed traders order flow may adversely move the
price. Alternately, trades in the the crossing network do not have any impact on price,
however the probability of execution decreases as order size increases.
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In order to balance these risks, Ye (2011) identifies that the informed trader’s optimal
strategy is to split his orders between the crossing network and the exchange. The
removal of some of these informed orders from the market is shown to reduce both price
discovery and volatility. These impacts are likely to be larger for those stocks that have
greater uncertainty surrounding their true value; as the informed agent’s information is
more valuable, he has a greater incentive to hide his information by using the crossing
network. While Ye’s (2011) model is closer to reality than that of Degryse et al. (2009),
many dark pools both anti-gaming techniques and employ exclusive access in order to
try to limit the ability of informed traders to access their venue, thereby limiting the
generalisability of this model.
The idea of increased dark pool liquidity resulting in lower execution probability is
extended by Zhu (2011). Unlike Ye (2011), who treats the choice to trade in the dark
as exogenous, Zhu (2011) allows this choice to be endogenous to the trader’s information
set and the liquidity of the security. While dark pools execute at the midpoint of the best
bid and ask, the need to find a counterparty in the dark renders execution uncertain,
depending on the availability of counterparties.
He argues that informed traders will tend to cluster on the same side of the order book,
reducing their probability of execution. Given non-execution in the dark, the informed
traders will need to execute the remainder of their order with the exchange market maker
at prices inferior to those prevailing at the time of their dark order. Due to this non-
execution risk, informed traders will exhibit a preference for lit venues, while liquidity
traders will prefer to execute their trades in the dark. Zhu (2011) argues that this
“cream-skimming” of uninformed traders by dark pools will concentrate price-relevant
information onto the lit exchange. Consequently, Zhu (2011) theorises that the addition
of a dark pool will improve overall price discovery.
Zhu (2011) also separately models dark venues as either opaque crossing networks, where
trades are executed at the midpoint of the bid and ask, or as opaque limit order books in
which price priority can be gained. While both models predict that dark pools expose the
informed trader to a greater risk of non-execution, informed traders will prefer opaque
limit order books as they can reduce the non-execution risk by submitting aggressive
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hidden orders. This theoretical prediction fits well with the structure of actual dark
pools in both Canada and the US, as most offer traders the ability to vary the level
of price improvement offered, with priority given to orders offering prices closer to the
midpoint.
Kratz and Schoeneborn (2011) examine the implications of non-execution on the optimal
intra-day submission of orders. Their theoretical model finds that in the presence of
a dark pool the optimal trader will initially delay lit market executions in favour of
seeking less revealing dark executions. If no dark executions are found, either due to a
lack of traders or due to a prevalence of traders also seeking executions on that same
side, these traders are forced to increase the speed of their lit market executions in
order to ensure the liquidation of their positions. The authors document the existence
of adverse selection in dark pools - the possibility that latent liquidity in the dark
indicates impending favourable price movements in the lit market. The addition of
adverse selection risk to the model increases dark execution costs and discourages the
usage of the dark pool.
Kratz and Schoeneborn (2011) also model conditions under which manipulation in the
dark will be unprofitable. The authors suggest that buy orders submitted in the lit mar-
ket can be profitably sold in the dark market without incurring a price impact “penalty”.
Kratz and Schoeneborn (2011) argue that the profitability of such manipulative strate-
gies can be eliminated by imposing constraints on the amount of liquidity available in
the dark as well as by introducing adverse selection into the dark market.
Buti et al. (2011a) model the interaction between a lit order book and a dark pool.
Similar to Zhu (2011), the dark pool is modelled as a crossing network that allows
traders to enter opaque orders that will be crossed at the midpoint of the best bid and
ask. Unlike Ye (2011) and Zhu (2011) who analyse the effects on informed order
flow, Buti et al. (2011a) provide evidence on the drivers of dark pool activity, as well
as documenting the effects on the lit market of the introduction of the dark market.
The authors show that dark pool activity will increase when the lit limit order book is
deep, the tick size is large and the stock is trading at the minimum tick. Given these
situations, a trader can either place their order at the end of the limit order book queue
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or cross the spread to gain priority. The dark order at the midpoint offers preferential
execution at half the cost of a market order. Dark pool activity is theorised to decrease
as spreads widen, representing the uncertainty around the value of the security.
Buti et al. (2011a) also provide mixed predictions on the impact of dark pools on market
quality. While the introduction of a dark pool will cause some lit order flow to migrate
to the dark, the introduction of a dark pool will also encourage more price-sensitive
traders to enter the market, and thus increase total liquidity, a finding similar to that
of Degryse et al. (2009).
Boulatov and George (2013) develop a further theoretical model on the order flow im-
plications of the introduction of dark markets. They model the choice to trade with
the existence of either a combination of lit and dark markets, or a lit market only -
these situations are the closest to the market structures observed in most equity trad-
ing venues. The authors find that hidden liquidity has a favourable impact on market
quality, as it increases the competition between liquidity suppliers, and forces informed
agents to actively provide liquidity, though this competition does involve a trade-off be-
tween certainty of execution and the leakage of information. As liquidity providers are
able to extract “rents” from their information (of the true value of a security) by buy-
ing when underpriced and selling when overpriced, the addition of a dark venue allows
them to extract this rent without exposing their value information to the market as a
whole. They are therefore encouraged to act as liquidity providers, narrowing spreads
and improving the efficiency of the market. Boulatov and George (2013) argue that
these agents will trade less aggressively when only lit liquidity is available. As execut-
ing market orders will tend to reveal their information, liquidity providers will seek to
extract rents from their information by instead using limit orders. The authors argue
that this reduction in competition between liquidity suppliers to extract informational
rents will result in wider bid-ask spreads and decreased informational efficiency. The
implications of Boulatov and George’s (2013) work are empirically testable, as they are
directly observable on the lit market.
The theoretical evidence reviewed above has developed a variety of competing views.
Bloomfield et al. (2011) use an experimental market framework to provide additional
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evidence for these theoretical models. They show that both informed and uninformed
traders substitute their lit market orders for dark-market orders when dark markets are
available. In the presence of dark markets, informed traders tend to convert a larger
portion of their lit market trades relative to uninformed participants, consistent with
the theoretical findings of Ye (2011) that when informed traders are able to trade in the
dark, they become less aggressive in their trading. Bloomfield et al. (2011) attribute
this to the lack of information leakage through visible order books. This minimises the
extent to which informed traders compete amongst themselves for order flow.
This line of argument contrasts to the position adopted in Boulatov and George (2013).
Using their experimental framework the authors show that the profits of informed traders
are significantly higher when they have the ability to use dark order types, providing
supporting evidence as to why informed traders may prefer dark markets. The authors
also find that the introduction of hidden order types increases total depth in the market
whilst simultaneously reducing the amount of visible depth. The “true” spread (that is,
the spread taking into account both hidden and visible limit orders) does not significantly
differ between the visible and opaque markets. However, the “visible” spread (equivalent
to the lit market spread) is almost twice as high in the presence of hidden orders. These
results may be less applicable to market structures that do not allow dark limit orders,
such as those based on midpoint pricing. The authors find that the introduction of dark
orders does not create any differences in the volume traded, nor in the informational
efficiency of the marketplace.
2.5.2 Empirical Evidence on the Introduction of Dark Pools
The development of empirical literature dealing with the introduction of dark pools is
hindered by three particular issues. The first is the necessary opacity of these markets.
The removal of pre-trade transparency is necessary to maintain the integrity of the dark
pool, however it significantly increases the difficulty of measuring microstructure changes
such as non-transparent depths or buy/sell imbalances. This has led the literature to
rely primarily on (often incomplete) proprietary data sets. The second impediment to
assessing the impact of the introduction of dark pools is that not all traders begin to use
these dark order types as soon as they are introduced. Without a critical mass of users,
the introduction of dark pools may in itself be a non-event, and in such a case, it will
not be until months or even years subsequent to the introduction that trading in these
instruments is sufficiently large as to cause an effect. This renders typical event-study
methodologies ineffective. The final challenge for the study of dark pools is the likely
endogenous relationship between market conditions and dark pool usage. Low spreads
may encourage dark trading, however if dark trading causes low spreads the causality of
these two events is difficult to disentangle. Table 2.3 provides a summary of the previous
empirical works on the market quality impact of the introduction of dark pools.
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The established literature documenting the impacts of partial pre-trade opacity (other-
wise known as iceberg orders) can supplement the literature on dark pool orders. Anand
and Weaver (2004) examine the impact of the removal and subsequent re-instatement
of iceberg orders on the TSX in 1996 and 2002, respectively. The authors find that
although lit market depth is reduced by the decision to allow iceberg orders, this re-
duction in depth does not affect total traded volume. Anand and Weaver (2004) (as
well as Burns (2009)) argue that this finding implies market orders are substituted for
the non-visible portion of iceberg orders, while also showing that informed traders use
hidden limit orders to minimise their price impact, especially when the probability of
non-execution is small. This addition of hidden limit orders can increase the combined
lit and dark order books, consistent with the experimental findings of Bloomfield et al.
(2011).
One of the first examinations of the performance of executions in dark pools is under-
taken by Naes and Odegaard (2006). Using a data set constructed from the executions
around the establishment of the Norwegian oil fund, the authors find that institutional
orders sent first to dark pools and then to the lit market obtain lower realised execution
costs for the dark component, but not necessarily for the entire order. Consistent with
the theoretical arguments about same-side clustering by informed traders, the authors
find that these lower explicit dark pool trading costs are offset fully by the increased
implicit costs of non-execution caused by adverse selection in the dark pool.
Some of the earliest works to examine dark trading utilise the US trade reporting facility
(TRF) as a proxy for dark pool activity. The TRF is a problematic proxy for dark pool
activity because it includes trades occurring in a range of venues, including dark pools,
crossing networks, retail market makers and broker internalisers. This inability of the
TRF to capture dark pool activity prohibits these studies from directly identifying dark
pool activity, though they may still provide useful insights into dark trading generally.
O’Hara and Ye (2011) use TRF volumes to proxy for the degree of dark fragmentation
at the stock-day level, concluding that dark fragmentation does not harm market quality.
Using a sample of 2,754 NYSE and NASDAQ listed securities over a six month period
in 2008, the authors are able to show that dark trading reduces average effective spreads
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and improves the speed with which orders are executed. While short-term volatility is
found to increase with dark fragmentation, prices are generally found to be more efficient.
This improvement in market quality is most pronounced for smaller stocks, suggesting
that dark fragmentation increases competition for stocks that have traditionally been
less liquid.
Weaver’s (2011) method of analysis is very similar to that of O’Hara and Ye (2011)
except that the data set used is from 2010 rather than 2008. Weaver (2011) argues that
this change is important as the TRF data used by O’Hara and Ye (2011) contained
trades reported from two crossing networks which became exchanges shortly after their
sample period, and so are not present in Weaver’s (2011) sample.
Contrary to the findings of O’Hara and Ye (2011), Weaver (2011) finds that dark
fragmentation harms market quality. Five measures of market quality are used: quoted
spreads, effective spreads, realised spreads, Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity metric, and the
volatility of midpoint returns. Weaver (2011) finds that absolute quoted spreads increase
by approximately one half of a percent for every ten percent of volume that is transacted
off-exchange. Similarly, relative quoted spreads, realised spreads and effective spreads
on the lit market are all found to increase as TRF trading increases. Furthermore,
this work also finds that dark fragmentation is associated with increased illiquidity and
volatility. These results contradict those found by O’Hara and Ye (2011), though the
differences may be due to the inclusion of the crossing networks in the earlier TRF
data. While Weaver (2011) is unable to directly attribute his findings to dark pools,
the study’s conclusions are consistent with the theoretical findings of Zhu (2011), that
informed traders will continue to use the primary lit market in the presence of opaque
alternatives.
Neither O’Hara and Ye (2011) nor Weaver (2011) attempt to differentiate between the
market quality impacts of lit market fragmentation as compared to dark fragmentation.
Degryse et al. (2011) and Gresse (2013) fill this gap in the literature by using the
Herfindahl index to account for the level of fragmentation in European lit markets. The
introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) on the 1st of
November 2007 resulted in the establishment of a number of multilateral trading facilities
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(MTFs), both lit and dark in nature, causing significant fragmentation across European
equity markets.
Degryse et al. (2011) examine the market quality impacts of the fragmentation of liq-
uidity to dark and lit venues. To achieve this, the authors analyse trading in 52 large
Dutch stocks between 2006 and 2009, using the Herfindahl index as a proxy for fragmen-
tation in the lit markets. These stocks are able to be traded in three types of venues:
regulated market, MTFs with visible liquidity, and MTFs with hidden liquidity. Regu-
lated markets are those market centres that existed prior to the introduction of MiFID.
MTFs with visible liquidity are analogous to the alternative trading systems that exist in
Canada, the US and Australia and include Chi-X, Turquoise, Bats Europe and Nasdaq
OMX. MTFs with dark liquidity include regular dark pools, broker-dealer systematic
internalisers and over-the-counter transactions. The authors find that lit market frag-
mentation reduces quoted, realised, and effective spreads, consistent with the reduced
explicit costs and increased competition between liquidity suppliers across venues. This
relationship between liquidity and lit market fragmentation is found to be quadratic in
nature, with liquidity improving as lit market fragmentation increases up to 35%, and
decreasing as fragmentation exceeds 35%.
Dark trading, however, is found to significantly reduce quoted depth and increase the
price impact of trades. The authors propose that this effect may be due to uninformed
traders preferring the dark venue, leaving relatively more informed traders in the lit
market. This relative increase in informed traders usage of the lit market results in
reduced liquidity and increased adverse selection in the lit venues, consistent with the
theoretical findings of Zhu (2011).
Gresse (2013) analyses the FTSE 100, CAC 40 and SBF 120 in a similar way to Degryse
et al. (2011), using a pre-MiFID period from October 2007 and a post-MiFID period
from 2009. Consistent with Degryse et al. (2011), the author finds that lit market
fragmentation reduces realised, quoted and effective spreads, with dark fragmentation
not having any significant impact on market quality.
While both Degryse et al. (2011) and Gresse (2013) are able to account for the dif-
ference between dark and lit fragmentation, their measure combines dark pool trading
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with other types of internalisation, similar to the TRF in the US. This complicates the
interpretation of the findings of these studies, reducing their applicability to specific
dark pool activity.
2.5.2.1 Empirical Studies of Dark Pools Using Proprietary Data
Several studies obtain proprietary data sets to examine the impact of dark pool activity
on market quality directly. These include: Ready (2010), who uses trading volume
from three dark crossing networks; Nimalendran and Ray (2014) who use trade level
data from an unspecified dark pool; Buti et al. (2011b) who use daily volumes that are
self reported by a small selection of US dark pools; and Comerton-Forde and Putnins
(2012) who use transaction data from the dark pool operated by the Australian Stock
Exchange (ASX).
Ready (2010) studies the determinants of dark pool volume using monthly data at
the stock level from three dark pools: Liquidnet, POSIT, and Pipeline, between June
2005 and September 2007. Dark pool volumes are higher in stocks that are liquid, have
low bid-ask spreads, and have high daily turnover. Stocks that exhibit higher levels
of information asymmetry (determined by high institutional holdings as reported in
13F filings) are found to have less dark pool activity, consistent with the findings of
Zhu (2011) that informed traders will self-select the lit market due to low execution
probability in the dark.
Nimalendran and Ray (2014) examine the information flows between dark and lit venues
using a proprietary trade-by-trade data set from an unspecified US crossing network.
The authors show that bid-ask spreads are higher immediately after dark executions,
with more pronounced effects for less liquid stocks. This impact on liquidity is also found
using Amihud’s (2002) price impact measure, with price impact increasing in the ten
minutes following dark trades. Nimalendran and Ray (2014) interpret this as evidence
of information-based trading occurring in the dark venues, and to test this hypothesis,
the returns to dark trades are constructed. They find economically and statistically
significant half-hour returns to signed dark trades of 8.6 basis points, indicating that
dark participants have some short-term informational advantage. Nimalendran and
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Ray (2014) further divide these returns into three types of trade counterparties: trades
with the firm’s proprietary desk; manually negotiated trades between two large traders;
and trades between crossing network members and an external (electronic) liquidity
provider. Informed trading is concentrated in those trades initiated by electronic liquid-
ity providers against crossing network members.
To further examine the information flows between the dark and lit markets, Nimalen-
dran and Ray (2014) test the order flow imbalances on the lit exchange around dark
transactions. They find that there is a preponderance of signed lit market order flow in
the same direction as the signed dark orders immediately around the dark transactions.
This provides evidence for their hypothesis that there is concurrent informed trading
occurring on both dark and lit venues, revealing a channel by which information may
be disseminated across both venues.
To test the type of information dark traders possess, Nimalendran and Ray (2014)
examine dark executions around earnings announcements. They find that there is no
significant difference between dark executions that occur on earnings and non-earnings
announcement days. Nimalendran and Ray (2014) argue that this indicates that the
information possessed by those traders operating in the dark is likely based on short-
term, technical information, rather than only long-term fundamental information.
Buti et al. (2011b) use data self reported by dark pools to the Securities Industry in
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) in 2009 to provide empirical evidence on the
determinants of dark pool participation. The authors consider this data superior to that
of Ready (2010) as it is recorded daily rather than monthly. Due to the voluntary nature
of the data, however, the authors only have information from approximately one third
of dark pools active in the US market during their sample period. Their cross-sectional
results show that dark pool activity is greater for stocks with low spreads, low volatility,
and high liquidity, consistent with the findings of Ready (2010). Additionally, the
authors find that days with low order imbalances and days with small absolute returns
each tend to exhibit greater dark pool participation.
Using a time-series analysis, Buti et al. (2011b) show that dark pool activity is greater
on days with higher turnover, narrower quoted spreads, greater bid-depth and lower
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volatility. The authors argue these results have desirable explanations. Higher turnover
results in higher execution probabilities in the dark. Narrower spreads make dark pools
attractive to traders as they are able to compete in sub-penny increments in the dark
and are indicative of lower adverse selection costs. Greater bid-depth makes it harder to
receive executions on the lit market, making dark venues more attractive. Low volatility
indicates there is no buyer or seller imbalance in the market, making dark-executions
more likely.
To account for the potentially endogenous nature of dark pool trading and market
quality outcomes, Buti et al. (2011b) use a two-stage least squares estimation to infer
the direction of causality between dark trading and market quality outcomes. Similar to
Hasbrouck and Saar’s (2010) HFT instrument, they use the percentage of dark trading
on all stocks except for the stock in question as an instrument for the level of dark
trading on the stock of interest. The authors find that the impact of dark pool activity
on market quality is mixed. While spreads, bid-depth and volatility are all improved,
dark activity appears to reduce total market volume and reduce pricing efficiency.
Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2012) use dark orders executed on the ASX between
2008 and 2011 to investigate the informativeness of dark trades using the information
leadership share technique introduced by Yan and Zivot (2010). The authors show
that the order flow that initially migrates to dark venues tends to be less informed
than that which is left behind in the lit exchange. This, in turn, leads to an increase
in adverse selection, bid-ask spreads and price impact in the lit market, and generally
negatively impacting pricing efficiency. The authors identify that the loss of pre-trade
transparency to the dark pool renders quotes less informative, resulting in a negative
relationship between dark volume and price discovery.
This finding that dark pools hinder the price discovery process provides initial support for
the concerns of regulators that dark pools do harm the overall efficiency of marketplaces.
In light of their finding that block-trades do not harm price efficiency, the authors suggest
that one potential solution to this problem is the introduction of minimum trade sizes
for trade orders.
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Kwan et al. (2013) provide evidence that informed traders may not determine the usage
of dark orders. Rather it may be the discretion of dark pools (at least in the US)
to price in sub-penny increments that makes them attractive to traders. To examine
the role of dark pools in facilitating sub-penny pricing regimes in the US market, the
authors use NASDAQ data from the TRF. They find that dark trading in stocks that
are constrained to the minimum tick size in the lit market is significantly higher as
compared to stocks that are unconstrained. Kwan et al. (2013) test the robustness of
this finding by analysing the change in dark trading for stocks that cross the tick-size
threshold of $1. The authors show that stocks that increase in price from below $1
to above $1 (which increases the tick size from $0.0001 to $0.01) experience significant
increases in dark volume at the time of crossing, and vice versa for stocks reducing to
prices below $1.
This empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Buti et al.
(2011b) that constrained spreads will drive order flow to sub-penny venues that offer
reduced transaction costs. Their work indicates that it may be the demand for finer
trading increments that is driving liquidity to the dark, and thus that the harmonisation
of pricing grids between dark and lit markets (as proposed by the Ontario Securities
Commission (OSC) and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada
(IIROC)) would be likely to reduce the incentive to trade shares in dark markets.
Given the opaque nature of dark pools, and the possibility that traders in the dark are
informed, it is not surprising that the “leakage” of dark-traders demand for liquidity
is valuable information. Boni et al. (2012) find that the heterogeneity present in the
variety of dark pools offerings have an impact on the execution quality of orders sent
to these venues. They argue that “more exclusive” dark pools (that is, those that
attempt to cater to buy-side traders by excluding high-frequency traders), provide better
execution quality than those that provide access to all traders. Using Liquidnet Classic
as one example of an exclusive dark pool, the authors compare the trade executions
in this venue to those of other less “exclusive” dark pools, as well as to lit market
executions for large orders (those greater than 50,000 shares). The authors’ evidence
suggests that more exclusive dark pools exhibit less serial return correlation, less pre-
trade volume increases, fewer volatility increases, and more trade clustering across days.
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These findings are consistent with less exploitation of the information contained within
the order-flow data, resulting from less information leakage in the more exclusive venue.
The current literature suggests that an optimal dark pool is one with a pricing grid
harmonised to the lit market and with restrictions around the type of participants that
have access to the dark market and minimum trade sizes for dark executions. It is un-
surprising, therefore, that regulations in countries such as Canada and Australia around
dark pools have introduced limits to the pricing grid that can be used and the minimum
quantities of shares that are allowable for dark transactions. This dissertation examines
the introduction of one of these rules - the minimum price improvement legislation in
Canada - with the aim of providing evidence as to the impact of this rule on efficiency
and liquidity of dark trading. Additionally, the introduction of dark orders to the lit
market of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) is examined to identify the desirability of
dark pools for market quality.
Chapter 3
Does Insider Trading Explain
Price Run-Up Ahead of Takeover
Announcements?
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the extent to which toehold6 acquisition prior to a takeover event
can account for the observed pre-bid run-up. The ability to explain pre-bid price run-up
has two main contributions. The first of these is the quantification of the impact of both
toehold acquisition and timing on the pre-bid run-up. The second is the examination
of the combined ability of rumours, information announcements and toehold timing to
explain the pre-bid run-up.
A considerable body of empirical evidence has accumulated over the last few decades
showing a persistent and substantial target stock price run-up prior to the announce-
ment of a takeover bid (Dodd, 1980; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Betton and Eckbo,
2000 and Bris, 2005). This effect is robust across different time periods and financial
market structures, but whilst there is considerable consensus regarding the nature and
magnitude of the run-up, its cause is less clear. Whilst anecdotal Australian evidence
6 Toeholds are pre-bid acquisition stakes.
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suggests that unchecked illegal insider trading7 is the cause, several other explanations
have been suggested in the academic literature.8 These suggested explanations include
the actions of illegal insider traders (Meulbroek, 1992); market speculation of industry
dynamics, that is perpetuated by market anticipators (Jensen and Ruback, 1983); or the
incorporation of takeover rumours based on market information such as those related to
toehold acquisitions (Jarrell and Poulson, 1989).
The causes of the run-ups observed in the lead up to takeover events are empirically
examined using a uniquely constructed database containing the changes in substantial
shareholdings prior to each takeover. The findings show that the timing of toehold
positions is a non-trivial cause of the price-run up, and that in combination with market
rumours and information announcements the vast majority of the pre-bid run-up is able
to be explained. This pre-bid run-up has been used in several studies as evidence of
illegal insider trading. If toehold timing has the capacity to drive significant pre-bid
run-up, these previous findings may need revisiting.
In addition to bidder toehold information, the operation of continuous disclosure rules in
the Australian market means that information events not associated with the takeover
announcement can be identified and removed from the examination of takeover wealth ef-
fects.9 Not only does the continuous disclosure framework require the immediate release
of potentially price sensitive announcements to the market, each of these announcements
are subsequently flagged as either price or non-price sensitive. The ability to control for
price sensitive announcements provides further clarity on the causes of pre-bid price
reactions by allowing potentially confounding events to be removed from the data set.
Disclosure requirements, such as those in Australia exist in many developed markets
globally, including the UK, New Zealand and Canada. This potentially allows for the
extension of this research method to other developed markets, though it should be noted
that the Australian disclosure regime differs significantly from the Fair Disclosure regu-
lations of the US, which mandates only periodic reporting, with additional intervening
news releases submitted voluntarily.
7 Illegal insider trading, is defined by section 1002G(2) of the Corporations Act as the “profitable
trading in securities by a person with material non-public information”.
8“Insider Trading Rife in Australia”, The Australian, 20th February, 2008, Michael Sainsbury
9 These regulations mandate that any price-sensitive information be released to the market as soon
as companies become aware of it.
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As regulators seek to become more “evidence based”10 in their approach to policy mak-
ing, this work quantifies the impacts of rumours, news announcements and toehold
acquisitions as sources of pre-bid run-up. This has implications for regulators interested
in identifying and limiting the causes of information leakage. It also reveals poten-
tial impacts of toehold acquisition timing to market participants, particularly bidders
considering acquiring a pre-announcement stake in a target company.
3.2 Data
The data set of takeover bids is obtained from the Reuters Connect4 database, which
provides a record of all deals involving Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed
public companies from January 2000 to December 2009. Data collected from Connect 4
includes deal values, deal types and break fees, as well as other relevant acquisition and
accounting information. This raw data set contains 852 takeover bids for 668 unique
target companies.
Stock trading information and firm level data are collected via the Reuters intra-day
interface provided by the Securities Institute Research Centre of Asia Pacific (SIRCA).
This data is captured in real time from the ASX Integrated Trading System (ITS).
Toehold information is collected manually from bidder statements, s.603 “Becoming
a Substantial Shareholder” notifications, or form 671B “Change in substantial share-
holding” notices, which are analogous to the US 13D filings. As soon as an investor
has beneficial ownership of greater than 5% of a publicly listed company, they are re-
quired to complete one of these notices within two business days of the acquisition.11
A database comprising over 10,000 such changes has been constructed manually for the
period 1999 - 2010. Given the dependence of this study on the timeliness of these fil-
ings, the “reporting lag” of the sample was determined, with an average of 0.53 days.
10 See, for example, the Foresight Driver Review being undertaken by the Financial Services Authority
in the UK.
11 This prompt disclosure differs significantly from the comparable US Schedule 13D filings which are
required to be submitted within 10 days, with acquirers able to continue purchasing shares during this
10 day period.
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This lag is consistent with both the reporting requirements12 and the prompt reporting
documented by da Silva Rosa et al. (2005).13
As investors are not required to report holdings smaller than 5%, toeholds below this
threshold level are not captured in the data set.14 Of the target firms subject to takeover
offers, 38% contain pre-announcement purchases by the acquirer. News releases used
to adjust announcement dates are manually collected from the Factiva database and
cross referenced with ASX announcements. In order for an announcement date to be
adjusted, both the acquirer and target must be named in the same release as a potential
business combination. In such cases, the event date is brought forward to reflect the
earlier release of the takeover rumour.
To ensure the integrity of the analysis, certain exclusions needed to be made to the
initial set of 852 takeovers identified in the database. Firstly, any deal that represents a
secondary bid for the same target firm, (either a competing or revised bid), is excluded
from the sample in order to isolate the run-up effects of the first bid, with 184 deals
excluded in this manner. A further 30 bids are removed as the bidder has pre-existing
majority control via a toehold that is greater than 50%. Bids with more than 50 missing
observations in the period (-250,0) are removed due to the paucity of such data excluding
an additional 56 bids. Finally, any bid with an announcement flagged by the ASX as
price sensitive in the 30 days prior to the adjusted announcement date is also removed
so as to narrow the possibility of confounding effects in the price run-up.15 This process
results in the removal of an additional 132 observations. The final sample adjusted for
missing data, multiple bids, existing control and sensitive announcements contains 450
takeover offers.
Table 3.1 describes the final sample of 450 target firms. Information regarding the share
price, deal value, deal premium, market to book ratio, earnings and the news adjustment
12 The Financial Services Reform Act, 2001 (Cth), effective as of the 11th of March, 2002, imposes
significant penalties for non-compliance with the continuous disclosure regime.
13In a sample of 5,213 substantial shareholding notices between 1996 and 1999 a mean lag of 2.4
calendar days was documented. This is consistent with two business days (given the potential of weekends
and public-holidays) and was also prior to the introduction of the continuous disclosure regulations.
14There were twelve such observations in the data set, with toeholds ranging between 0.43% and 4.9%.
15 An additional robustness test is performed to identify the possibility that the announcement effect
may not be due to the toehold but rather to the release of the price-sensitive news by constructing
dummy variables capturing the release of news 2, 5, 10, and 30 days prior to the takeover event. The
results are qualitatively similar to those reported.
Chapter 3. Does Insider Trading Explain Price Run-Up? 59
process are all provided. The mean (median) value of the sample of deals is $AU1.28
billion ($AU113 million) indicating that a sizeable fraction of the deals announced are
for small-to-medium tier capitalisation firms. Figures reporting the profitability of the
sample of firms show average (median) earnings of approximately $AU62.38 million
($AU4.24 million) for takeover targets. The average premium of approximately 18%
over the defined sample period is broadly consistent with the 18% found by King
(2009) in Canada and the 28% found by Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) in the US.
The pre-bid run-up caused by rumours of the bid is controlled using an adjustment pro-
cess implemented by both Aitken et al. (1992) and King (2009). This process searches
news sources for any rumour of an impending transaction that is publicly disclosed and
includes the names of both the eventual acquirer and target. When such a rumour is
identified, the event date is set to be the earlier of the official announcement date and
the date of the first rumour to reflect the dissemination of this information. The Factiva
database is then searched for publications regarding the listed takeovers in the sample
up to one calendar year prior to the official announcement date. Of 450 announcements,
the mean number of calendar days between the news-adjusted and formal announcement
dates is 68.69 days across those announcements. This is a similar adjustment period to
the 58 days reported by King (2009) for deals conducted on the Toronto Stock Exchange
and the 59.21 days reported by Aitken et al. (1992) on the ASX.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Target Firms
Table 3.2 displays information about the acquisition patterns of toeholds in Australian
deals between the years 2000 and 2009. The deals are divided into two categories: short-
term toeholds, which occur when the bidder acquires an incremental toehold stake within
30 days of the official announcement date; and long-term toeholds, which represent all
toeholds taken outside 30 days after the official announcement date. An acquirer that
has an existing long term toehold and increases their stake within 30 days of making a
bid is treated as a short-term toehold, due to the additional information provided by
the increased purchase of shares.16
Short-term toeholds are purchased on average up to 10 days prior to the bid, although
the median of 1 day is evidence of frequent buying activity on the day before the for-
mal announcement. In purchasing one day prior to the bid, acquirers are able to delay
reporting their stake until after the bid has been made public. This deprives potential
rivals of sufficient time to prepare competing bids, allowing firms to minimise the trans-
mission of their intentions to the market. Long-term toeholds are held on average for
just over a year. The mean of 404 days implies that these toeholds are often acquired
with the intention of making a bid in the near future, either as an investment, to deter
16 There are 24 such takeovers in the data set that have been categorised as “short-term”.
Chapter 3. Does Insider Trading Explain Price Run-Up? 61
Table 3.2: Toehold Characteristics
rival merger activity or as an option over anticipated future acquisition (Betton, Eckbo
and Thorburn, 2009).
Table 3.2 shows that there are more than twice as many long-term toehold acquisitions
than short-term toeholds in the sample. This finding may reflect the common use of
standstill agreements at the start of negotiations, which prevents bidders from acquiring
a stake during the period prior to the formal announcement (Bruner, 2004). The descrip-
tive data on deal size presented in Table 3.1 illustrates that acquirers avoid toeholds
in the largest companies. This is likely due to the costly nature of such a shareholding,
and the risks associated with the disposition of such a stake in the event of deal failure
(Betton, Eckbo and Thorbun, 2009).
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Table 3.3 reports the distribution of takeover bids through time. It shows that over the
ten year sample 38% of deals include an acquirer held pre-bid toehold stake. This figure
is marginally higher than comparative empirical studies, however the relative decline
observed through time is consistent with the findings of Betton et al. (2009) in the
United States.17 The literature describes several advantages to acquiring a toehold,
including; cost advantages (Bishop, 1991); avoiding the free-rider problem (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986); reducing price impact (Walkling, 1985); and the potential to deter rivals
(Bulow, Huang and Klemperer, 1999). Despite these documented benefits to toehold
acquisition, the results in Table 3.3 show that the majority of Australian acquirers do
not purchase a toehold prior to their formal bid. One potential explanation for this
is that the risks to deal negotiations stemming from the market activity involved in
purchasing the common stock may overshadow the potential benefits.
To date, only one other study has examined the timing of toehold purchases. Betton,
et al. (2008) examine the impact of short-term toeholds on final acquisition price, with
90% of their toehold sample being acquired over a period greater than six months prior
to the launching of a bid. The proportion of acquirers taking toeholds in Betton et al.
(2008) is significantly lower than reported in this study. Additionally, in this study
long-term acquisitions are found to account for over 69% of all toehold activity. The
apparent reluctance of firms to establish toeholds shortly prior to an acquisition across
both samples highlights the perceived costs of such activity.18
17 Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) report that 58% of US bidders take toeholds, Betton, et al. (2009)
report 13% in a later sample, and King (2009) finds 19% in Canada.
18 Bris (2002) argues that short-term toeholds act as a signal to the market of the impending bid,
increasing the eventual takeover premium.
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Table 3.3: Toehold Time Series Distribution
Table 3.4: Toeholds by Size and Type
Table 3.4 provides a breakdown of the size of toehold positions held by bidders. The
majority of toehold positions held by short-term acquirers are clustered around 15-20%
of outstanding share capital. This clustering reflects regulations prohibiting firms from
acquiring toeholds greater than 20% without formally announcing a takeover to the
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market.19 In the US market, where such “fair price” provisions do not exist, Betton,
et al. (2009) report a clustering of both short-term and long-term toeholds around the
10% level. The comparatively smaller size of short-term toeholds can also be partially
attributed to the upward sloping-supply curve encountered by acquirers, increasing costs
with toehold size (Walkling, 1985). Long-term toeholds are on average larger, with 46%
of long term toeholds exceeding 20% of outstanding equity. The tendency for long-term
toeholds to be greater than 20% is likely associated with the need to acquire a significant
enough position to deter rivals ( Bulow et al. (1999)).
3.3 Research Design
Standard event study methodology is used to examine whether timing of the toehold
placement has an impact on the pre-bid price run-up. In order to limit the upward
bias in the run-up driven by trading on rumours of the deal in the financial press, the
event date is adjusted to reflect the earlier of the public announcement of the takeover,
or any rumour mentioning both the takeover target and the acquirer as a potential
combination. Though the announcement of a toehold will not of itself necessitate an
adjustment, it is possible that a toehold reported to the exchange results in a rumour
of the potential takeover on the following day. In these cases, the toehold is considered
“short-term”, whereas if the toehold is taken after the first rumour, it is classified as
a “no-toehold” event. The determination of the toehold classification is only possible
ex-post, with uninformed market participants unable to determine ex-ante if a toehold
acquisition is going to be long-term or short-term in nature. This classification process
is consistent with the previous work of Aitken et al. (1992) and Sanders and Zdanowicz
(1992).
Abnormal returns are calculated for a window around the adjusted announcement date
for all the firms in the sample. To calculate the pre-bid run-up, the daily excess returns
19 Section 615 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) prohibits an individual or company from exceeding
20% share ownership without launching a full takeover bid for all remaining shares. Section 618 provides
an exception for “creeping” takeovers, whereby an acquirer may increase their shareholding above the
20% level in 3% increments every six months without launching a full takeover bid.
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from 30 days prior to the announcement to the day before the announcement are ag-
gregated. Equation 3.1 is used to compute the cumulative abnormal return per stock
(CAR):
Runupi = CARi,(−30,−1) =
−1∑
−30
ARi. (3.1)
Figure 3.1 plots the CARs for the official announcement date, the news adjusted date
and the announcement adjusted data set. The news adjusted date considers the earlier of
the rumour or announcement date as the event date. Also removed from the announce-
ment adjusted set are takeovers that have a market sensitive announcement within the
30 days prior to the bid. Consistent with Aitken et al. (1992), media-published rumours
are shown to account for over 20% of the observed pre-bid run-up. Prior to any ad-
justment, the run-up begins up to twenty-three days prior to the official release of the
takeover, reaching almost 6% on day -1.
Once rumours in the market are controlled for, CARs become uniformly lower, amount-
ing to just under 4.5% on day -1. A further source of potential bias in the run-up is
from price sensitive announcements unrelated to the takeover. The additional removal
of these from the sample accounts for a further 10% of the observed pre-bid run-up. The
pre-announcement run-up of 4%-6% is consistent with the reported pre-bid run-up in
studies such as Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) and King (2009) of 7.4% - 8.1%.
This analysis uses the news and announcement adjusted event dates to assess the impact
of toehold timing on the pre-bid run-up. The impact of toeholds and their placement
strategies are determined using the regression analysis documented in equation 3.2:
Runupi = αi + βToeholdi + γLT i + δST i + σln(valuei) + θTurnoveri+
κThirdPartyi + ωLT i ∗ Toeholdi + µST i ∗ Toeholdi + i,
(3.2)
where; Run-up is the CAR of stock i between day -30 and -1; Toehold is the proportion
of the targets shares held by the acquirer immediately prior to the takeover bid; LT is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a long-term toehold was acquired in stock i and
0 otherwise; and ST is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a short-term toehold
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Figure 3.1: News Adjusted Returns
was acquired and 0 otherwise; ln(Value) is a control variable for the target firm, being
the natural log of stock i’s market cap twenty days prior to day “0”; Turnover is the
cumulative abnormal turnover in stock i, defined as the cumulative average daily volume
for each target as a percent of turnover in the benchmark period (-250,-100); Third Party
is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a third party other than the bidder increases their
substantial shareholding in stock i in the 30 days prior to the announcement, and 0
otherwise; ST*Toehold and LT*Toehold are interaction terms of the timing and size of
the toehold. A fixed effects model is used to capture the industry and time variation in
the sample. These results are reported in Table 3.5. Whilst a large body of empirical
literature documents the post-takeover announcement effects of bid characteristics (such
as whether the offer is in cash or stock, if the bidder is a public or private company, and
whether the bid was subsequently consummated) these characteristics will only become
public knowledge after the announcement of the bid. As only the run-up prior to the
takeover announcement is of interest, only factors contemporaneous with the period
prior to the takeover bid have been considered.
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Figure 3.2: Toehold Adjusted Returns
3.4 Results
The results presented in Figure 3.2 show the target run-up after controlling for toehold
timing. These results provide preliminary evidence that a significant proportion of
the target run-up can be explained by considering the recent acquisition of toehold
shares. Figure 3.2 shows that takeovers with established long-term toeholds without
confounding information announcements have on average a 2.25% run-up in the thirty
days prior to the first rumour or announcement of a bid. This is found to be statistically
insignificant from zero at the 5% level.20 Choi (1991) argues that the acquisition of
a toehold, which results in a positive valuation effect, reflects investors’ perception of
an increased probability of a subsequent takeover. Since the control premium is largely
impounded at the time of the acquisition of the toehold, the insignificant run-up observed
in this period is consistent with minimal leakage prior to the announcement of the bid.
Figure 3.2 additionally shows a significant run-up for short-term toeholds in the 30
days prior to the first rumour or announcement of a takeover bid. This run-up of
approximately 15% is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Consistent
20 Tests for significance have been omitted for brevity.
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with the theoretical predictions of Bris (2002), these results provide preliminary evidence
that the acquisition of a toehold in the target is associated with increased abnormal
returns. It is not possible to disentangle the effects of market anticipation and the
market impact costs of the toehold acquisition - the the two are intrinsically related.
Market participants attempting to identify takeover targets may use unusual price and
volume movements to inform their purchasing behaviour (Choi, 1991). If this is the case,
large trading volume will drive market anticipation, which will in turn drive additional
trading volume. This circularity describes the mechanism by which toehold activity can
cause prices to anticipate takeovers. Table 3.5 presents the results of the regression
analysis using various model specifications. There are two interesting results. Firstly,
Model 1 shows that the size of the toehold alone cannot explain the variation in the run-
up. This is consistent with the lack of consensus in the empirical literature regarding
the impact of toehold size on the pre-bid run-up. Secondly, Models 2 - 5 demonstrate
that the acquisition of toeholds shortly prior to the announcement of a takeover are
associated with significantly increased price run-up.21 Consistent with the findings of
Betton et al. (2008), short-term toeholds are associated with larger pre-takeover run-
ups relative to long-term and no toehold positions. This increased run-up provides
support for the theoretical predictions of Bris (2002) that toehold activity can signal
a bid to the market, thus generating market anticipation. While short-term toeholds
have a significant and positive impact on the run-up, the presence of existing long term
toeholds is not significantly related to run-up. If the acquisition of toeholds causes
investors to revise their expectations of a takeover, then the run-up may have already
occurred around the placement of the toehold. Evidence consistent with this proposition
is presented in the following section.
Examining the control variables, the measure of abnormal turnover reported in Table
3.5 is positive and significant across all model specifications. This finding suggests
a positive association between increased market activity and abnormal pre-bid price
increases. The market anticipation hypothesis proposed by Jensen and Ruback (1983)
posits that traders predicting a takeover bid will buy in anticipation of receiving the
takeover premium. Such buying activity will also increase the volume of shares traded,
21 The inclusion of a thin-trading bias variable, as constructed in Fidrmuc et al. (2006) does not
significantly alter the results presented.
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Table 3.5: Regression results: The determinants of pre-bid run-up
which is supported by the results. Consistent with previous studies, the coefficient on
the deal size variable is positive and significant, demonstrating that larger target firms
have a greater pre-bid share price run-up. Finally, the interaction terms in Table 3.5
show that the size of the toehold, with respect to the proximity of its placement to the
announcement date, does not have a statistically significant impact on the size of the
run-up. This result demonstrates that the impact toeholds have on the run-up arises
not from their size, but rather from the information conveyed by their purchase. This
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Table 3.6: Matched Sample Descriptives
finding provides an interesting and novel explanation to reconcile the lack of consensus
that exists in the literature regarding the impact of toehold size on the run-up.
3.5 Robustness Test - The Impact of Toehold Acquisitions
Not all acquisitions of toeholds or increases in sizes of existing toeholds are followed by a
takeover bid. By constructing a matched sample of toehold stakes that are not followed
by takeover bids, the pre-bid price run-ups can be assessed to determine whether they
were a function of insiders profiting from their privileged position, or an average market
reaction to the establishment of a toehold. This allows for the impact of the toehold
acquisition to be directly observed, free of the look-ahead bias inherent in only analysing
takeover bids. A matched sample stock is identified for each of the short-term toehold
acquisitions in the sample by minimising Distance in Equation 3.3,
Distance = min
2∑
i=1
|factorSTi − factorMatchi |(
factorSTi +factor
Match
i
2
) . (3.3)
To construct the Distance measure, the absolute difference of either the market value or
toehold size is computed for the run-up sample stock and each potential match. This
difference is then divided by the average of the matched factors. Each matched stock is
chosen without replacement by minimizing the sum of these two factors.
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Table 3.6 documents the difference in market value and toehold size between the short-
term toehold stocks and their matched samples. Significance tests confirm that there is
no significant difference between the samples based on the matching criteria. The match-
ing of the size of the toehold is considered especially important due to the unusually
large size of the toehold acquisitions, as reported in Table 3.4.
The regression analysis used to examine the determinants of the reactions to the toehold
acquisitions is documented in equation 3.4 below:
CARi(x, y) = αi + βiln(valuei) + γToeholdi + δTurnoveri + µMatchedi + i, (3.4)
where CAR(x,y) is the cumulative abnormal return of stock i between x and y days;
value refers to the market value of firm i’s shares; Toehold indicates the size of the
toehold; Turnover is the cumulative abnormal turnover of stock i between x and y days;
and Matched is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 to indicate that the stock is
part of the matched sample, and 0 if it is part of the short-term toehold sample.
Table 3.7 reports the returns around toehold acquisitions prior to the announcement
of a takeover, vis-a-vis the returns with no resulting takeover announcement. As the
median short-term holding period is only one day before the takeover announcement (as
reported in Table 3.1) the returns up until the public announcement of the toehold are
specifically considered. This exercise isolates the run-up and announcement period from
the confounding impacts of the takeover announcement itself.
Table 3.7 compares the CARs for the short-term and matched samples. Both samples
exhibit similar pre-announcement patterns, with positive pre-event CARs of 6.5-7.5%
for the 30-day window preceding the acquisition of the toehold. The difference reported
between the short-term toeholds and the matched sample are not significant at the 5%
level for any of the event windows examined. Furthermore, the size of the observed
abnormal return is comparable to results presented in Akhigbe et al. (2007), with
toehold targets which were not subject to takeovers exhibiting returns of 2.5%, while
targets acquired within one year experienced returns of 9.5%, over a comparable 20-day
period.
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Table 3.7: Matched Sample Toehold Returns
To further examine the significance of the previous result a regression analysis is per-
formed across the two samples. The results reported in Table 3.8 show that the
“matched” dummy variable is insignificantly different from zero in all specifications.
This suggests that run-ups in a target’s share price (where short-term toeholds have
been established) are not the result of insiders using their position to trade ahead of
the takeover announcement, but rather due to the price discovery that occurs around
the acquisition of toeholds. The fact that the returns between the matched samples
are statistically indistinguishable means that prior conclusions attributing the run-up to
insiders may be an overstated concern.
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Table 3.8: Matched Sample Toehold Regressions
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter presents an analysis that finds that the purchase of a toehold immediately
prior to the announcement of a takeover induces a significant price run-up. The existing
literature is extended by identifying and controlling for three potential causes of pre-
bid run-up: media speculation, price sensitive announcements and toehold acquisitions
by the bidder. As this chapter shows, the activity generated from these three areas
explains a significant proportion of the pre bid share price run-up. The impact of the
timing of the acquisition of a toehold stake is specifically analysed to ascertain the
affects on the share price run-up, finding that takeover bids with toeholds acquired
shortly before the takeover announcement are associated with significantly larger share
price run-ups. Share-price run-ups documented for the short-term targets also exist
for other toehold acquisitions that are not followed by takeover announcements, which
suggests they are driven by the toehold acquisition process itself. New evidence is
provided on the impact of the toehold timing decision, potentially resolving previous
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inconsistencies in the literature regarding the impact of toeholds on pre-bid run-up.
This evidence further suggests the timing of the toehold significantly affects the pre-
bid price behaviour in the target firm: an absence of any such toehold is associated
with no significant run-up. In light of this evidence, previous studies attributing the
price run-up to cases of insider trading appear to over-state the case, as this study
shows that the existence of insider traders is not necessary to induce an increase in
the target’s share price, as has been previously claimed. Insider trading is by nature
surreptitious, and it is not possible to rule out arguments such as that proposed by
Chakravarty (2001) - that insiders’ trade stealthily to conceal their trades. If insiders do
actively try to conceal their trades for fear of prosecution, it is possible that they trade
more frequently when they observe abnormal price and volume movements generated
by toehold acquisitions or by market rumours. Without data describing the trades of
prosecuted insiders, however it is extremely difficult to ascertain if this behaviour is
occurring. Despite this potential limitation, this research suggests that almost all of the
pre-bid run-up which has previously been attributed to insider trading can be explained
by legal factors associated with market anticipation.
Chapter 4
Assessing the Impact of HFT on
Market Efficiency and Integrity
4.0.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the impact of high-frequency trading (HFT) on efficiency and
integrity in the LSE and Euronext Paris markets. Much of the current academic lit-
erature has focused on the impact HFT has on efficiency, with no empirical evidence
presented that attempts to identify the relationship between HFT and market integrity.
This chapter analyses the impact of HFT on two distinct aspects of market integrity -
using both trade and information-based measures of market manipulation.
This focus on integrity is important for two reasons. The first is that the integrity of the
market is one of the key mandates of regulators when assessing any regulatory changes,
of which HFT is one. The second reason integrity is important is that theoretical
finance models (as far back as those of Kyle (1985)) demonstrate a relationship between
adverse selection and market efficiency. This interrelationship between market efficiency,
integrity, and the level of HFT poses a potential endogeneity problem: spreads may be
narrow due to the prevalence of HFT market makers, or narrow spreads may encourage
the participation of HFT market makers. To allow for such endogeneity, a three-stage
least squares (3SLS) method is used to simultaneously estimate the determinants of
efficiency, integrity and HFT. Using this technique, HFT participation is shown to have
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had a significant impact on both the cost of trading (a proxy for efficiency) and the
frequency of end-of-day price dislocation22 (a proxy for market integrity), both of which
have improved as the degree of HFT participation has increased.
4.1 Institutional Detail
Regulatory framework changes have both encouraged and restricted the practice of high-
frequency trading. As an increasing number of firms enter this space seeking to carve
out niches for themselves, regulators have had to regulate HFT without fully under-
standing how it impacts on market fairness and efficiency. This section provides a broad
examination of the major structural changes at both the market and exchange level that
have facilitated the expansion of HFT participation.
4.1.1 Structural Changes at the Market Level
Following a similar transformation in U.S. financial markets some years prior, the im-
plementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in 2007 trans-
formed the European equity market landscape. An unintended outcome of this variation
in the rules regarding best execution, market transparency, and market organisation is
the promotion of HFT. According to a statement from the Committee of European Se-
curities Regulator (CESR): “...one of the primary objectives of MiFID was to introduce
competition among trading venues and thereby reduce transaction costs for the benefit
of both the final investors and issuers. These results were meant to be achieved, among
others, by removing the concentration rule and, at the same time, introducing specific
pre- and post-trade transparency for listed shares coupled with a detailed best execution
regime for investment firms which execute clients’ orders.”23 It is this competition that
has facilitated the increasing rate of HFT in Europe.
22This practice is also often referred to as “marking the close”.
23 Committee of European Securities Regulator - 24th April 2006.
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MiFID specifically introduced four key changes with clear implications for HFT. These
changes included the abolishment of the “concentration rule”, the introduction of “best-
execution” obligations for brokers, the promotion of greater pre- and post-trade trans-
parency rules, and the introduction of “passporting”. The requirement of best-execution
to ensure all market prices are taken into consideration, as well as the passporting rule
which allows securities listed anywhere in Europe to be traded on any other venue have
significantly fragmented the trading of European securities. This fragmentation has
provided a fertile field within which HFT has blossomed.
Prior to MiFID, the concentration rule required all trades in a single stock to go through
one, centralised exchange (typically the national incumbent exchange). The abolition of
this rule meant that trades were simply required to go through a regulated exchange,
allowing for greater competition amongst trading venues in Europe. Provisions in MiFID
allowed the introduction of competing structures, such as multilateral trading facilities
(MTFs) and systematic internalises (SIs), which saw traditional incumbent exchanges
being challenged by more aggressive entrants who were supported by the introduction
of a principles-based best-execution regime.24
This change created an incentive for the incumbent exchanges to compete on cost. Mar-
ket operators, looking to attract order flow, began to offer alternative fee structures
that were asymmetric in nature, so called “maker-taker” pricing models. Under such
conditions, market participants that provided liquidity enjoyed a lower fee (and in some
circumstances a rebate) relative to those participants that demanded liquidity from
the market.25 This differed substantially from the typically symmetric explicit pricing
regime that had existed pre-MiFID.
This change was expected to deliver a market environment that was characterised by
lower trading costs. Evidence provided by Gomber et al. (2011) suggests that the
delivery of this fragmented marketplace resulted in lower explicit costs for market par-
ticipants. Given the acute sensitivity of HFT to the cost of trading, regulatory changes
which have allowed both implicit and explicit trading costs to fall have also encouraged
HFT participants to be more involved in equity markets.
24This was subsequently amended in MiFID II bringing it in line with the U.S. regulatory regime.
25These market operators would be able to offset some of the cost of the rebate from “tape-revenue”.
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The fragmentation of trading away from a monopolistic primary market into a variety
of smaller venues also opens up the potential for inter-market arbitrage, as well as “fee-
arbitrage”, whereby electronic liquidity providers seek to capture these explicit rebates
by posting limit orders on both sides of the market.
In the aftermath of the changes introduced by MiFID, the CESR’s second version,
MiFID II imposes a variety of future challenges to the practice of HFT. In a bid to
safeguard against potential systemic risks, the directive warned that there was now a
greater potential for “overloading of trading venues systems”, “duplicative or erroneous
orders”, and “overreaction to other market events”.26 These risks are still the subject
of much contention, as any proposal that would require entities who engage in HFT
to employ greater risk mitigation practices may produce a whole range of unintended
consequences.27 To avoid such unintended consequences, it is important to understand
the impact of the practice of HFT on market efficiency and integrity.
4.1.2 Changes at the Exchange Level
Whilst changes at the market level have been partly responsible for driving the growth
in HFT participation at the exchange level, a number of other initiatives have also sup-
ported this dramatic increase. For example, in June 2007, the London Stock Exchange
(LSE) introduced a system called TradElect, which promised to deliver an average 10
millisecond latency from order submission to order confirmation.28
This system was subsequently replaced by MillenniumIT, which went live in 2011, de-
livering average latency of less than 120 microseconds, and making the LSE one of the
fastest trading venues in the world. Unlike the initial MiFID directives. The LSE also
introduced Direct Market Access (DMA) in 2007 (under the name Member Authorised
Connection MAC) - a direct, low latency connectivity solution allowing non-member
firms to access the Exchange’s central clearing engine using an authorised member firm’s
trading account. This increased investment in market infrastructure was geared towards
capturing a greater share of the HFT order flow.
26MiFID II - Committee of European Securities Regulator (CESR)
27HFT is also being scrutinised at the national level, with a recent proposal in France requiring a tax
of 0.1% on firms that cancel more than 50% of their automated orders per day be implemented.
28Equivalently accommodating 3000 orders per second.
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Despite adopting and abandoning a maker-taker fee structure in 2008 the LSE, respond-
ing to pressures from competing trading platforms such as Chi-X and Bats Europe, intro-
duced an amended tiered pricing facility based on trade turnover. With exchanges and
MTFs encouraging and implementing low latency access, lower explicit trading costs,
and direct market access, HFT will continue to feature prominently across European
markets.
4.2 Definition of HFT
Though attempts have been made by regulators, academics, and practitioners to define
HFT, most statements in circulation seem only to highlight the fact that HFT is a tool
employed by professional traders.29 More recent and earnest efforts to understand and
define HFT have recognised the multifaceted nature of the activity, and these can be
used to produce a more accurate and thoughtful explanations.
One source of confusion in many open debates is the relationship between HFT and an-
other prevalent trading activity - algorithmic trading. The two, though possessing some
similarities, are not synonyms. Rather, HFT is generally viewed as a subset of algo-
rithmic trading (see Brogaard, 2010) where trading decisions are normally pre-designed
and submissions are automated and executed without human intervention. While al-
gorithmic trading is employed in agency trading to achieve particular outcomes such
as stealthily capturing liquidity, engaging in block trading in a manner that minimises
information leakage, or simply minimising implementation shortfall, HFT is specific to
proprietary traders.30
More explicitly, HFT is characterised by rapid order submissions and cancellations, and
these are normally accommodated by exchanges offering co-location services (thereby
facilitating low latency). Furthermore, HFT participants hold little to no over-night
positions. This minimum inventory position characteristic adds some insight to the core
business model used by those that engage in HFT. HFT traders realise profits from
29For a comprehensive list of definitions see Gomber et al. (2011)
30Proprietary traders (or “prop traders”) utilise their own capital for trading activities to create profit.
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small deviations in prices across hundreds if not thousands of transactions throughout
the day, and is therefore a low margin, high turnover trading practice.
Similar to algorithmic trading, HFT is characterised by a broad range of active strategies
employed by a diverse group of trading participants. With participants ranging from
proprietary market making firms to quantitative hedge funds, and trading strategies that
can include both pseudo market-making and statistical arbitrage trading, there is no
clear profile to either HFT participants or their trading strategies. HFT is distinguished
instead by technological changes; though many HFT trading approaches derive from
strategies that have long existed in markets, it is only in recent years that they have
been able to be implemented as such high speeds and low costs.31 With these changes
delivering significant competitive advantages to HFT participants, the dramatic growth
in HFT over such a short time horizon is not unexpected.
The proxy used for HFT in this chapter is the cancel-to-trade ratio. This ratio is
versatile, as it can be constructed from public full orderbook data, and is also highly
correlated with HFT given the intensity of the enter and cancellation messages that are
necessary to execute this kind of trading. This measure is the most commonly used in
the literature, being implemented in papers such as Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011),
Hendershott et al. (2011) and Malinova et al. (2013).
4.3 Data
The data used in this chapter relates to all listed securities on the LSE and Euronext-
Paris between 2003 and 2011 for which level 10 depth data is available. The trade
and quote data used for the analysis is obtained from Thompson Reuters Tick History
(TRTH) which is provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific
(SIRCA). In relation to the fields obtained, information is acquired on bid and ask
quotes (time-stamped to the nearest millisecond) for up to ten levels of the order book.
Intra-day information on market prices, volume, number of level 1 orders/trades, and
all changes to the level 10 order book is also collected.
31Whilst the nature of trading strategies employed has not significantly changed over time, the mix
of participants organising and executing HFT strategies has fundamentally evolved over this period.
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To construct the information leakage metric, company news announcements from the
Reuters News Announcement feed (RNA) are used. As these announcements only be-
came available after 2003, the analysis is restricted to the period 2003 - 2011, inclusive.
In order to determine the number of order cancellations, it is necessary to match each
trade execution against the limit order book immediately prior to the trade. To match
these trade executions, the methodology employed by Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) is
used. This involves the assumption that the dominant economic event is the arrival of
a marketable limit order. Similar to their data set, when an incoming marketable order
executes against more than one standing limit order, multiple messages are generated -
one for each limit order that it is executed against. Thus, order executions that carry
the same millisecond timestamp and direction and are unbroken by any non-execution
message are combined to define a single marketable order.
The cancellations data used in this study are generated by analysing the combination of
trade records and level 10 quote data. Any decrease in quoted depth is caused by either
an execution against an incoming marketable order or a cancellation or amendment
request. All trades and quotes are matched by time and price to account for all quoted
depth reductions resulting from trade executions. Changes in the quoted depth are
then analysed for the remaining quote updates, with each categorised according to the
following rules:
1. If the new quote update increases depth from the previous quote at any of the 10
levels , then it is considered to be due to the addition of a limit order.
2. If the quote update contains additions to depth at some levels and reductions in
depth at others, this is considered to be an amendment.
3. If the quote update contains reductions in depth at any of the 10 levels and is not
associated with a corresponding trade, it is considered to be due to a cancellation.
The number of cancellations is then compared to the number of trades to arrive at
the Cancel-to-Trade ratio, which is used to identify the rate of HFT participation. A
cancellation ratio has been used in previous empirical works (such as Hendershott et al.
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(2011)) to identify the level of HFT participation, and is found to be highly correlated
with explicit measures of HFT due to the high rate of order submissions and cancellations
necessary to conduct a HFT strategy.
4.4 Metrics of Market Efficiency and Market Integrity
The following section describes the metrics used in the empirical analysis. This section
also describes the rationale for the proxies adopted as well as the methods used to
construct them.
4.4.1 Market Quality Metrics
The academic literature to date has largely focused on the impact of HFT on those
elements of market quality that relate to efficiency: spreads, depth, volatility and to a
lesser extent, price discovery. While these elements are fundamental to the operation of
efficient markets, the mandate of national regulatory agencies and exchanges alike is to
promote both efficient and fair marketplaces. This study seeks to address the impact
of HFT participation on both of these market quality outcomes. Empirical evidence
indicates that increasing HFT participation has resulted in increased efficiency. Ideally,
this increase in efficiency would occur without harming the integrity of the market.
Indeed, one of the main criticisms raised by other market participants against HFT is
the impact of HFT on the fairness and transparency of the marketplace. Two integrity
metrics are used to address this question, with each of the metrics detailed below.
4.4.2 Market Efficiency
Ideal market efficiency is defined as the minimisation of transaction costs with a maximi-
sation of price discovery; the lower the cost of trading, and the more quickly information
is impounded into price, the more efficient the market. Thus, measures of transaction
costs and price discovery are useful proxies for market efficiency. Three explicit elements
of transaction costs that can be measured in a marketplace include quoted, effective, and
realised spreads.
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4.4.3 Effective Spreads
Transaction costs are measured using the volume-weighted effective spread calculated
on a per-trade basis as in Venkataraman (2001)32 and averaged across the month. This
spread is transformed into a percentage of the share price to arrive at the final statistic
as in Equation 4.1
RESi,t = 200×Dt × Pricei,t −Midi,t
Midi,t
, (4.1)
where; D is the direction of trade t in stock i, and is given a value of 1 for a buyer
initiated trade and a value of -1 for a seller initiated trade; Price is the traded price of
stock i ; and Mid is the midpoint of the best bid and ask prevailing at the time of the
trade.
This metric is separately constructed for every execution in every stock traded on the
respective market for each day in the month. The average daily spread for each stock is
then constructed as the volume-weighted average of the effective spread for each trade.
This stock-day effective spread is then converted to a daily-market-wide effective spread
by equally weighting the daily-stock spread experienced by each of the stocks traded on
that day. In order to reach the monthly-market wide effective spread utilised in this
report, the daily-market-wide effective spread is then averaged over every trading day
in the month.
To determine the direction of trades, the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is used.
Specifically, all trades that occur above the prevailing midpoint of the best bid and ask
price are classified as buyer initiated and all trades occurring below the midpoint are
classified as seller initiated. While Ellis et al. (2000) and Chakrabarty et al. (2007)
document that the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm may misclassify trades at the mid-
point, we exclude dark transactions from our sample, relying instead only on lit market
transactions. This will limit the impact of misclassifying within-spread executions, as
lit transactions will occur either at the bid or ask. Trades occurring at the midpoint are
32Venkataraman, K., 2001, Automated versus Floor Trading: An analysis of execution costs on the
Paris and New York Exchanges, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, No. 4, pg. 1445-1885.
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dealt with using the “tick-test”, whereby, if the trade immediately prior to the last trade
was seller initiated, the last trade will be classified as seller initiated and vice-versa for
buyer initiated trades.
There are two alternative measures of transaction costs: realised spreads and quoted
spreads. Realised spreads measure the benefits associated with supplying liquidity to
a market, as opposed to demanding it. Quoted spreads measure the average cost of
demanding liquidity throughout the day, as opposed to at the point in time at which
trades actually occurred. Due to the high degree of correlation between realised, effective
and quoted spreads, effective spreads are preferred in this study due to their reflection
of the actual conditions that generated each trade.
4.5 Market Integrity
Market integrity is defined as the extent to which market participants engage in pro-
hibited trading behaviours. These prohibited conducts can be categorised as either
information-based (such as insider trading) or trade-based (such as market manipula-
tion and front-running). While none of these prohibited actions are directly measurable,
there are proxies which are highly correlated with such conduct. The two proxies used
for the purpose of this analysis are: information leakage - an indirect measure of the
level of insider trading; and dislocation of the end-of-day price - an indirect assessment
of the degree of market manipulation.
4.5.1 Information Leakage
Information leakage relates to the dissemination of non-public, price sensitive informa-
tion prior to the public transmission of the news. The measure of information leakage
used here calculates the proportion of public announcements that exhibit leakage. As
such, a lower measure implies fewer potential violations of market integrity.
The theoretical and empirical findings of Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) suggest that
it is possible for HFT participants to be better informed than other market participants.
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There are several reasons that this could occur. One possibility is that informed traders
are trading on private information, resulting in an order imbalance that the HFT par-
ticipants are able to identify and trade on. Whilst this type of conduct is not directly
attributable to the HFT participants, their role in exaggerating the trades of informed
participants may exacerbate information leakage, leading to larger pre-announcement
run-ups. Kirilenko et al. (2010) find evidence consistent with this theory surrounding
the flash crash of 2010.
A second reason HFT participation may exaggerate the appearance of information leak-
age is related to the ability of mechanical processes to almost instantaneously incorpo-
rate changes to public information. With information providers such as Reuters and
Bloomberg now selling RSS (Rich Site Summary) feeds in a format that is friendly to
mechanical analysis, HFT participants may simply be able to impound the impacts of
new information quicker than non-HFT participants.
A third possibility is, in the worst case, HFT participants’ informational advantage could
be based on their operators (illegal) inside information.
While the true level of insider trading is not directly measurable, the concept of informa-
tion leakage can be used to estimate it. Both the level of insider trading and the proxy
of information leakage seek to measure the extent to which price sensitive information
ends up in the hands of a privileged few rather than the market as a whole. Insider
trading is the subset of information leakage cases where such conduct is illegal. A proxy
for information leakage gives an idea of the extent of the practice and can be considered
an upper bound for the incidence of illegal insider trading in a market.
The proxy for information leakage is constructed by measuring the extent of unusual
price and volume behaviour prior to price sensitive announcements. The leakage metric
is calculated using abnormal price returns relative to a market index.
Abnormal Returni,t = Returni,t − βi(Returnm,t), (4.2)
where; Returni, t is the daily return for stock i on day t, βi is the stock-specific
correlation with the market return constructed during the benchmarking period, and
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Returnm, t is the day t market return. This measure is constructed to detect prohib-
ited trading behaviour in equities markets and uses both a market model and a “clean”
event window (similar to the measure constructed by Dubow and Monteiro, 2006). The
information leakage metric is constructed using a subset of all announcements, those
that are price sensitive. An announcement is regarded as price-sensitive when the re-
turn of the underlying security between days t-6 and t+2 is more than three standard
deviations (σi) away from the average seven-day abnormal return (sevendayreturni),
which is constructed using a bootstrap procedure over the 250 trading day benchmark
period ending at t-10. The bootstrap procedure computes the average return across
nine randomly drawn days from the benchmark period 1,000 times, with replacement.
The use of period which includes pre- and post-announcement returns allows for sensi-
tive announcements to be captured even if there is substantial price anticipation of the
event.
t=+2∑
t=−6
Abnormal Returni,t > sevendayreturni + 3σi. (4.3)
For an announcement to be included in the sample, it must also occur within a “clean”
event window, that is, where there are no other stock-specific announcements within the
six day pre-event window. By only investigating announcements from clean events, any
price reaction can only be associated with one single announcement. Where the company
has more than one announcement within a clean event day, only the first announcement
is considered, with the second announcement discarded. A case of suspected leakage is
defined as an event where there is an abnormal price movement on one or more days in
the t-6 to t-1 pre-announcement period in the same direction as the overall announcement
return. An example is given below in equation 4.4 for a positive announcement.
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ARi =
1
250
−260∑
t=−10
AbnormalReturni,t
Information Leakage if anyAbnormal Returni,t > ARi + 3σi
Where day t occurs between event day -6 and -1
and there are no days in which Abnormal Returni,t < ARi − 3σi
for any day in the pre-event window (-6 to -1).
(4.4)
A daily price movement is considered abnormal if it is at least 3 standard deviations (3σi)
away from the mean abnormal return over the 250 day benchmarking period ending on
day t-10. In the case of positive price sensitive announcements, at least one pre-event
return must exceed three standard deviations above the mean, where none of the other
pre-announcement day’s exhibit abnormal returns lower than three standard deviations
below the mean.
A measure of information leakage that increases as a market becomes more “leaky” is
constructed by examining the ratio of suspected information leakages to clean event
windows, as follows in Equation 4.5:
%Information Leakage =
# of information leakages
# of clean event windows
(4.5)
4.5.2 Market Manipulation
Trade-based manipulation is the creation of a false or misleading representation of either
price or volume with the intent to affect the market price. Such manipulation reduces
the average, long-run informational efficiency of stock prices and degrades overall market
quality. There are many types of trade-based market manipulation, and distinctions need
to be drawn between actual market manipulations and activities that may merely look
like manipulations, such as temporary liquidity imbalances.
Brogaard (2010) and Jarnecic and Snape (2010) both find that HFT participants are
inclined to end the trading day in a stock-neutral position. This results in elevated HFT
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participation towards the end of the trading day. This, coupled with Brogaard’s (2010)
finding that the trading patterns of HFT’s are similarly correlated, could create a false
impression that markets are being manipulated.
In this chapter, market manipulation is proxied by examining the number of suspected
instances of dislocation of the end-of-day price. Dislocating the end-of-day price involves
influencing closing prices so that they no longer represent the true forces of supply and
demand. Closing price manipulation affects both the pricing accuracy and liquidity of
equities markets, and may, in the long-run, discourage participation in equity markets
that exhibit such undesirable conduct. Given the globalised nature of equity trading, any
negative impact on liquidity has the potential to increase the cost of capital, discouraging
firms from listing on markets known for manipulation. Closing price manipulation also
impairs the price discovery process by reducing order flow and distorting prices away
from their natural levels. This has the potential to adversely impact the role of market
prices in efficiently allocating scarce capital (Goldstein and Guembel, 2008).
There are many reasons that participants may try to manipulate closing prices. These
include profiting from derivatives positions on the underlying stock (Kumar and Seppi,
1992), and brokers gaming their clients’ perception of their execution ability (Hillion
and Suominen, 2004). There may also be an incentive for pension fund managers to
manipulate closing prices, as a pension fund’s net asset value and performance are often
calculated using closing prices, and may be used to determine the ranking between
funds as well as the remuneration of the funds’ management team. The clustering of
such “high-closing” events is documented empirically by both Carhart et al. (2002) and
Bernhardt and Davies (2009).
Nevertheless, not all abnormal closing prices are the result of deceitful trading strategies.
Stock prices may naturally close at unusual levels if there are announcements towards
the end of the day, if brokers needing to fill unexecuted positions become aggressive in
their trading, if participants unwilling to hold positions overnight clear their inventory
or if large orders are entered towards the end-of-day without considering the liquidity
available. It is therefore important to categorise and distinguish between different types
of abnormal end-of-day prices.
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Distinguishing between the various forms of abnormal end-of-day prices is a challeng-
ing task. Following the method established by Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2011),
attempts to mark the close are measured as abnormally large end-of-day price changes
which exceed predetermined stock-specific thresholds. For each stock and trading day,
the price change of the last 15 minutes of trading is compared to a distribution of his-
torical price changes, over the previous 30 trading days. The calculation of end-of-day
movement and the average distribution of end-of-day movements are shown in equation
4.6.
4EODi,t = Peod,i,t − Peod−15m,i,t
Peod−15m,
4EODi = 1
30
t=−1∑
t=−31
4EODi,t,
(4.6)
where; 4EODi,t is the return between the closing price and the price 15 minutes prior
to the close, 4EODi is the average return over a rolling window of thirty trading days
prior to the day being analysed, and σi is the standard deviation of 4EODi over the
same period. Manipulative behaviour is suspected when an end-of-day price change ex-
ceeds 3 standard deviations above or below the mean of the distribution over the past
30 days.
There is potential positive price manipulation if Ri,t > 4EODi + 3σi
And potential negative price manipulation if Ri,t < 4EODi − 3σi
Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2013) show that prosecuted cases of end-of-day manipu-
lation are likely to exhibit next-day price reversion. Instances of abnormal end-of-day
price changes which are followed by a price reversion of 50% or more on the open of
the next trading day are considered successful attempts at marking the close (MTC).
These are referred to as instances of “dislocating the end-of-day price”. Without this
reversion, the abnormal change in the end-of-day price could be due to changes in the
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true supply and demand for the stock. In the absence of this reversion, manipulation is
not considered to have occurred.
4.6 Research Design
To study the cross-sectional determinants of HFT participation, it is necessary to include
variables that are publically available over a long time series. The structural model used
accounts for the fact that quoted spreads and measures of market integrity are likely to
be endogenously related. Higher levels of suspected cases of market manipulation raise
volatility and reduce order aggressiveness, and overall lead to higher bid-ask spreads.
At the same time, however, quoted spreads are a non-trivial execution cost of market
manipulation. Higher quoted spreads, therefore, are expected to reduce the incidence of
manipulation, ceteris paribus.
Market integrity, efficiency, and the level of high-frequency trading are also likely to
be simultaneously determined. Both lower costs of trading and improved market in-
tegrity increase the level of high-frequency trading. High-frequency trading itself has
the potential to lead to lower bid-ask spreads if it leads to a more competitive market
environment, characterised by improved market integrity. A three-stage least squares
(3SLS) method is adopted to account for the fact that efficiency (spreads), integrity
(EOD manipulation or Information leakage) and HFT participation residual errors will
likely be cross-equation correlated.
The empirical model is a simultaneous set of three structural equations describing in-
tegrity violations alert incidence (Integrity), the effective spread (Spread), and HFT
participation (HFT). These are set out in equations 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 below:
Integrity Eqn:
Integrityi,t = Ŝpread+ĤFT+Control variables + Market Design Changes + Fixed effects,
(4.7)
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Efficiency Eqn:
Spreadi,t = ̂Integrity+ĤFT+Control variables + Market Design Changes + Fixed effects ,
(4.8)
HFT Eqn:
HFTi,t = ̂Integrity + Ŝpread+ Control variables + Market Design Changes, (4.9)
where: Integrityi,t is a constructed variable including the number of suspected cases of
insider trading (“Insider”) and market manipulation (“MTC”) in market i for month t ;
Spreadi,t is a constructed variable of effective spreads, measuring the cost of a round
trip transaction in market i for month t ; HFTi,t is a variable that is constructed to
proxy the level of HFT participation in market i for month t using the order-to-trade
and cancel-to-trade ratios;33 and market design changes is a variable that takes into
account whether the period is pre- or post-MiFID.
The instrumental variables for the endogenously determined items (Spreads, integrity
and HFT) are based on reduced-form equations of all the exogenous and predetermined
regressors; hat symbols signify these simultaneously determined predicted values. As
each of the endogenous variables could in principle, affect each other, the order condition
for identification is ensured by excluding from each equation two control variables present
elsewhere in the system. For each equation, the excluded variables are control variables
found to be insignificant in preliminary single-equation estimations of the focal equation
but highly significant in the other two structural equations.
Equation 4.10 presents the regression relationships between the level of integrity of a
single exchange (proxied by either the percentage of suspected cases of insider trading
or the level of marking around the close) and a range of explanatory variables described
below:
33 The order condition for identification is satisfied in the following ways: Integrity is identified
through the exclusion of the Yearly Fixed Effects and Price variables; Efficiency is identified through
the exclusion of the End of Quarter Effects and market return, whilst HFT is identified by excluding
the End of Quarter Effects, the Yearly Fixed Effects and total Price.
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AIt = α+ β1̂Spreadt + β2ĤFTt + β3Stdt + β4Returnt + β5V olumet
+β6Integrity(t− 1) + β7MiFID + β8Quarter + ˜t′.
(4.10)
Equation 4.11 describes the level of market efficiency (proxied by the size of the quoted
spread):
Spreadt = α
′ + β9 ̂Integrityt + β10ĤFTt + β11Pricet + β12V olumet
+β13Stdt + β14Spread(t−1) + Y early + ˜t′′.
(4.11)
While equation 4.12 describes the determinants of HFT participation:
HFTt = α
′′ + β15 ̂Integrityt) + β16ĤFTt + β17Stdt + β18V olumet
+β19HFT(t−1) + β20HFT(t−2) + ˜′′′,
(4.12)
where: Stdt is the mean standard deviation of daily returns in time period t ; Rett is
the mean daily return in time period t ; V olumet is the mean turnover in time period
t ; MiFID is a dummy variable for the introduction of MiFID taking a value of 0 prior
to November, 2007, and 1 thereafter; Quarter is a dummy variable which accounts for
the end of each financial quarter (taking a value of 1 for March, June, September and
December, and 0 for all other months); Pricet is the mean price in time period t ; Yearly
represents yearly fixed effects which are applied to the constructed regressions; and ˜′, ˜′′
and ˜′′′ represent the residual error terms.
The specifications are modelled separately for all LSE and Euronext-Paris listed secu-
rities. Beyond accounting for the potential simultaneity bias in the multiple-equation
results, the potential cross-equation correlation of the error terms is addressed by using
the three-stage least squares estimation.34
34Lindleys paradox identifies that large data sets can result in inflated levels of significance. Robustness
tests were conducted clustering the errors so as to account for this phenomenon. The results of these
tests are qualitatively similar to those reported in this thesis
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4.6.1 Stationarity of the estimates and adjustment for Autocorrelation
Durbin-Watson tests indicated the presence of autocorrelation. In order to assess the
optimal lag structure, general to specific F-tests were used, starting with six lags. The
optimal lag structure was found to be 1 month for the Spread, Insider Trading and
Marking the Close metrics. The HFT proxy was found to exhibit a two month lag
structure. The regression analyses have used these optimal lag structures to minimise the
presence of autocorrelation, with reported Durbin-Watson statistics for each regression
found to be insignificant at the 5% level. The parameters themselves are adjusted for
possible auto-correlated disturbances by adopting Newey-West standard errors.
4.7 Descriptive Statistics
For each of the metrics used as dependent variables in equations 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9,
descriptive data is presented in Table 4.1. These descriptive statistics are separated
both by market and time periods (that is, pre- and post- the introduction of MiFID).
This distinction has been made due to the significant structural changes MiFID initi-
ated, including the fragmentation of the European equities market.
The introduction of MiFID appears to have reduced the prevalence of marking the close
violations on the LSE significantly, with smaller reductions also observed on Euronext.
The impact of MiFID on the amount of information leakage is less clear, with minor
reductions observed on the LSE but minor increases observed on Euronext. The proxy
for market efficiency, effective spreads, exhibits significant reductions in the post-MiFID
period across both markets. This is likely driven by the increased fragmentation ob-
served in the market subsequent to the introduction of MiFID. The proxy used for
HFT, the cancel to trade ratio, exhibits a marked increase subsequent to the introduc-
tion of MiFID, increasing by over 5 times its pre-MiFID levels for both the LSE and
Euronext.
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Table 4.1: Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics by Market
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4.7.1 HFT Influence on Periodicities
In their analysis of NASDAQ trade and quote data, Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) identify
periodicities in their 2008 and 2009 data. These periodicities exist in “wall-clock” time
- that is taking timestamps which define milliseconds since midnight. This deconstructs
each second into 1000 equally sized buckets, and analyses the arrival rate of orders based
upon the part of the second in which they were entered. If there were no patterns to order
entry, approximately 1/1000th of orders would exist within every millisecond. Instead,
Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) identified very frequent order entries immediately following
the start of the second, and less strong, though prevalent, order entries immediately
following the half-second barrier.
Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) attribute these peaks in order entry activity to automated
trading systems that periodically access the market near the second and half-second
boundaries. They further find that these periodicities are on much longer intervals
than the minimum latency within which HFT participants are able to react to orders,
which they find to be in the sub 20 millisecond range. This leads Hasbrouck and
Saar (2013) to identify two subsets of HFT participants, those that are programmed to
access and revisit the market periodically, potentially in order to “slice and dice” an
institutional order, and those that react to information events. The seminal work of
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) shows that where liquidity is demanded, both informed
and discretionary uninformed traders will congregate. It appears that these longstanding
theories are also applicable to the millisecond environment.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 document the millisecond level order entry characteristics of each
market during 2003, when little HFT is likely to be present in the respective markets.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 document the order entry patterns at the millisecond level in late
2011, when there was considerably more HFT participation in the markets.
Figure 4.1 considers the month of February 2003 for the Euronext Paris market, with
an approximately equal incidence of order arrivals reported throughout the second. This
is close to the situation which would be expected with truly random order arrival, that
is a uniform distribution at 0.1% (ie, 11000 * 100%). Whilst Figure 4.2 reveals a bulge in
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Figure 4.1: Euronext Millisecond Remainders February 2003
Figure 4.2: LSE Millisecond Remainders February 2003
order entries for the LSE between 100 and 300ms, neither market exhibit any particular
deviation from the relatively uniform distribution across each millisecond bucket.
Figure 4.3 shows the millisecond order and trade entry pattern for Euronext in December
2011. Euronext exhibits very marked periodicities around 150ms and 300ms. The shape
of these periodicities is similar in nature to the double peak observed by Hasbrouck
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Figure 4.3: Euronext Millisecond Remainders December 2011
and Saar (2013) in their NASDAQ data for the periods 2008 and 2009. Hasbrouck and
Saar (2013) attribute this double peak to either clustering in transmission time (due to
geographic latency, with co-located orders arriving at the exchange more quickly than
non-co-located orders) or to other potential technological challenges associated with
handling large volumes at the firm level.
Figure 4.4 indicates an even more striking periodicity for the LSE during December
2011. There are ten double peaks, offset from the second boundary by approximately
20ms, with each of the second peaks approximately 50ms away from the first. These
ten double peaks appear to occur just after the 100ms boundary. This appears to be
evidence of the same kind of algorithmic approach to trading found on the NASDAQ
and LSE, but occurring every 100ms. As in the Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) 10-second
analysis, there appears to be a heightened order submission rate around the first, second
and third 100ms periods.
The contrasting appearance of millisecond remainders between 2003 and 2011 confirms
that there now exist high-frequency trading patterns that did not exist at the beginning
of 2003. This evidence is consistent with the empirical findings of Brogaard (2010) and
Jarnecic and Snape (2010), who find significant levels of HFT participation in the LSE
market using data from 2009 and 2010.
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Figure 4.4: LSE Millisecond Remainders December 2011
4.8 Regression Results
4.8.1 Market Efficiency
Table 4.2 presents the results of the 3SLS estimation described in the research design.
Specifically, the determinants of effective bid-ask spreads are examined for the LSE and
Euronext-Paris.35 The percentage of potential insider trading violations (the proxy for
market integrity) is found to be positively and statistically significant across both the
LSE and Euronext markets, which suggests that a deterioration in market integrity is
associated with higher trading costs. This result is consistent with the premise that
market efficiency can be improved with appropriate controls and supervision of the
trading behaviour of market participants. Whilst this first measure of market integrity
is significant for both Euronext and the LSE, the measure of the dislocation of end-of-day
prices is only weakly associated with bid-ask spreads on the LSE. Furthermore, it does
not have a significant impact on bid-ask spreads on Euronext. This result is consistent
with Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2011) who show the bid-ask spread is likely to be
lower on days where end-of-day manipulation is present, but higher the following day
as market participants react to the possibility of market manipulation.
35 Note that due to the restricted availability of announcement data from January 2003 specifications
have been run with only 2003-2011 data. Unreported specifications using the MTC proxy were run over
the period 2001 - 2011 with similar results.
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Table 4.2: Determinants of the Effective Spread
Results from the regression analysis suggest that HFT participation has a negative and
significant impact on bid-ask spreads for both LSE and Euronext-Paris listed securi-
ties. This result is foreshadowed by the intense competition for order-flow and market-
making revenues documented in the literature. The introduction of MiFID, which,
largely through the increase in HFT activity, has increased competition for incumbent
exchanges, has thus resulted in lower trading costs for market participants.
The opposing signs on the coefficients for MiFID, whilst initially a curious result, may
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be explained by the differences in market structures prior to 2007. The introduction
of the passporting rule by MiFID allowed stocks listed in any EU country to be traded
in any of the venues also regulated by an EU country. It thus provided for significant
competition in the trading of securities which is likely to have had a larger impact on
Euronext-Paris than the LSE market because the UK market was not previously subject
to the concentration rule.
The control variables for price behave as predicted, with higher priced securities reducing
the spread across all specifications. The results for traded volume are positive and
significant for the Euronext sample. This is likely driven by the market-wide nature of
the estimation, with larger traded volume during points of market stress, such as the
GFC. Where volatility is found to be significant it increases spreads, as anticipated.
Included year fixed effects are found to be significant and negative, reflecting the deter-
ministic downward trend in spreads through the estimation period that is attributable
to both MTFs (such as Instinet-Europe) and MiFID-triggered competition for order flow
across exchanges.
Finally, the lag of the bid-ask spread is found to be positive and significant in three of the
four specifications. This result is driven by the presence of first-order autocorrelation.
The Durbin-Watson statistics ranging from 1.62 - 1.84 are not found to be statistically
different from 2 at the 5% level, indicating that the inclusion of the first order lag has
accounted for the detected autocorrelation of the residuals.
4.8.2 Market Integrity
Table 4.3 presents the results of the 3SLS estimation for market integrity described
in equation 4.10, with the determinants of market integrity specifically examined for
the LSE and Euronext-Paris. The results firstly indicate that HFT participation is
negatively and significantly related to market integrity, meaning fewer integrity breaches
occur as HFT activity increases. This suggests that HFT has not only created a more
competitive market environment resulting in lower trading costs, but has also improved
the integrity of the operating environment.
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The coefficient on the effective spread variable is positive and significantly related to
the number of integrity violations in three of the four specifications. This indicates a
strong association between attempted market manipulations and bid-ask spreads. This
relationship is documented by studies such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Copeland
and Galai (1983), Meulbroek (1992) and Chung and Charoenwong (1998) as a result of
traders and/or market makers identifying the existence of asymmetric information and
consequently becoming less willing to trade.
As in the other specifications, MiFID is found to have had differing impacts on the
LSE and Euronext. These differences are likely to do with the level of enforcement
and regulation existing in each market. In discussions as recent as March 2012, the
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee Rapporteur Arlene McCarthy argued that
the fragmentation which MiFID has fostered makes it more difficult to detect instances
of manipulation or misconduct.36 The increased fragmentation in Paris from a single
venue to multiple venues may have increased the difficulty of enforcement in Paris. In
contrast, due to the UK’s higher existing levels of fragmentation, the introduction of
MiFID may not have caused any change in the difficulty of regulatory enforcement. The
fragmentation of markets leads to a greater ability of manipulators to hide their conduct
amongst the crowd of multiple markets. This difficulty of cross-market manipulation
may be one of the unintended consequences of the fragmentation caused by MiFID, and
bears further scrutiny in its own right.
An additional potential explanation is provided by Cumming et al. (2011). The authors
analyse the impact of the introduction of MiFID on US cross-listed ADR’s and find that
MiFID actually leads to a reduction in the European trading of these securities. They
attribute this to the complexity of the newly introduced regulations. Such increased
complexity may further complicate the role of enforcement agencies within Europe.
The end of quarter fixed effects are found to have a positive relationship with the level
of integrity violations. This evidence explains in part the initial non-stationarity of the
integrity results prior to inclusion of this deterministic trend variable. This is entirely
consistent with the findings of Carhart et al. (2002) - that the incentives for individuals
36European Parliament News Release - 12th of April, 2012.
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Market Integrity
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to commit integrity violations are greater at the end of the quarter due to the calculation
of listed fund returns.
Similar to the trading cost specifications, the other control variables behave in the ex-
pected fashion. The lag of the MTC and Insider variables are found to be positive and
significant in three of the four specifications a result driven by the presence of first-order
autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson statistics ranging between 1.87 and 2.24, after in-
clusion of the lagged terms, are not found to be statistically different from 2 at the 5%
level.
4.8.3 High-Frequency Trading
Table 4.4 presents the HFT results of the 3SLS specification described in the research
design section. Specifically, the determinants of HFT participation are examined for the
LSE and Euronext-Paris. The proxies for market manipulation (both marking the close
and information leakage) are found to be negatively associated with the degree of mar-
ket participation by high-frequency traders. This result indicates that high-frequency
traders either avoid trading in venues that are characterised by lower levels of market
integrity or, more likely, that their presence in the market inhibits the practice, partic-
ularly with respect to closing price manipulation.
The instrument for trading costs shows that as it becomes more expensive to trade,
there is a negative impact on the level of HFT activity. This reflects the high degree of
sensitivity that high-frequency traders have to the cost of trading, due to the frequency
with which they are required to trade. HFT participation does not appear to be signif-
icantly related to the total amount of volume in the market. This lack of a significant
relationship, despite empirical evidence of HFT participants preferring larger stocks, is
likely due to the market-level aggregation conducted.
4.9 Robustness Test - Top Decile
To explore the sensitivity of the results in the previous section, a subset of the initial
sample is chosen to reflect the securities which are most likely to be traded by HFT
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Table 4.4: Determinants of HFT Participation
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participants.37 The securities chosen are from the top traded quintile and are rebalanced
on an annual basis. This results in a sample of approximately 570 stocks on the LSE and
220 on Euronext. This sample reflects the most liquid securities in the market so as to
be consistent with previous empirical studies such as Brogaard (2010) and Jarnecic and
Snape (2010), that show HFT participation exists primarily in large, liquid stocks. As
a result, the relationships between HFT activity and the efficiency and integrity metrics
are expected to be stronger in this subset than when assessing the market in aggregate.
4.9.1 Market Efficiency
Table 4.5 displays results similar to those of Table 4.2. Spreads are found to increase
as the level of information leakage increases, consistent with the findings of Dubow and
Monteiro (2006) that reduced market integrity leads to an increase in transaction costs.
Attempts to manipulate the closing price do not appear to have an impact on spreads
in the most liquid securities. This result is indicative of the difficulty of manipulating
the closing price of highly liquid securities. Indeed, the work of Comerton-Forde and
Putnins (2011) finds that prosecuted closing price manipulations occur only in low-
medium liquidity securities. Therefore it is unsurprising that closing price manipulation
does not appear to have an impact on the spreads of the largest listed securities.
high-frequency trading is found to significantly reduce spreads amongst the highest decile
of stocks on both the LSE and Euronext markets. This reduction is found to be signif-
icant at the 1% level in all specifications. The strength of this result confirms that the
market making activity of HFT participants has a stronger impact on reducing spreads
amongst the most liquid securities, as compared to all securities.
Consistent with Table 4.2, reductions in spreads due to MiFID are found to be largest
for securities listed on Euronext-Paris, demonstrating the significant impact of the con-
centration rule in introducing competition for European listed securities.
37Unfortunately, due to the limited number of monthly observations, an analysis of a shorter time
period is unlikely to provide stable estimates.
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Table 4.5: Top Traded Quintile - Determinants of the Effective Spread
4.9.2 Market Integrity
Table 4.6 documents the determinants of the market integrity metrics. As in Table
4.3, there is a strong and negative relationship between integrity violations and the level
of HFT. The presence of high levels of HFT provides competition between electronic
market makers, resulting in more efficient prices. Trade-based manipulation, such as
trying to influence the closing price, moves prices against their fundamentals. Such
attempts at manipulation, if market makers can identify them, provide an opportunity
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for profit. As manipulators attempt to inflate prices through buying pressure, market
makers can sell stock back to the manipulators at these inflated prices, thwarting their
attempt to manipulate while also profiting from this attempted manipulation.
Similarly, the ability of HFT to rapidly impound information may allow high-frequency
traders to identify, and trade upon, order imbalances generated by insiders. This would
result in a rapid movement towards the new, equilibrium price, minimising the prof-
itability of insider trading and so discouraging its’ existence. Given the attention paid
to large securities by HFT participants, it is unsurprising that this negative relationship
exists between market misconduct and HFT.
Similar to the results presented in Table 4.3, Table 4.6 also shows that as integrity vio-
lations induce uncertainty around the true value of the security, traded spreads become
wider. In general, because of the greater degree of certainty around the fair value of
larger securities, bid-ask spreads for these set of firms are on average lower. Due to this
low base, however, integrity violations tend to result in much larger increases in spread,
with the positive co-efficient on the integrity variables found to be more significant than
those reported in Table 4.3. Taken together, these results imply that there is no sig-
nificant difference between the estimated specification and the top decile. In fact, the
results themselves are stronger in the top decile than what is observed market wide.
4.9.3 High-Frequency Trading
Table 4.7 documents the determinants of HFT participation. As in table 4.4, there is
a strong negative relationship between HFT and both measures of market misconduct.
As expected, these results are stronger amongst the top decile stocks than in the main
sample, reflecting both the scrutiny of these stocks by market participants and the
difficulty of manipulating larger securities.
While the relationship between HFT and spreads is found to be negative and significant,
the magnitude is not as large for the top decile stocks as it is for the main sample. This
is likely due to the fact that many stocks amongst the top decile are already have their
spread constrained by the minimum tick size.
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Table 4.6: Top Traded Quintile - Determinants of Market Integrity
The findings amongst the top decile are qualitatively similar to the results presented
in the full sample, with increased levels of HFT associated with lower spreads and
fewer integrity violations. Consistent with the findings of previous empirical works,
both the significance and magnitude of the impact of HFT on spreads is greater than
in the primary sample. In the integrity equations, the HFT variable exhibits the same
negative correlation with both insider trading and marking the close that was observed in
Table 4.4; however, in the restricted sample these coefficients become highly significant,
likely due to the increased attention given to these larger stocks by HFT participants.
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Table 4.7: Top Traded Quintile - Determinants of HFT Participation
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4.10 Conclusion
This study examines the impact of HFT activity on the efficiency and integrity of the
Euronext-Paris and LSE marketplaces. While a number of academic studies have shown
that HFT participation has a negative impact on market efficiency (as proxied by both
realised and effective spreads), none of these studies have examined the impact of HFT
on integrity, nor have any examined the interaction between the multiple dimensions of
market quality and HFT.
In order to understand the impact of HFT participation on the LSE and Euronext
markets, a range of key market metrics are examined over a nine year period - from
2003 to 2011. The results indicate that there has been significant structural change
in the two markets during this period. The average trade size and value have reduced
significantly as have average bid-ask spreads. This evidence directly coincides with the
introduction of HFT activity, whose participants have been empirically shown to trade
in smaller packages. The results further show significant increases in both the order
to trade and cancel to trade ratios, following the introduction of HFT participants,
whose strategies require frequent order entry and cancellation. The results also identify
significant changes in the millisecond periodicities in each of the two markets between
2003 and 2011. In particular, there are heightened levels of activity observed at a
frequency of 100ms for the LSE. Collectively, this evidence indicates a significant and
rapid acceleration of HFT activity in both marketplaces.
The reduction in spreads observed over the sample period in this chapter is consistent
with the theoretical predictions of Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), which suggest that
because HFT participants are better able to update their information sets relative to
other market participants, they incur lower adverse selection and inventory holding costs
as compared to traditional market makers.
In order to examine the impact of this increased HFT activity, the cancellation to trade
ratio is utilised as a proxy for HFT - as commonly used in the academic literature.
Relative effective spreads are used as a proxy for efficiency, and two measures are con-
structed to proxy for the level of integrity in the market - one for insider trading and
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the other for end-of-day manipulation. These metrics are integrated in a three-stage
simultaneous regression framework, which allows for the endogenous relationships that
may exist between each of the dependent variables while also controlling for fixed effects
arising from the regulatory environment and other external variations through time.
The results of the simultaneous equations regression framework indicate that the in-
creasing level of HFT participation on the LSE and Euronext-Paris markets have un-
ambiguously increased market efficiency by reducing bid-ask spreads. This result is
consistent with both the observed decrease in spreads through time and the theoretical
and empirical findings of previous HFT studies.
The results for market integrity suggest a negative relationship between HFT participa-
tion and dislocation of the end-of-day price, which is used as a proxy for closing price
manipulations. This evidence implies that while HFT participants may increase their
activity towards the end-of-day, they do not do so with enough force or co-ordination
to dislocate the closing price. Rather, it seems HFT participants actually reduce the
incidence of end-of-day manipulation by providing liquidity to potential manipulators,
minimising their impact on the market.
The impact of HFT on insider trading is less clear. While it appears that HFT partici-
pation is associated with less insider trading on Euronext, it seems to be associated with
more insider trading on the LSE. The ambiguous direction of this relationship may be a
function of the regulatory design or enforcement differences between the two markets, or
could be due to other market-specific structural changes not controlled for in the current
study.
Overall, the results indicate that the increase in the level of HFT activity in the past
decade has increased market efficiency without significantly harming the integrity of the
market. Indeed, there is evidence that the integrity of the market has actually improved
as the level of HFT participation has increased. This additional evidence on market
integrity dispels concerns that HFT participants undermine market quality by creating
an “uneven” playing field.
Chapter 5
Impact of Dark-Lit Order
Interaction
5.1 Introduction
Over the last decade an increasing fraction of equity market trading volume has changed
hands without pre-trade transparency. This dark trading occurs on both separate, ded-
icated venues, such as so-called dark pools, and on public venues that introduce dark
order types. The shift of trading to the dark has attracted the attention of regulators
and policy-makers worldwide, with particular interest focused on the implications of
dark trading for market quality.38 Proponents of dark trading argue that using dark
venues gives larger orders the opportunity to avoid being “front run” by sophisticated
computer algorithms that can detect large orders. On the other hand, opponents of dark
trading argue that it removes liquidity from visible (or “lit”) markets and harms market
participants by hampering the price discovery process.With the impact of dark trading
on market quality still uncertain, it has been difficult for regulators to determine what
action to take, or even if further regulation is necessary at all.
There are several difficulties with conducting empirical analysis of the impact of dark
trading on market quality. One major difficulty is that little data on dark trading
38For instance, Canadian regulators recently decided to take steps to significantly curtail dark trading
(starting October 12, 2012), which is the subject of the subsequent chapter.
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has been made available. Furthermore, new dark order types have little impact until a
sufficient proportion of market participants have access to them, which causes difficulties
in performing event type studies. Finally, dark trading may be endogenous to market
conditions, as highlighted in Buti et al. (2011b), and so it is challenging to establish a
causal relation without sufficiently granular data.
With these challenges in mind, this chapter conducts separate analyses on the effect
on market quality of both the introduction, and subsequent intra-day usage, of fully
hidden orders on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), using a proprietary order-level
data set. Dark orders on the TSX were largely introduced in two-stages. The TSX is
the main exchange in Canada with more than 60% market share in trading volume, and
all brokers are connected to it. From the first of April 2011, the constituent stocks of
the TSX60 (the main index) could be traded using dark orders; starting May 20, 2011,
all remaining symbols were enabled for dark trading. These dark on-exchange order
types are able to interact with non-dark orders as well as fully hidden orders. Using
this staggered introduction of dark trading an event study is performed to examine the
impacts of dark trading on market quality. A difference-in-differences design is employed
which controls for any market-wide fluctuations in the measures of market quality. The
order-level data enables the study of the intra-day relationship between dark trading
and market quality.
While the focus of this chapter is the examination of the impact of dark trading on a
visible exchange, the results also provide insight into dark trading in general. Specifically,
the results of this study also apply to a situation wherein a dark pool venue that matches
orders continuously is introduced alongside a visible market, assuming that trades in this
new dark pool occur at a price within the visible spread. Obtaining a fill on the dark
venue would therefore be cheaper and, ceteris paribus, market-order traders would have
incentive to send their order to the dark venue first and then route any unfilled portion
to the visible venue. Liquidity providers would then be in a similar situation as found
in this study, since they would have to account for the possibility of dark liquidity that
would execute before their quotes are hit. Thus, the observations from this analysis also
provides insight into the assessment of the impact of such dark pool trading.
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Furthermore, studies of markets in Canada are relevant to the world’s largest market,
the U.S., since many market players (such as high-frequency trading firms) are active in
both markets, and key features of market regulation, including so-called best execution
and order protection, apply in both markets.
5.2 Institutional Detail
Dark trading in Canada refers to a trading environment characterised by a lack of pre-
trade transparency. In other words, traders do not publicly reveal their trading inten-
tions. Canadian regulation does, however, mandate immediate post-trade transparency
of prices and quantities for all transactions, whether they be dark or lit.
Trading away from visible markets can occur in the form of broker crosses, electronic
(buy-side) crossing networks (e.g., Liquidnet), and continuous dark pools (e.g., ITG’s
MatchNow). Trading in Canada follows rules that, historically, have been designed
to foster transparency and trading on marketplaces with pre-trade transparency. For
instance, trades in the off-exchange market, colloquially referred to as “upstairs” trades,
have to follow a set of rules. Such orders fall under the “order exposure rule” which
requires that these orders be exposed to the public market.39 Once an upstairs cross
has been arranged, it must be reported to a public exchange immediately; Canada has
no trade reporting facilities as in the U.S. or Europe, and broker crosses are usually
posted on the TSX. Unlike the U.S., where a large fraction of retail orders are either
internalized by broker-dealers or sold in payment-for-order-flow arrangements, in Canada
off exchange internalisation is discouraged, and payment-for-order-flow arrangements are
illegal (including those using U.S. based systems).40
As mentioned earlier, the focus of this chapter is undisplayed, on-exchange orders, also
known as “dark orders”. In Canada, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and Chi-X
39An exception arises if the broker who facilitates an off-exchange trade provides price improvement.
If the order is sufficiently large (more than 50 standard trading units (usually 100 shares) or $100,000
in value), price improvement is not required, but order protection regulation still applies so that same-
priced orders on visible venues must be cleared; further details are outline in Section 6.4 of the Universal
Market Integrity Rules (UMIR). See also Smith, Turnbull and White (2001) for more details on the
Canadian upstairs market, or Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) for the French upstairs market.
40For the TSX Composite stocks there are, on average, less than two dealer crosses per day with an
average size in excess of 100,000 shares; see Table 5.1 for details.
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Canada offer the submission of priced orders that do not display any volume. These
dark orders are part of the limit order book and they interact with incoming marketable
orders. Dark orders can be either midpoint orders or priced limit orders. Midpoint
orders execute at the midpoint of the national best bid and offer price, provided that
the bid-ask spread is not locked or crossed.41 Submitters of midpoint orders can further
specify a limit price such that the order does not execute at prices outside of that limit.
Midpoint orders will generally have price priority though at the same price level, visible
orders receive priority over dark orders. In the sample, around 65% of all dark order
volume is midpoint pegged, and 66% of executions with dark orders involve midpoint-
pegged dark orders.
5.3 Data
The analysis uses a proprietary order-level data set, provided by the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSX).42 This data specifically identifies dealer crosses, and these trades are
excluded from the sample as the timing and size of crosses is likely to be determined
by a number of unobserved and uncontrollable factors. Most visible market trading in
Canada occurs on the TSX, TMX Select, Pure, Alpha, and Chi-X, and to compute their
respective market share, their volume data is obtained from SIRCA’s ThomsonReuters
Tick History.43 Data on shares outstanding, splits, and index status is obtained from
the monthly TSX e-Review publications. Data on the Canadian volatility index VIXC
is taken from the Montreal Exchange’s website. Trading days that have no or limited
U.S. trading (U.S. Thanksgiving and Black Friday, for example) are excluded as there is
little trading in Canada on these days. Information on scheduled U.S. market closures
is obtained from the NYSE Calendar.
41The NBBO is locked when the best bid on one venue is equal to the best ask on another. The NBBO
is crossed when the best bid on one venue is higher than the best ask on another.
42Legal disclaimer: TSX Inc. holds copyright to its data, all rights reserved. It is not to be reproduced
or redistributed. TSX Inc. disclaims all representations and warranties with respect to this information,
and shall not be liable to any person for any use of this information.
43The only visible market place that the data does not cover is Omega ATS; according to the annual
IIROC trading statistics (available on their website, www.iiroc.ca), Omega’s market share in 2011 was
below 2.2% of all dollar-volume.
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The TSX introduced dark orders in three phases, and this structure of introduction
informs the design of the analyses in this chapter. On March 15, 2011, three symbols
(BBD.B (Bombardier Class B shares), COS (Canadian Oil Sands), and SC (Shopper’s
Drugmart)) could be traded with dark orders. This was followed with the introduction
of the constituents of the TSX60, Canada’s blue-chip index, and all Exchange Traded
Funds (ETFs) on April 1st, 2011. Then, from May 23, 2011, all symbols were allowed
to be traded with dark orders. Figure 5.1 documents the level of dark trading on the
three dark venues during the sample period. The way in which these dark order types
were introduced allows for two separate natural experiments. The first is an event study
designed to understand the impact of the introduction of dark orders, is performed on
the April 1st adoption of dark orders for TSX60 symbols. The second is an analysis
into the effect of the actual usage of dark orders, and for this the intra-day occurrence
of dark trading is examined. For this second analysis to be meaningful a sufficiently
large uptake of dark orders is required, and so the second half of 2011 is used as the
sample period for this intra-day study, as by then dark trading was available for all
securities.44 To avoid potentially contaminating effects from the market opening and
the market-on-close facility (beginning at 3:40 p.m.) only data between 9:45 a.m. and
3:35 p.m. are used for this analysis.
The TSX data encompasses all incoming and outgoing information from the central
trading engine, including all messages from the (automated) message protocol between
the brokers and the exchange. These messages include all orders, cancellations and
modifications, trade reports, and details on dealer (upstairs) crosses. Each message
consists of up to 500 sub-entries, such as the date, ticker symbol, time stamp, price,
volume, and order visibility. As this chapter focuses solely on dark trading via the
limit order book, opening trades, odd-lot trades,45 dealer crosses, trades in the special
terms market, and trades occurring outside normal trading hours are all excluded. The
data also specifies the active (liquidity demanding) and passive (liquidity supplying)
party, thus identifying each trade as buyer- or seller-initiated. The data provides a
44It appears that a number of traders only started using these orders after they were available for all
securities.
45Odd-lot trades are portions of orders that are not in multiples of 100 shares; these are not cleared
via the limit order book, but they are automatically cleared via the so-called registered trader for that
symbol.
system message identifying the “prevailing quote”, the best bid and ask quotes, as well
as the depth at the best quotes, and is updated each time there is a change in the
price or depth of these quotes. Starting with the introduction of dark orders, the data
additionally provides the prevailing national best bid and offer prices.
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5.4 Sample Selection
The TSX Composite index is split into two groups: a treatment group of TSX60 stocks,
and a control group which comprises the remaining stocks. This control group, consisting
of companies that are in the TSX Composite but not in the TSX60, is also referred to
as the “TSX Completion” index. Companies must remain part of the TSX Composite
for the entire sample period to be included, and any securities that have stock splits are
also excluded (January - May for the introduction, January-December for the intra-day
analysis). Furthermore, stock-days with an average midpoint below $1, or stocks with
fewer than 10 transactions per day are also excluded. Fairfax Financial Holdings (FFH)
is also excluded as it has an average share price above $400 (the second highest priced
stock in the sample has an average price of around $120). Finally, because of damaged
data files and suspected data errors, all data for January 3rd, October 3rd and November
30th is excluded, and, for symbol ABX only, November 9th is excluded. These exclusions
leave 230 securities which are used for both the introduction and intra-day analysis. Of
these, 53 are constituents of the TSX60, with the remainder being constituents of the
TSX Completion Index. While it is not ideal to consider the TSX60 separately from the
rest of the market, this is the natural experiment that has presented itself. In order to
overcome the differences that may be inherent between the TSX60 and the remainder
of the market, only the TSX Completion index is used in the non-introduction control
sample. Additionally, controls are incorporated for differences in the price and level of
constraint of the securities, which should control for any structural trading differences
between the two samples.
5.5 Regression Methodology for the Introduction of Dark
Orders
To understand the impact of the introduction of dark orders, an event study approach
is used. A panel of TSX Completion constituents are used as a control group for the
TSX60 constituents to account for market-wide fluctuations. There is major limitation
to using the composite stocks as a control group, namely, TSX60 constituents are larger
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and trading in these stocks is more competitive. This manifests in the data in a number
of ways: for example, bid-ask spreads are smaller and depth is larger. These issues are
controlled for by including firm fixed effects.46
Further controls for daily fluctuations in market-wide volatility are introduced by using
the Canadian volatility index VIXC. This index is based on the implied volatility of
TSX60 index options. To account for the possibility that the TSX60 and the TSX
Completion constituents react differently to changes in this index, specifications were
estimated in which a differentiated response to the VIXC was allowed by interacting it
with a dummy for the TSX60 and the TSX Completion.
Degryse et al. (2011) and O’Hara and Ye (2011) show that market fragmentation plays
a major role in understanding trading costs. The method of Degryse et al. (2011)
is adopted, with fragmentation measured as one minus the per firm daily Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) based on the squared shares of total volume that are traded on
each venue. The contemporaneous observation of fragmentation is used as a security-
level control variable. For the sample of TSX Composite firms in the second half of 2011,
market fragmentation was about fifty percent, meaning half of all trading occurred
on the TSX, with the other half occurring on other venues; see Table 5.1 for further
fragmentation statistics.
To avoid biased standard errors (whether stemming from observations being correlated
across time by firm, or across firms by time, or both), an approach suggested in Petersen
(2009) is used. This approach compares a variety of specifications to determine which
fixed effects need to be included and on which variables the standard errors should be
clustered. Based on this approach, standard errors are clustered by both firm and date
for all specifications in this paper.47
46Alternatively, regression specifications were also run in which controls were introduced for size and
a number of other long-term, pre-event liquidity-determining measures; the results from this analysis
are similar. A number of securities are also cross-listed with U.S. exchanges. The results for the group
of cross-listed securities is similar to the main analysis, though the estimates have lower significance,
and the results for the non-cross-listed securities are inconclusive. There are, however, few non-cross-
listed securities in the TSX60, while there are few cross-listed securities in the control group of TSX
Completion securities, overall causing the tests to have low power. This analysis is thus omitted from
the dissertation.
47Cameron et al. (2011) and Thompson (2011) developed the double-clustering approach simultane-
ously. Controlling for autocorrelation of the errors for up to 5 lags had no impact on the results and
thus the results presented are without this correction.
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5.5.1 Part 1: Event Study.
The first part of this analysis is an event study performed on the effect of the introduction
of dark orders. This study is based on daily averages of a number of key measures. For
each measure, the following regression is run:
dependent variableit = αi+β1×eventt×tsx60i+β2×eventt+
n∑
j=1
β2+jcontrolijt+it, (5.1)
where: dependent variableit is the value of the dependent variable on day t for security i;
αi are firm fixed effects; eventt is an indicator variable taking the value 1 after the event
date, April 1st, 2011, and 0 before; tsx60i is an indicator variable taking the value 1 for
constituents of the TSX60 (the treatment group) and 0 otherwise; and controlijt are daily
realisations of security level control variables for the company, and depending on the
specifications, the log of the average daily mid-quote, the level of market fragmentation,
and the Canadian VIX (possibly interacted with the index constituency indicator). The
variable of interest in the regressions is the coefficient on the event-treatment group
interaction term, β1.
To further understand the effect of a change in the level of dark trading on the dependent
variables, a specification is constructed in which the daily percentage of dark volume is
included. This is defined as the percentage of daily TSX trading volume for which at
least one side of a trade is a dark order. Due to the endogeneity between dark trading
and measures of market quality (as identified by Buti et al. (2011b)), the specification is
estimated using a two-stage approach, whereby an instrument for the percentage of dark
trading is used. The interaction of the event with index constituency (eventt× tsx60i) is
used to instrument dark trading in the first stage. This instrument provides an exogenous
event which activates dark trading for the constituents of the TSX60 without impacting
dark trading for the remaining listed securities. The first stage regression is as follows:
% Dark Tradingit = αi + β1 × introductiont × TSX60i + β2 × introductiont
+β3VIXCt +
n∑
j=1
β3+jcontrolijt + it.
(5.2)
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This estimate of the level of dark trading is then used in the second-stage regression to
identify the impact of this dark trading on variables of market quality using Equation
5.3:
dependent variableit = αi + β1 ×% dark tradingit + β2 × eventt
+β3VIXCt +
n∑
j=1
β3+jcontrolijt + it.
(5.3)
The estimated coefficient β1 can then be interpreted as signifying the linear effect on
the dependent variable caused by a 1% increase in dark trading. A number of tests
are run to ensure that the regression is not misspecified and the Kleibergen and Paap
(2006) Wald statistic of under-identification is computed, which, for this specification,
is χ2(1) distributed. The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) statistic for weak identification
is also computed (critical values as per Andrews and Stock (2005)). Since only a single
instrument is used, it is not necessary to test for over-identification.48
In principle, the introduction of dark trading for non-TSX60 stocks after May 20, 2011,
could allow for the construction of a second event study. In reality, however, a simple
event study with a regressor such as second event 2 × non-TSX60 stock is difficult to
interpret. As the adoption of dark trading took place over time, the extent of dark
trading in the TSX60 stocks continued to increase past the second event date - that
is, after May 20, dark trading continued to change for both groups. This continuing
change in dark trading could instigate learning effects. In addition to this, dark trading
for TSX60 stocks may also be affected directly by the second event. One example
where this could occur is in a situation where a group of traders are trading in both
TSX60 and non-TSX60 stocks, but wait until the second event before starting to use
dark trading, perhaps because of technological limitations. With these two caveats in
mind, a specification similar to (5.3) is estimated, with the percentage of dark trading
instrumented by the interaction of the two events with the affected index constituents -
event1t×tsx60i and event2t×non-tsx60i. For this specification, however, many estimations
48Lindley’s paradox identifies that large data sets can result in inflated levels of significance. Robust-
ness tests were conducted clustering the errors so as to account for this phenomenon. The results of
these tests are qualitatively similar to those reported in this thesis
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led to a rejection of the over-identification test, as based on Hansen’s J-stat, indicating
that the IV coefficients did not vary significantly when using different subsets of the
excluded IV sets. This finding is consistent with the economic intuition that there
are spill-over effects following the second event. Any interpretation of the IV coefficient
would then be biased with the effect of the second event on the outcomes for non-TSX60
constituents. The results for these estimations are accordingly not presented.
5.5.2 Part 2: Intra-Day Analysis.
To understand what impact dark trading has had on liquidity, continuous dark trading
in TSX60 stocks is examined. Of particular interest is whether dark trading has an
impact on market liquidity.
Buti et al. (2011b) argue that there may be an endogenous relationship between market
quality variables and dark trading activity. As dark trading is found to be concentrated
in large, tick constrained stocks, it is difficult to determine whether dark trading has
helped constrain the spreads, or these constrained spreads have driven dark trading. To
overcome this endogeneity problem, it is necessary to instrument dark trading . The
fraction of dark order volume at time t − 1 is used as an instrument for the fraction
of dark trading volume at time t, where t is measured intra-day, and dark trading
volume is defined as the volume of trades for which a dark order was on the passive
side. The intuition behind this construction is that lagged dark orders correlate with
dark trading because orders precede executions. Since dark orders are invisible until
they are part of a trade, they cannot directly affect market quality measures that are
based on visible measures. Consequently, dark order volume should only affect market
quality variables when dark trades actually occur. Furthermore, dark order volume at
time t−1 is, arguably, not affected by future bid-ask spreads. One possible limitation of
this approach is that liquidity variables such as the bid-ask spread are serially correlated.
Therefore, when submitting a dark order at time t − 1, traders may form expectations
about the spreads at t.
As in the first part of the study, firm fixed effects are used and errors are double-clustered
by time and firm. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show that there are intra-day patterns in spreads,
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depth, volume, and volatility. To control for the possibility that the intra-day patterns
of observable variables affect outcomes, time-of-day fixed effects are also included. The
impact of dark order introduction is analysed in a number of specifications, that use
different controls, including the average log-midpoint in each 10-minute bucket, the
level of market fragmentation in each stock, and the daily realisation of the Canadian
VIX.49
The trading day is split into 35 10-minute intervals between 9:45 a.m. and 3:45 p.m., with
average liquidity measures computed and aggregated for each interval. Shorter intervals
are undesirable as they result in many empty observations for dark trading, while longer
time intervals (eg, daily) would negate the justification for the relationship between dark
orders and dark trades, as the dark orders would no longer be contemporaneous with
the executions that follow them.
In the first stage regression, the fraction of dark trades is instrumented using the fraction
of dark orders submitted in the preceding 10-minute period, as described in Equation
5.4:
% dark tradingit = β1% dark ordersit−1 + β2VIXCd +
n∑
j=1
β3+jcontrolijt + it. (5.4)
The following specification is then analysed using in the second-stage regression:
dependent variableit = αi + γ(k) + β1 ×+β2VIXCd +
n∑
j=1
β3+jcontrolijt + it (5.5)
where: αi and γ(k) are stock and 34 time-of-day fixed effects respectively;
50 VIXCd is the
daily realisation of the Canadian VIX. Contemporaneous stock-level control variables,
suggested by Degryse et al. (2011) are used. These include: volatility (the Hasbrouck
and Saar (2013) measure of maximum relative price fluctuation in a 10-minute time
49The Canadian VIX is equivalent to the U.S. VIX and is constructed by the Montreal Exchange. It
measures the market’s expectation of stock market volatility over the next 30 day period using index
options prices.
50In untabulated regressions day-dummies were included in addition to the other dummies; the results
are similar to the ones presented both in terms of magnitude of the effects and in terms of statistical
significance.
interval is used), volume, fill-rate (trade volume relative to order volume), and the
average execution size. Finally, the average of volatility, volume, and trade-size over all
stocks except for i are used as firm-level controls.
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The fraction of trading involving dark orders in stock i for time interval t, % dark tradingit,
is instrumented by % dark orderit−1, the fraction of dark orders one period lagged, in
the first stage of the regression. Since the variable % dark orderit−1 is not defined for
the first interval of the day, the first observation for each day is dropped. Both the
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald statistic of under-identification and the Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) statistic for weak identification are computed to test for misspecifica-
tion in the first step of the two-stage regression. Since a single instrument is used, a test
for over-identification is unnecessary.
5.6 Liquidity Measures
A number of liquidity measures are used to proxy the liquidity that is available in the
Canadian market. These include quoted spreads, realised spreads, effective spreads,
the $Depth at the best bid and ask, the fill rates, and the volume traded daily. The
construction of each of these measures is discussed in detail in the following section.
5.6.1 Quoted Visible Liquidity
Quoted liquidity is measured using time-weighted quoted spreads and depth. The quoted
spread is the difference between the lowest price a participant is willing to sell, or the
best offer price, and the highest price a participant is willing to buy, or the best bid
price.51Share depth is defined as the average of the number of shares that can be traded
on the bid and offer side, and dollar depth is defined as the value that can be traded
at the bid and the offer. The time weighted measures reflect the availability of liquidity
throughout the day.
51Spreads can also be expressed in basis points as a proportion of a prevailing quote midpoint. The
advantage of the proportional spread is that, in principle, one can compare companies with different
price levels. However, in today’s markets, most stocks trade at spreads between 1-2 cents. As spreads
follow the discrete and fixed increments in cents, it is possible that effects (or non-effects) can be driven
entirely by movements in the underlying stock price (i.e., the denominator in proportional spreads).
The analysis is performed using cent-spreads, with additional controls for the daily price levels of the
underlying stocks (Joel Hasbrouck lead a discussion on this topic during a recent NBER microstructure
group meeting).
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The event study focuses on the effect of dark order introduction on the TSX spread,
and thus uses the best bid-ask spread as quoted on the TSX alone. For the intra-
day analysis, however, the TSX-only and the Canada-wide spread measures are both
computed. Depth is constructed for the TSX only; depth data for the other trading
venues is not provided by the TSX, and the integrity of the time-stamps cannot be
guaranteed across the multiple sources of data.
5.6.2 Effective Liquidity with and without Maker-Taker Fees
Effective liquidity captures the conditions upon which traders decided to act. The costs
of a transaction to the liquidity demander are measured by the effective spread, which is
the difference between the transaction price and the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes
at the time of the transaction. This measure also captures the costs that arise when the
volume of an incoming order exceeds the posted volume at the best prices. For the t-th
trade in stock i, the effective spread is defined as:
espreadti = 2qti(pti −mti), (5.6)
where pti is the transaction price, mti is the midpoint of the quote prevailing at the time
of the trade, and qti is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if the trade is buyer-initiated
and −1 if the trade is seller-initiated. The data includes identifiers for the active and
passive side of each transaction, as well as all quote changes, thus allowing the prevailing
quote at the time of each transaction to be identified. A large fraction of dark orders in
the sample are at the midpoint which results in an effective spread of zero.
To account for the fee that traders of marketable orders pay the exchange (the “taker”
fee) an adjusted spread is also computed:
taker fee adjusted espreadti = 2qti(pti −mti) + 2× taker feeti. (5.7)
Colliard and Foucault (2012) refer to this measure as the “cum-fee” spread. In Canada
(as in the U.S.), these fees are sub-penny amounts that accrue per share traded. On the
TSX, these fees can differ by broker - high-volume brokers pay lower fees. The lowest
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taker fee on the TSX is $0.0033 per share, and this is the value used in this study. The
highest is $0.0035.52 For orders that execute against a dark order, both the active and
passive fees are $0.001 per share.
The change in liquidity provider profits is measured by decomposing the effective spread
into its permanent and transitory components, the price impact and the realised spread :
espreadti = priceimpactti + rspreadti. (5.8)
Price impact reflects the proportion of transaction costs that are due to the presence
of informed liquidity demanders. Therefore, a decline in price impact costs indicates a
decline in the degree of adverse selection. The realised spread reflects the portion of
the transaction costs that is attributed to liquidity provider revenues. In this analysis
the five-minute realised spread is used, which assumes that liquidity providers are able
to close their positions at the midpoint five minutes after the trade. The five-minute
realised spread is defined using Equation 5.9:
rspreadti = 2qti(pti −mt+5 min,i), (5.9)
where: pti is the transaction price; mt+5 min,i is the midpoint of the quote 5 minutes after
the t-th trade; and qti is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the trade is buyer-initiated,
and −1 if the trade is seller-initiated.
As with effective spreads, the impact of maker rebates can be explicitly accounted for
by computing the maker rebate adjusted realised spread, using Equation 5.10 below:
maker rebate adjusted rspreadti = 2qti(pti −mt+5 min,i) + 2×maker rebateti (5.10)
where: maker rebateti is the per share maker fee rebate,
53 and the highest possible rebate
is used, which is $0.0031. Dark orders that clear against incoming marketable orders
receive no rebate.
52This information is provided by the TSX and is available at
www.tmx.com/en/trading/feeschedule/
53As with taker fees, maker fees depend on the amount of dollar volume that a broker executes on the
exchange.
5.7 Results on the Introduction of Dark Orders
Table 5.1 provides a summary set of statistics for the sample of firms, during the period
of July 1st to December 31st, 2011, a period when dark trading was available for all
229 securities. TSX60 firms are larger and trade more frequently than TSX Completion
firms. As a fraction of orders and trade volume, dark trading in the groups is similar
(3.3% dark trading for TSX60 stocks as compared to 2.7% for TSX completion stocks).
Dark orders are between 2.4 and 3 times larger than standard limit orders. Transaction
sizes of dark and lit trades are similar, but this size depends on the incoming marketable
(not-necessarily dark) order, and so is not directly reflective of the available dark liq-
uidity. During the sample period, around 66% of the total Canadian dollar-volume
occurs on the TSX, consistent with the TSX’s overall market share of trading, as per
the regulator’s published statistics.
Quoted depth on the TSX in terms of number of shares is comparable between the
TSX60 and TSX Completion constituents, but since share prices for TSX60 constituents
are larger, posted dollar-value is also higher for TSX60 constituents. Bid-ask spreads for
TSX Completion constituents are larger, and the midpoint more volatile, as compared
to TSX60 constituents.
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
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5.7.1 Quoted Liquidity
Figure 5.4 shows that the quoted spread increases after the introduction of dark orders.
The average quoted spreads before and after the introduction are 2.18 cents and 2.44
cents, respectively, for the TSX60 symbols, and 2.82 cents and 2.85 cents, respectively,
for the TSX Completion firms.
The panel regression results for the change in the quoted spreads are in Panel A of Table
5.2. These results confirm that spreads for TSX60 stocks increased after the introduction
of dark orders. The increase is estimated to be between 0.24 to 0.32 cents, depending on
the specification, and are significant at the 5% level. The average time-weighted quoted
spread before April 1st, 2011 for TSX60 constituents was 2.18 cents, and thus marks
an increase in spreads of between 11-15%. This result implies that liquidity suppliers
may be more reticent to quote at the best bid and ask during the introduction of dark
orders. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Zhu (2013) who contends
the existence of midpoint dark orders will attract uninformed traders but not informed
traders, leaving a higher level of adverse selection in the lit market. This result is found
to be robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls for volatility, fragmentation and the
price of the security.
Table 5.3 displays the first-stage results from the instrumental variable regression; the
instrument is significant at the 1% level and all tests of over and under identification
are rejected.
Panel B of Table 5.2 displays the results from the second-stage instrumental variable
regression. Depending on the specification, a 1% increase in the usage of dark orders
leads to a widening of the spread of between 0.25 and 0.32 cents. This observation is
consistent with the finding from the first regression - the fraction of dark trading was
about 1% by the end of May. These results of the spreads analysis are also consistent
with Buti et al. (2011b), who show that the introduction of fully hidden orders widens
quoted bid-ask spreads.
Figure 5.5 indicates that depth decreased between January and June 2011; however, the
decline was before the introduction of dark orders, and depth was constant afterwards.
Table 5.3: First Stage of the IV Regression on the Introduction of Dark Orders
That is, even though the panel regression results for the change in the quoted depth (from
Table 5.2) indicate a decrease, the graph indicates that the drop happened before the
introduction of dark orders. This effect is accordingly not attributed to the introduction
of dark orders; when the regression is run for a shorter event window (e.g., starting
mid-February), there is no effect for depth.
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5.7.2 Effective Liquidity
As orders are allowed to execute at the midpoint in the dark, an increase in quoted
spreads is not necessarily correlated with an increase in effective spreads. Neverthe-
less, Panel A of Table 5.4 shows that after the introduction of dark trading, effective
spreads increased significantly. The increase in quoted spreads dominates any reduction
in effective spreads resulting from midpoint executions.
Similarly, since taker fees for executions against dark orders are lower, an increase in
effective spreads without taker fees need not be accompanied by an increase in effective
spreads with taker fees. Once again, however, Panel A of Table 5.4 shows after the
introduction of dark orders, effective spreads with taker fees also increased.
5.7.3 Other Measures of Market Quality
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show that the introduction of dark orders had no impact on realised
spreads (including maker fees), price impact, or volume. The fill rate (i.e., the fraction
of order volume that is executed) is also unaffected. A measure of midpoint volatility is
also computed, following Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), whereby the day is split into 36
10-minute intervals. For each of these, the difference between the highest and the lowest
midpoint is computed and scaled by the average midpoint. The average over these 36
periods is the daily midpoint volatility. No change is found after the introduction of
dark orders for this volatility measure.
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Table 5.5: Panel Regression Results for Volume-Weighted Realised Spreads and Price
Impacts
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Spreads can also be expressed as a proportion of the prevailing quoted midpoint (i.e.,
in basis points). The introduction of dark orders is found to have no significant effect
on basis point spreads. The advantage of the proportional spread is that stocks with
different price levels may be more comparable, though these effects (or non-effects) can
be driven entirely by movements in the underlying stock price (i.e., the denominator in
proportional spreads). For the period July to December 2011, volume-weighted effective
spreads are just under 2.0 cents for TSX60 stocks, and 2.6 cents for TSX Completion
stocks, and so while they are different, this difference is not major. When scaled by the
midpoint, however, effective spreads are 5.4 basis points for TSX60 stocks, and 16.8 for
the TSX Completion stocks, a difference arising from the lower prices (on average) at
which TSX completion stocks trade; as TSX Completion stocks trade at lower dollar
prices, their proportional spreads are systematically more sensitive to price changes.
Due to this systematic difference, the regressions for the spreads in basis points are not
unbiased, and so have not been reported.
5.8 Results for the Intra-Day Usage of Dark Orders
Table 5.7 presents results from a two-stage instrumental variable regression analysis of
equation (5.5). As described earlier, in this regression the percentage of dark orders
submitted at t−1 is used as an instrument for the percentage of dark executions at time
t. Table 5.7 indicates that this instrument is highly significant and that all tests for
over-, under- and weak specification are rejected for all of the estimated specifications.
Table 5.8 illustrates that transactions involving dark orders occur at wider spreads than
transactions that involve only lit orders. One reason this can occur is that, when spreads
are large, traders may submit orders to tighten the spread. If these new quotes cross
the midpoint, an execution against a dark midpoint order will occur, if such an order
exists. Such an execution differs fundamentally from a dark pool trade - these specifically
require that both sides of a trade deliberately access the dark pool at the same time.
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Table 5.7: First Stage of the IV Regression on the Intra-Day Impact of Trading in
Dark Orders
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Table 5.8: Summary Statistics Dark vs. Lit Trading
5.8.1 Quoted Liquidity
Table 5.9 presents the results from the estimations of the intra-day impact of dark trading
on quoted liquidity. These results show that a 1% increase in dark trading decreases
TSX spreads by between 0.019 to 0.027 cents, depending on the model specification.
Increases in dark trading also lead to an increase in quoted depth, and this result is
statistically significant at the 1% level
Taken together, these findings indicate improvements in quoted liquidity that are asso-
ciated with contemporaneous increases in dark trading. This finding is notable for two
reasons: firstly, the results from the introduction of dark trading indicate that quoted
spreads increased following the introduction of dark trading; secondly, that one fact
unique to dark trading is that the prevailing quoted spreads for trades that involve
a dark order are greater than when the trade only involves lit orders (see Table 5.8).
Trades against dark orders can be identified from the published trades, and are primarily
identified as being within-spread executions.54 An explanation for this surprising finding
is that traders may post wider spreads when they suspect that a dark midpoint order
may be present. When an execution against a dark order is observed, traders learn that:
(a) there was a dark order; and (b) dark liquidity has now been reduced. These traders
may then be posting quotes more aggressively in order to capture the dark liquidity that
they know was recently in existence.
54TMX offers a number of data feeds. The cheapest of these rounds prices and thus midpoint executions
at one cent spreads are not identifiable; data from Thomson Reuters Tick History is based on this feed.
Professional traders and major brokerages, however, usually subscribe to the Level 2 feed which provides
more detailed information.
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5.8.2 Effective Liquidity
Table 5.10 examines the impact of changes in effective spreads associated with increases
in dark trading. These measures are estimated both in terms of the raw effective spread
and the effective spread plus the maker-taker fee. The table documents that a 1%
increase in dark trading is associated with a 0.45 cent decline in effective spreads. The
point estimate of 0.45 cents is remarkably consistent across the both constructions of
the effective spread. The decrease in trading costs associated with dark trading is also
robust to the inclusion of controls for a variety of market conditions, including market
wide volatility, price, level of fragmentation, traded volume, the average order size in
the preceding week, the average fill rate, unsystematic (stock-specific) volatility as well
as controls for the traded value, size and volatility in all other symbols. This finding of
reduced transaction costs in the presence of dark trading is consistent with the findings
for previous measures of liquidity, such as reduced quoted and realised spreads.
Table 5.11 illustrates that this effect applies not only when the effective spread is com-
puted based on the local TSX best bid and offer prices, but also when the effective
spread is based on the national mid-quote. Effective spreads for orders that involve
visible trades on the passive side are also computed. Here, reductions in the spread are
also found, with similar magnitudes to the reduction in the quoted spread. In other
words, the reduction in effective spreads is not solely caused by the zero-spreads that
dark midpoint executions generate, but also by more aggressive quoting by liquidity
providers leading to reduced quoted spreads.
5.8.3 Volume
For TSX data, it is generally observed that quoted spreads at transactions are lower
than time-weighted quoted spreads, indicating that executions occur when spreads are
small. As dark trading reduces spreads, one can expect an increase in volume, and the
results shown in Table 5.12 indicate that this is what has occurred. Additionally, the
ratio of executed to submitted volume, which can be interpreted as the fill-rate, is also
examined to determine if it is affected by dark trading. As Table 5.12 shows, fill-rates
increase with higher levels of dark trading, including for orders executed solely on lit
markets.
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5.8.4 Price Impact and Volatility
Tables 5.12 and 5.13 outline that there is a reduction in price impact and volatility
following increases in dark trading. One possible explanation for this effect is that
although informed traders will trade regardless of the spread, there are some price-
sensitive, uninformed traders that act only once spreads are sufficiently small and who
are thus attracted by the reduction in spreads that occurs following dark executions.
This finding is consistent with those of Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2012) - that
uninformed traders are more likely to move to the dark.
The decline in the price impact is then consistent with the arguments made for the
result on quoted liquidity: upon observing dark executions (which, by themselves, reduce
the price impact), traders submit limit orders attempting to pick off the dark orders.
Assuming the purpose of these trades is to execute cheaply against the dark order, the
information content of such trades is small, and thus the price impact is low. Table 5.13
further outlines a decline in volatility, in line with the reduced average price impact over
the time interval.
The effects of dark orders on effective spreads presented are not only statistically signif-
icant, but also economically significant. For each 1% increase in dark order executions,
effective spreads (an active order execution cost) reduce by 0.045 cents. This is more
than double the net exchange fee (i.e. the taker fee minus the maker rebate) that the
TSX charges per transaction (being 0.02 cents).
5.9 Conclusion
The impact of dark trading is studied from two angles. Firstly, the impact of the intro-
duction of dark orders is analysed using a difference-in-differences approach. Consistent
with Buti, et al. (2011a)’s theoretical predictions, the introduction of dark orders is
found to increase both quoted and effective spreads, suggesting that dark trading causes
an increase in trading costs. No changes are found in volume or volatility as a result of
this introduction.
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Secondly, the usage of dark orders at the intra-day level is examined to understand how
dark trading is treated by market participants. Dark trading is found to lead to lower
spreads, higher volume, and lower volatility. The findings of these two separate studies
present two sides of the same coin: upon observing dark executions, traders may infer
that existing dark liquidity is diminished, and may thus post quotes more aggressively,
either to access this dark liquidity or to determine if it still exists.
Overall, however, these results may understate the potential benefits of having the option
to trade with dark orders, as standard liquidity measures do not capture several of their
potential advantages. For example, traders may benefit by switching from submitting
marketable orders to posting dark midpoint orders. Dark orders have high fill rates, and
execute at a price that is superior to the visible quotes. Furthermore, limit orders of
market participants who don’t have the ability to monitor the market at high frequencies
may become stale, and allowing midpoint-pegged dark orders gives these traders an
option to avoid this pitfall. Finally, marketable orders that execute against dark orders
always obtain a superior price. While the effective spread does account for these savings,
the uptake of dark orders immediately after their introduction may have been too low
to reflect this benefit — the uptake continued to increase well past the time frame that
can be used for the difference-in-difference analysis.
Chapter 6
The Impact of Continuous
External Dark Pools
6.1 Introduction
Dark trading refers to trades that are executed without pre-trade transparency. While
it has long been a feature of equity markets in the form of upstairs block trades, it is
only in recent years, with the introduction of continuous dark pools for smaller sized
non-transparent orders, that dark trading has attracted the attention of regulators and
policy makers worldwide. Dark pools have been very successful in attracting order flow,
and are estimated to account for approximately 15% of US consolidated volume, 14%
in Australia, and 10% in Canada.55 Proponents of dark trading attribute this success
to certain attributes, such as the ability to avoid large orders being front run, reduced
information leakage, and lower market impact costs.
The rapid increase of dark market share has caused considerable concern among market
regulators. For example, the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed rules
in 2009 for the “Regulation of non-public trading interest”, the Committee of European
55 The US estimate is from Rosenblatt Securities for April 2013. The Australian estimate is from
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Report 331 for the September quarter 2012 and
includes some internalization. The Canadian estimate combines statistics from the Investment Industry
Regulatory Organization of Canada and proprietary data obtained for this study and corresponds to the
period Aug-Dec 2012.
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Securities Regulators (CESR) has undertaken a review of dark trading with recommen-
dations to limit the activities of broker crossing systems; and the Australian Securities
Investment Commission (ASIC) released a report in 2013 identifying their intention to
restrict the kinds of trades that can be undertaken in the dark.56 Although these regula-
tory bodies have all conducted public consultations for proposed limits on dark trading,
they have hesitated to introduce any new regulations for dark trading. Such hesitance
reflects the scarcity of evidence on the costs and benefits of dark pools, the distribution
of costs and benefits among the different market participants. This chapter aims to
address this problem by providing empirical evidence on the impact of continuous dark
trading on market quality.
The investigation in this chapter focuses on the dark trading minimum price improve-
ment rules introduced in Canada in October 2012 - the first such regulation in the world.
These rules require that dark orders of 5,000 shares or less provide one full tick of price
improvement (or half a tick if the spread is constrained at one tick). These rules reduced
the amount of dark trading in Canada by over one third on the day of their introduction.
This unique natural experiment, together with proprietary trade-level data from dark
trading venues, allows the study of the causal impact of dark trading on liquidity and
informational efficiency, both in dark pools and dark trades in lit venues. By using a
two-stage instrumental variables analysis with the rule change as an exogenous instru-
ment, the endogeneity issues that have hindered the empirical analysis of dark trading
and market quality are avoided.
One of the main concerns raised by market participants and market operators during
the consultation process for the minimum price improvement regulation was that dark
trading would migrate to the US to circumvent the new rules. Given that a large number
of Canadian stocks are cross-listed in the US, such a shift could harm the overall quality
of the Canadian market. In order to test the possibility of such “regulatory flight”, a
difference-in-differences model is constructed to compare dark trading volume in cross-
listed stocks with dark trading volume in matched samples of stocks listed only in Canada
and the US.
56 ASIC Report 331 “Dark liquidity and high-frequency trading”.
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6.2 Continuous Dark Trading
6.2.1 Trading Venues and Order Types
Canada has experienced rapid fragmentation of its trading landscape over the last
decade. In addition to the main listing exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX),
there are currently five Alternative Trading Systems, on which trading occurs with pre-
trade transparency (referred to as “lit” venues): Alpha, Chi-X, Pure Trading, TMX-
Select, and Omega. TSX is still the dominant market, executing approximately 61% of
Canadian dollar volume during the sample period, followed by Alpha (15%) and Chi-X
(13%). Additionally, there are four continuous auction venues in which orders can be
submitted without pre-trade transparency: ITG’s MatchNow, Alpha Intraspread, Chi-X
and TSX.57 MatchNow and Alpha Intraspread fall into the category of markets often
referred to as “dark pools” because only dark orders can be submitted to these venues
and therefore dark orders execute exclusively against other dark orders. They account
for approximately 3.0% and 2.5% of Canadian dollar volume, respectively, during the
sample period. In contrast, Chi-X and TSX allow dark orders in addition to lit orders
and the two types of orders interact and can execute against one another. Following the
introduction of the minimum price improvement rules in 2012, Alpha Intraspread (which
had been a stand-alone continuous dark pool) was merged with the Alpha lit exchange.
Subsequently, Intraspread orders are able to interact with both lit and dark liquidity,
similar to the situation in both the TSX and Chi-X. Table 6.1 provides a summary of
the market shares, order types and other characteristics of each of the Canadian trading
venues.
Prior to 15 October 2012, all dark orders were required to provide some price improve-
ment, resulting in dark executions within the national best bid and offer (NBBO) spread.
The required amount of price improvement, however, was not specified in legislation.
MatchNow and Intraspread both offered two types of price improvement: midpoint (i.e.,
50% improvement over the NBBO) and 20% (on MatchNow) or 10% (on Instraspread)
improvement over the NBBO. Price improvement of 10%, for example, means that if
57 MatchNow was launched in July 2007. Intraspread was launched in May 2011. Chi-X introduced
dark midpoint orders in February 2008. TSX introduced dark orders between April and May 2011, as
analysed in the previous chapter.
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Table 6.1: Summary of all trading venues in Canada
a stock has a national best bid of $10.00 and a national best offer of $10.01, a passive
dark buy order could be placed at a price of $10.001 (an improvement of 10% of the
NBBO spread) and a passive dark sell order could be placed at a price of $10.009 (also
an improvement of 10% of the NBBO spread).
Both MatchNow and Intraspread previously supported price priority, meaning a passive
midpoint order would execute before a passive 20% or 10% price improvement order.
When an active order is submitted to a dark pool, the matching engine first checks
if there are any passive orders available to execute against. If there are, the order is
executed and immediately reported to the Canadian marketplace.58 If the active order
cannot be matched it is either cancelled (akin to a fill or kill order) or it is forwarded
to a lit venue based on the user’s routing table preferences. TSX and Chi-X previously
only offered floating midpoint orders, which could execute against both incoming active
lit orders as well as other dark orders.
58 The reporting is facilitated by TMX Datalinx and is required according to Universal Market Integrity
Rules. While this forms a consolidated feed of quotes and trades, it does not provide the NBBO
for Canada; rather, participants must reconstruct it from the order flow. For more information see
www.tmxdatalinx.com.
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The order execution priority rules in Canada differ significantly from those in other
countries, primarily in the existence of broker preferencing, which allows passive orders
resting in the limit order book to break time priority if an incoming active order is
from the same broker. Many of the dark trading venues have employed unique priority
systems in order to differentiate themselves from other venues. Of these, the most
complex are found on Alpha Intraspread. Intraspread provides priority based on the
amount of price improvement first, with orders offering 50% of the spread receiving
priority over those that offer 10% of the spread. Given equal price improvement, broker
preferencing provides priority for orders from the same broker. Assuming equality on
these two rules, priority will be given to passive orders that are able to fulfil the entire
active order. If all four of these priorities are equivalent, time priority will be given to
the oldest order.
In addition to the continuous dark pools, systems to negotiate block trades without pre-
trade transparency have existed for decades. Two that currently operate in Canada are
Liquidnet and Instinet. These venues provide “trade blotter” services that facilitate the
execution of “upstairs” trades. Typically, clients enter their desire to trade large blocks
into the system. The system then identifies whether any potential counterparties exist,
and if so, allows the counterparties to negotiate the trade anonymously. While these
systems also have limited or no pre-trade transparency, they differ from dark pools that
have captured significant market share in recent years in that they are generally only
used by large institutional traders, are non-continuous, and only offer services for block
trades. Although block trading facilities have existed for many years, the combined
market share of Liquidnet and Instinet in Canadian equities during the third quarter of
2012 was only 0.2%.59 Brokers are also able to internalize orders off-market. The order
exposure rule requires however, that internalised trades are provided one full tick of
price improvement, in conjunction with the fair access regulations that prohibit venues
from providing exclusive access to certain types of clients.60 This has hampered the
development of automated “internalizers” such as those that exist in the US, Australia
and elsewhere.
59 This statistic is taken from the IIROC “Marketplace Statistics Report” available at www.iiroc.ca.
60 See the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR) section 6.3.
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6.3 Minimum Price Improvement Regulation
The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) sets and enforces
the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR), which govern trading on debt and equity
marketplaces in Canada. On 13 April 2012 IIROC notice 12-0130 announced changes
to the UMIR, which became effective on 15 October 2012. These changes imposed
a minimum threshold for price improvement by dark orders of one full tick relative
to the prevailing NBBO, except where the spread is already constrained to one tick,
in which case dark orders are allowed at the midpoint of the NBBO (half a tick price
improvement). An exemption to this requirement was allowed for dark orders larger than
either 50 standard trading units (STU) - usually 5,000 shares or $100,000.61 Such large
dark orders are able to execute at the NBBO, without providing any price improvement,
as long as they give priority to lit orders at the same price on the same trading venue.
Prior to the change in regulation, dark orders were required to provide a “better price”
than the prevailing NBBO but with no minimum increment of price improvement to
constitute a “better price”.62
The minimum price improvement requirements caused a significant decline in dark vol-
ume, and a change in the prices at which dark trades execute. Figure 6.1 documents the
significant decrease in dark volume as a result of the change in regulation. The level of
dark trading fell from approximately 7.5% of dollar volume during the two months pre-
ceding the regulatory change to approximately 4.6% in the two months after the change
- a decrease of over one third. The reduction in dark trading occurred very quickly and
distinctly around the change in regulation.
Figure 6.2 shows that prior to the introduction of the minimum price improvement
requirements approximately 70% of orders were executed at fractional price increments
(10% and 20% of the NBBO spread), which are not allowed under the new rules, and
the remaining 30% executed at the midpoint. Under the new regulation, fractional
price improvement orders disappeared and almost all dark trading now takes place at
61 A standard trading unit is 100 shares for stocks priced above $1.00, 1,000 shares for stocks priced
between $0.10 and $1.00, and 10,000 shares for stocks priced below $0.10.
62 The UMIR defined “better price” simply as a lower price than the best ask price in the case of a
purchase and higher price than the best bid price in the case of a sale.
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Figure 6.1: Dark Trading in Canada as a Percentage of Consolidated Dollar Volume
the midpoint of the NBBO (99.8% of all dark trades). Although the rule change still
allowed large dark orders to execute at the NBBO after giving priority to lit orders, such
dark orders are rare and account for a negligible fraction of dark trades.
To comply with the new regulations all venues providing dark orders were required to
adjust the types of dark orders provided. Table 6.2 documents these changes for each
venue. For the continuous dark pools Intraspread and MatchNow, orders offering 10%
or 20% price improvement were removed on 15 October 2012. Intraspread retained
dark midpoint orders and added the potential for large orders to execute at the NBBO.
MatchNow removed their 20% order type but chose not to introduce orders at the NBBO,
offering only midpoint orders after the rule change. Chi-X and TSX did not need to
remove any dark order types to comply with the new rules because they did not provide
dark orders at increments finer than the midpoint. Both exchanges enabled large orders
to execute at the NBBO, although as shown in Figure 6.2 these orders never account
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Figure 6.2: Price Improvement Provided by Dark Trades
for more than %0.3 of daily volume.
6.4 Data
The constituents of the TSX Composite Index (which comprises approximately 250
of the most actively traded Canadian listed securities), are analysed over a period of
two months either side of the introduction of the minimum price improvement rules (15
August 2012 - 15 December 2012).63 Tick-by-tick data is combined for lit and dark trades
from a number of sources. Proprietary data on all dark trades executed on MatchNow,
63Two trading days in which the US markets were closed (during US Thanksgiving and Hurricane
Sandy) are removed, so that the sample is consistent across all analyses including those that use US
data.
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Table 6.2: Effect of price improvement regulation by venue
Intraspread, Chi-X, and Alpha is obtained directly from the trading venues.64 The data
on dark trades includes the stock ticker, date, time, price and volume. As it has not
been possible to obtain data on dark trades executed on the TSX or dark block trades
negotiated on Liquidnet/Instinet, the measures of dark trading presented as a fraction
of the total dollar volume are therefore lower bounds.
Estimates from other sources provide an indication of the coverage of the dark trading
data. The previous chapter reports that TSX dark trades at the beginning of 2012 ac-
count for approximately 2.3% of total Canadian dollar volume, and IIROC Marketplace
Statistics indicate that in the third quarter of 2012 Liquidnet and Instinet together ac-
counted for only 0.2% of total Canadian dollar volume, including traded block volume.
The dark trades for which data is available account for 7.2% of total Canadian dollar
volume before the rule change, which when combined with the dark trades for which
data is unavailable (approximately 2.3% + 0.2% = 2.5% of total dollar volume) suggests
that before the rule change dark trading on all Canadian marketplaces accounted for
7.2% + 2.5% = 9.7% of total dollar volume. Therefore, the sample contains approxi-
mately three quarters (7.2% / 9.7%) of the dark trades on all Canadian marketplaces.
64This proprietary data consists only of information that was publically reported to the consolidated
tape.
Chapter 6. The Impact of Continuous External Dark Pools 164
The lack of dark trading data from the TSX is unlikely to significantly alter our results,
as although it is the largest venue in Canada, it did not experience any change in the
type of dark trades that could be offered as a result of the minimum price improvement
regulations. Both TSX and Chi-X already only offered 50% (ie. midpoint) dark trades.
Very little shift was observed in Chi-X dark volumes as a result of the minimum price
improvement, and it is likely for this reason that there would have been a similarly small
change in the dark volumes observed on the TSX.
Data for all lit trades and quotes for all Canadian lit marketplaces (Alpha, Omega, TSX,
TMX Select, Pure and Chi-X) is obtained from the Thomson Reuters Tick History
database.65 Lit trades contain information on the stock ticker, date, time, price and
volume, and the quotes comprise the best bid and ask quotes at every point in time for
every venue, with timestamps on trades and quotes recorded to the millisecond. The
best bid and ask quotes are consolidated across all lit Canadian venues at every point
in time to obtain the NBBO.
To examine the impact of the minimum price improvement rule on the migration of lit
and dark trading volume, similar trade-level data for the US markets is obtained from the
Thomson Reuters Tick History database. Lit trades and quotes are consolidated across
all lit US trading venues. A proxy for US dark trading is arrived at by using transactions
reported to Trade Reporting Facilities (TRF). TRFs are used to report dark trades and
block trades negotiated away from lit marketplaces. The US dark trading proxy is only
used in an alternative test of possible dark trading migration and is not used in the main
analysis of Canadian dark trading and market quality.
Data on shares outstanding, stock splits, index constituents and cross-listed securities
is obtained from the monthly TSX e-Review publications. The sample is restricted to
stocks that are included in the TSX Composite Index at both the start and end of the
sample period to avoid effects arising from index inclusion and deletion. This results in
246 Canadian stocks. To avoid problems associated with differing STU’s and tick sizes,
stocks with a price less than $1 are omitted. This criterion removes five stocks, leaving
a final sample of 241 stocks.
65The data for Omega only became available from July 2012, hence its inclusion in this chapter despite
exclusion in the previous chapter.
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For the purpose of calculating market quality metrics, the regular market hours of 9:30am
- 4:00pm are used, less the first and last 15 minutes to exclude the impacts of the opening
auction and market on close facility, though these periods as well as the opening and
closing auctions, are included in the summations of daily volume.
6.5 Method
6.5.1 Instrumental Variables Regressions
One of the main challenges in empirically studying the impact of dark trading on mar-
ket quality is the endogeneity of dark trading with respect to market conditions. For
example, dark trading tends to increase when spreads are structurally constrained to
the minimum tick size because dark trades are allowed to occur within the spread at
sub-penny price increments (Kwan et al., 2013). Buti et al. (2011b) find that dark pool
activity is higher when limit order depth is high, spreads are narrow and tick sizes are
large. They argue that the conditional nature of the decision to execute in the dark re-
sults in an endogeneity issue between market quality variables and dark trading activity.
To overcome the endogeneity issue, the introduction of the minimum price improvement
rule is used as an instrumental variable (IV) for dark trading in a two-stage regression
framework. This allows for the creation of a series of dark trades which is highly cor-
related with actual dark trading and which varies exogenously due to the change in
the regulations. This allows the potentially endogenous nature of dark trading to be
eliminated in the instrument. In the first stage, the level of dark trading in stock i is
regressed on a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the minimum price improve-
ment rule and 0 otherwise, and a time trend to remove any general trends in the level
of dark trading that are unrelated to the price improvement rule, as shown in Equation
6.1:
Darkit = α+ β1D
PostPeriod
t + β2Timet + it, (6.1)
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where: Darkit is the fraction of dollar volume in stock i on day t that is dark, D
PostPeriod
t =
1 after the rule change and 0 before, and Timet is a time trend variable that takes the
value 0 on the first day in the sample and increments by 1 for every subsequent day.
In the main results, the first stage documented in Equation 6.1 is estimated on the
pooled sample of stock-days. Robustness tests indicate that estimating the first stage
separately for each stock produces similar results in the second-stage, as does inclusion
of stock fixed effects in the first stage.
Using the parameter estimates from Equation 6.1 allows fitted values of the level of
dark trading in stock i on day t, D̂arkit to be obtained. The second-stage regressions
estimate the impact of dark trading on a number of market quality metrics that measure
liquidity and informational efficiency, as documented in Equation 6.2:
yit = αi + β1D̂arkit + β2Timet +
5∑
j=1
γjControlj,it + it, (6.2)
where: yit is a market quality metric for stock i on day t, αi is a set of stock fixed effects,
D̂arkit is the fitted level of dark trading, Timet is the trend variable. Controlj,it is a
set of control variables: $V olumeit is the natural logarithm of traded dollar volume;
MarketCapit is the natural logarithm of the stock’s market capitalization; V olatilityit
is the stock-day’s high-low price range divided by the time-weighted midpoint; Priceit
is the time-weighted midpoint; and Constrainedit is the percentage of the trading day
for which the stock’s NBBO is constrained at the minimum tick size, which is omitted
when the dependent variable is a spread measure.
Time fixed effects are not included in Equation 6.2 because the exogenous variation in
dark trading (from the introduction of the minimum price improvement rules) occurs
around one point in time. Instead, the variable Timet acts as a control for general trends
in the market quality metrics through time, and the other control variables account for
possible effects of changing market conditions on the market quality metrics. For ro-
bustness, an alternative approach is tested to control for pre/post changes in the market
quality metrics that may be unrelated to dark trading. This alternative approach uti-
lizes a difference-in-differences design to remove pre/post changes in the market quality
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metrics that are not attributable to changes in dark trading. As the control group (the
“untreated” group), stocks that do not experience a decrease in dark trading after the
minimum price improvement rules are used. The difference-in-differences results are
consistent with those from the two-stage IV regressions. Therefore, the focus of this
chapter is on interpreting the two-stage IV results first, with the difference-in-difference
design and results described in the robustness tests section.
6.5.2 Liquidity Measures
A variety of measures are used to analyse the impact of dark pools on market liquidity.
These include: quoted spreads which measure the conditions posted throughout the day;
effective spreads which measure the conditions prevailing when trades occur; realised
spreads which measure the returns to liquidity suppliers; and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity
metric, which measures the ability of the limit order book to absorb large trades without
significant price movement.
The first measure of liquidity is the time-weighted quoted bid-ask spread. The quoted
spread is the difference between the lowest ask price available on any lit market in
Canada and the highest available bid price, i.e., the NBBO spread. The quoted spread
is measured in basis points by dividing the spread in cents by the prevailing midpoint,
m = Ask+Bid2 :
QuotedSpread =
[
Ask −Bid
m
]
104. (6.3)
The time-weighted quoted spread for each stock-day, QuotedSpreadit, is calculated by
taking the time-weighted average of quoted spreads between 9:45am and 3:45pm.
Effective and realised spreads are also examined, which take into consideration the actual
prices at which trades execute. Effective spreads reflect the cost of a transaction for the
liquidity demander. Realised spreads reflect the proportion of the transaction cost that
is earned by the liquidity provider. For a trade that occurs at time τ its effective spread
and five-minute realised spread (both in basis points relative to the prevailing midpoint)
are measured using Equations 6.4 and 6.5 below:
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EffectiveSpread = 2q
[
pτ −mτ
mτ
]
104, (6.4)
RealisedSpread = 2q
[
pτ −mτ+5
mτ
]
104, (6.5)
where: pτ is the transaction price, mτ is the midpoint of the NBBO prevailing at the
time of the trade, mτ+5 is the midpoint of the NBBO five minutes after the trade,
and q indicates the direction of the trade (+1 for buyer-initiated trades and -1 for
seller initiated trades). Buyer and seller initiated trades are identified by comparing the
prevailing NBBO to the transaction price using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.
While Ellis et al. (2000) and Chakrabarty et al. (2007) document that the Lee and
Ready (1991) algorithm may misclassify trades at the midpoint, we are able to identify
the direction of the dark transactions using our proprietary dataset. This will limit
the impact of misclassifying within-spread executions, as inferred transactions (ie. lit
trades) will occur either at the bid or ask. To obtain estimates of the effective and
realised spreads at the stock-day level, EffectiveSpreadit and RealisedSpreadit, the
volume-weighted average of effective and realised spreads are taken across all lit trades
during the stock-day.
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity metric is also computed, which is a measure of price impact
scaled by traded dollar volume. Amihud’s illiquidity measure is a stock-day average of
hourly absolute midpoint returns divided by the dollar volume traded in the hour, as
described by Equation 6.6:
ILLIQit = log
[
1 +
105
H
H∑
h=1
|rit,h|
$V olumeit,h
]
, (6.6)
where: rit,h and $V olumeit,h are the midpoint return and traded dollar volume, respec-
tively, for stock i during hour h of day t. As indicated in Equation 6.6 the ILLIQit
metric is log transformed to reduce the impact of outliers, consistent with Karolyi et al.
(2012). If there is no volume traded in a given hour, the denominator in the ILLIQit
metric would be zero. Rather than generating a missing observation, such instances
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are replaced with the stock’s 99th percentile value of valid
|rit,h|
$V olumeit,h
observations. To
further reduce the influence of outliers, all liquidity metrics are winsorized at the 1%
level for each stock and each date.
6.5.3 Informational Efficiency Measures
Four measures of the informational efficiency of prices are used: autocorrelations, vari-
ance ratios, high-frequency standard deviations, and measures of short-term return pre-
dictability using lagged market returns.
Both positive and negative midpoint return autocorrelation indicates that quotes deviate
from a stochastic random walk process and exhibit short-term return predictability. Such
predictability is inconsistent with an informationally efficient market. The absolute value
of first-order midpoint return autocorrelations are calculated for each stock-day at three
intraday frequencies, k ∈ (10sec., 30sec., 60sec.), similar to Hendershott and Jones
(2005):
Autocorrelationk = |Corr(rk,τ , rk,τ−1|, (6.7)
where: rk,τ is the τ
th midpoint return of length k in a given stock-day. Taking the
absolute value of the autocorrelation yields a measure of informational efficiency that
measures both the under- and over-reaction of returns to information, with larger values
indicating greater inefficiency. For each stock-day, the absolute autocorrelations of the
three frequencies are combined by calculating their first principle component. The com-
bined measure, Autocorrelationit, is scaled so that it ranges from 0 (highly efficient) to
100 (highly inefficient).
The second measure of informational efficiency is the variance ratio. For stock prices
that follow a random walk, the variance of returns is a linear function of the return
measurement frequency - θ2k−PeriodReturn is k times larger than θ
2
1−PeriodReturn. The
variance ratio makes use of this property to measure inefficiency as the deviation of a
price series from the characteristics that would be expected under a random walk (e.g.,
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Lo and MacKinlay (1988)). Three variance ratios are constructed for each stock-day,
utilizing different intra-day frequencies:
V arianceRatiokl = | θ
2
kl
kθ2l
− 1|, (6.8)
where: θ2l and θ
2
kl are the variances of l− second and kl− second midpoint returns for a
given stock-day. The three (l, kl) combinations used are: (1sec., 10sec.), (10sec., 60sec.),
and (1min., 5min.). For each stock-day, the three variance ratios are combined by cal-
culating their first principle component. The combined variance ratio, V arianceRatioit,
is scaled so that it ranges from 0 (indicating high levels of efficiency) to 100 (indicating
low levels of efficiency).
For each stock-day the intra-day midpoint standard deviations calculated at 10, 30 and
60 second frequencies are also combined by taking their first principal component. This
produces a single measure of high-frequency volatility, HFV olatilityit, which is a proxy
for noise and temporary deviations of prices from their equilibrium values due to trading
frictions. In the regressions, volatility in the fundamental value is controlled using a lower
frequency measure of realised variance.
The final measure of informational efficiency is an intraday adaptation of the Hou and
Moskowitz (2005) Delay metric. This metric measures short-term return predictability
by the extent to which lagged market returns predict a stock’s midpoint returns. For
each stock-day it a regression of intraday 1-minute midpoint returns for the stock, rit,τ ,
is estimated on the TSX60 market index return, rmt,τ , and ten lags:
rit,τ = αit + βitrmt,τ +
1∑
k=1
0δit,krmt,τ−k + it,τ . (6.9)
The R2 from this unconstrained regression is saved as R2Unconstrained,it with the regression
then re-estimated constraining the coefficients on all lagged market returns to zero (i.e.,
δit,k = 0,∀k), with the R2 from the constrained regression saved as R2Constrained,it. Delay
is calculated from the ratio of the constrained and unconstrained regression R2s as
documented in equation 6.10:
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Delayit = 100
(
1− R
2
Constrained,it
R2Unconstrained,it
)
, (6.10)
where: Delayit takes values between 0 and 100 and describes the amount of variation
in a stock’s intraday returns that is explained by lagged market returns. An increase
in R2Unconstrained,it indicates an increase in the explanatory power of the lagged returns,
and thus Delayit approaches 100, implying a delayed incorporation of market-wide in-
formation into the stock’s price, and lower overall informational efficiency.
6.5.4 Regulatory Flight
One main concern raised during the consultation process for the minimum price improve-
ment legislation was that these restrictions could result in dark trading in cross-listed
stocks migrating to the US where such price improvement regulations do not apply.
Under this “regulatory flight” scenario the Canadian minimum price improvement rules
would be expected to result in: (i) a larger decrease in Canadian dark trading for Cana-
dian stocks that are cross-listed in the US than for stocks listed in Canada only, and
(ii) an increase in US dark trading of US-Canada cross-listed stocks compared to stocks
listed only in the US.
To test for this migration of dark trading, two difference-in-differences models are applied
to the 200 Canadian listed securities that are cross listed in the US: one that compares
cross-listed stocks to stocks listed in Canada only and a second that compares cross-listed
stocks to stocks listed in the US only. For this purpose, each US-Canada cross-listed
stock is matched to both a stock listed only in Canada and a stock listed only in the
US. The matching procedure requires that matched stocks are traded on the same venue
as their cross-listed counterpart to limit the influence that the trading venue may have
on dark trading. Matched stocks are chosen in a manner similar to Huang and Stoll
(1996) using price and traded dollar volume as the matching characteristics. Price has
been found to be an important determinant of dark trading volume, especially around
tick-size price thresholds (Kwan et al., 2013), while larger stocks (and thus those with
higher trading volume) tend to have more dark trading than smaller stocks (Buti et al.,
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2011b). Matched stocks are chosen as those that minimize the sum of squared relative
differences in price and trading volume, Xj , measured as the average daily values during
the two months prior to the price improvement rules (15 August - 15 October 2012):
MatchingScoreCO =
2∑
j=1
(
XCj −XOj
XCj +X
O
j )/2
)2
. (6.11)
The superscript C indexes US-Canada cross-listed stocks, and the superscript O indexes
stocks listed only in Canada (when constructing the Canadian matched sample) or stocks
listed only in the US (when constructing the second matched sample).66
The following difference-in-differences model is then constructed separately for the cross-
listed stocks with the matched sample of stocks listed only in Canada, and the cross-listed
stocks with the matched sample of stocks listed only in the US:
Darkit = α+β1D
PostPeriod
t +β2D
CrossListed
i +β3(D
PostPeriod
t D
CrossListed
i ) + it, (6.12)
where: DPostPeriodt = 1 after the rule change and 0 before, D
CrossListed
i = 1 for US-
Canada cross-listed stocks and 0 otherwise. When comparing cross-listed stocks with
stocks listed only in Canada Darkit is the dollar volume of dark trading in Canada as a
fraction of total dollar volume traded in Canada in stock i on day t, and when comparing
cross-listed stocks with stocks listed only in the US, Darkit is the dollar volume of dark
trading in the US as a fraction of total dollar volume traded in the US in stock i on
day t. The coefficient of interest is β3, which captures the effects of regulatory flight.
For robustness a modified specification is also estimated in which the pre/post dummy
variable and the cross-listing dummy variable are replaced with stock and time fixed
effects, as documented in Equation 6.13:
Darkit = αi + αt + β(D
PostPeriod
t D
CrossListed
i ) + it. (6.13)
66The median differences between the cross-listed and matched stocks’ prices, average traded dollar
volume and dark volume as a percentage of total volume are all less than 15%, suggesting the matching
is relatively precise.
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics on trading activity
6.6 Results
6.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 6.3 reports market-wide descriptive statistics on trading activity. The trading
activity variables are calculated daily, pooling across all stocks, and then the mean,
median and standard deviation are computed from the daily observations. Consistent
with Figure 6.1 and the previous discussion, the level of dark trading is considerably
lower after the minimum price improvement rules come into effect. The mean (median)
percentage of daily dollar volume executed in the dark falls from 7.49% (7.52%) to 4.63%
(4.93%) after the new regulation. Lit and dark trades tend to have a similar size (mean
of approximately $6,400 and median of approximately $3,100) and their size does not
change noticeably after the minimum price improvement rules. While the total amount
of dark trading is reduced from an average of $325 million per day to $265 million per
day, this is somewhat offset by an increase in lit trading. Average total daily traded
dollar volume remains unchanged at approximately $6.3 billion per day.
To get a sense of the variation in dark trading, Figure 6.3 presents the pooled sample
histogram of stock-day level dark trading as a fraction of total stock-day dollar volume,
Darkit. Approximately 5% of stock-days have no dark trading at all. Around 50% of
stock-days have between 1% and 5% of their dollar volume executed in the dark. There
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are very few stock days with greater than 20% dark trading, and only six stock-days
have dark trading in excess of 50% of total dollar volume. The pooled sample mean
and standard deviation of Darkit are 6.6% and 6.3%, respectively. The pooled standard
deviation of 6.3% is larger than the time-series standard deviation of approximately 1%
in Table 6.3 because it includes cross-sectional variation, and the (equal-weighted) mean
of Darkit is lower than the mean of daily aggregated dark trading in Table 6.3 due to
the tendency for large stocks to have higher levels of dark trading.
Table 6.4 reports descriptive statistics on the stock-day market quality metrics and
control variables. Quoted spreads have a mean and median of 12.56 bps and 9.89 bps
respectively; effective spreads have a slightly lower mean of 10.5 bps due to some trades
being executed within the spread; and realised spreads are even smaller with a mean of
2.75 bps due to the fact that trades tend to have a positive price impact on average.
The variable Constrainedit indicates that quoted spreads tend to be constrained to the
minimum of one tick approximately 52% of the time for an average stock. The means
and medians of the informational efficiency metrics do not have a natural interpretation
due to their arbitrary scale but are useful in interpreting the magnitude of effects in the
regressions.
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of Dark Trading Across Stock-Days
6.6.2 Instrumental Variables Regressions
The results from the first stage of the instrumental variables regressions, in which the
level of dark trading is regressed on an indicator variable for the introduction of the
minimum price improvement rules and a time trend, are reported in Table 6.5. The
estimates indicate that the effect of the minimum price improvement regulation is a
decline in the average level of dark trading by approximately 2.9 percentage points,
which is of high statistical significance. In contrast to the earlier descriptive statistics,
the results in Table 6.5 control for the possibility of general trends in the level of dark
trading (with the control variable Timet), though these turn out to be statistically
indistinguishable from zero. The estimated effect of the minimum price improvement
regulation is similar when stock fixed effects are included to account for differences in
the levels of dark trading across stocks.
Problems associated with “weak” instruments arise when first-stage F-statistics for the
instruments are close to one (Bound et al. (1995), p. 446). The F-statistics in the first
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Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics on Liquidity, Informational Efficiency and Control
Variables
stage regression, both with and without stock fixed effects, are well above this level (17
to 566), suggesting the instrument is strong.
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Table 6.5: First-Stage IV Regressions of the Impact of Minimum Price Improvement
Rules on Dark Trading
Table 6.6 reports second-stage estimates of the impact of dark trading on liquidity. The
results indicate that dark trading has a negative and statistically significant effect on
all of the spread measures, as well as Amihud’s illiquidity proxy, which suggests that
dark trading at the levels experienced in Canada actually benefits liquidity. A small
increase in dark trading by 1% of total dollar volume is expected to decrease average
quoted spreads by approximately 1.5 bps (0.01×(-149.9)), decrease effective spreads by
1.3 bps, and decrease realised spreads by 0.23 bps. These decreases for just a small
change in dark trading are economically meaningful compared to the means of quoted,
effective and realised spreads: 12.56 bps, 10.50 bps, and 2.75 bps, respectively. These
reductions in quoted and effective spreads represent a reduction in transactions costs
of between 2.5% to 10%, being a significant component of overall costs. An alternative
way to interpret the magnitude of the effects is in terms of pooled standard deviations.
A one standard deviation increase in dark trading (6.3% of total dollar volume) is ex-
pected to decrease quoted spreads by 0.98 standard deviations (0.063×(-149.9)/9.67),
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Table 6.6: Second-Stage IV Regressions of the Impact of Dark Trading on Liquidity
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decrease effective spreads by 0.91 standard deviations, decrease realised spreads by 0.20
standard deviations, and decrease price impacts (Amihud’s ILLIQit) by 0.05 standard
deviations. Therefore, while there is variation in the magnitudes across the different
liquidity measures, the results suggest that dark trading at the levels experienced in
Canada has economically meaningful benefits to liquidity. This result is consistent with
the notion that the ability to trade easily in the dark increases competition among in-
formed traders in providing liquidity (as predicted by Boulatov and George (2013)) and
that the increased competition for dark liquidity provision has a positive spillover effect
on the liquidity of lit markets.
Coefficients on the time trend are not statistically distinguishable from zero and vary
in sign across the liquidity metrics suggesting the absence of a meaningful trend in
liquidity during the sample period, after controlling for other market characteristics.
Most coefficients on the control variables are consistent with expectations - liquidity
tends to be higher for days with greater volume, higher market capitalization, and
lower volatility. The adjusted R2 of the regressions, which do not include the variation
explained by the stock fixed effects range between 0.02 and 0.27, suggesting that there
are many factors beyond the variables included in the model that influence liquidity.
Turning to the informational efficiency proxies, Table 6.7 reports second-stage regression
estimates of the impact of dark trading. The results suggest that dark trading has a
negative and statistically significant effect on absolute autocorrelations, variance ratios
and delay in reflecting market-wide information, suggesting that dark trading at the
levels experienced in Canada benefits informational efficiency.
Because the units of the informational efficiency proxies do not have a natural inter-
pretation, the magnitude of the effects are examined in terms of standard deviations.
A one standard deviation increase in dark trading (6.3% of total dollar volume) is ex-
pected to decrease absolute midpoint return autocorrelations by 0.29 standard deviations
(0.063×(-77.93)/16.74), decrease variance ratios by 0.29 standard deviations, decrease
high-frequency midpoint volatility by 0.05 standard deviations, and decrease delay in
impounding market-wide information by 0.16 standard deviations, after controlling for
other market characteristics and stock fixed effects. Therefore, while there is variation
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Table 6.7: Second-Stage IV Regressions of the Impact of Dark Trading on Informa-
tional Efficiency
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in the magnitudes across the different informational efficiency measures, the results sug-
gest dark trading at the levels observed in Canada has economically meaningful benefits
for informational efficiency. These benefits include reduced uncertainty around the true
price of the security, reflected by the reduced midquote autocorrelation and reduced
midpoint volatility. The decrease in delay also implies that market wide information is
impounded more rapidly in the presence of dark trading. These results are robust to
the inclusion of controls for a time trend, the traded value of the security, the market
capitalization of the firm, the price of the firm, the frequency with which it is constrained
as well as firm-specific volatility.
This result is consistent with the beneficial impact of low levels of dark trading on
liquidity, due to the close relationship between liquidity and informational efficiency
(Chordia et al. (2008)). It is also consistent with the prediction of Boulatov and George
(2013) that the ability to hide orders encourages not only more liquidity provision by
informed traders, but also increases the aggressiveness with which informed traders
trade, which in turn promotes informational efficiency. Furthermore, the improvement
of informational efficiency at low levels of dark trading complements the findings of
Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2012) in the Australian market, who conclude that dark
trading below 10% of dollar volume does not harm price discovery and may be beneficial.
6.6.3 Robustness Tests
The robustness of the results are tested to a variety of alternative specifications of the IV
regressions and different sub-samples. To concisely summarize the results of these tests,
Table 6.8 reports the t-statistics for the coefficient on the key independent variable,
D̂arkit, in the second-stage regressions. The rows of Table 6.8 correspond to different
dependent variables and the columns correspond to different specifications and sub-
samples. Specification (1) is the base case specification reported in Tables 6.6 and 6.7,
corresponding to Equation 6.2, which includes all of the control variables and stock
fixed effects. Specification (2) is identical to specification (1), but without stock fixed
effects. Specification (3) contains no control variables except for stock fixed effects.
Specification (4) is identical to specification (1) except that the first stage IV regression
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Table 6.8: Robustness Tests
is estimated on each stock separately, allowing for heterogeneity in the way in which the
dark trading of individual stocks is affected by the minimum price improvement rules.
Specification (5) is identical to specification (1) except that it omits two weeks either
side of the introduction of the minimum price improvement rules to allow for transitory
effects and adjustment in trading behaviour. Specifications (6) and (7) are estimated on
the largest 121 stocks and smallest 120 stocks, respectively, using the same variables as
in specification (1).67
The results from the different specifications and sub-samples are consistent with the
base specification. Dark trading is associated with improved liquidity and informational
efficiency (or decreased illiquidity and informational inefficiency) across all proxies and
specifications with few exceptions. The results are robust to heterogeneity in the impact
of the instrumental variable, allowing for transitory effects around the rule change, and
67Lindley’s paradox identifies that large data sets can result in inflated levels of significance. Robust-
ness tests were conducted clustering the errors so as to account for this phenomenon. The results of
these tests are qualitatively similar to those reported in this thesis
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are similar for the largest and the smallest stocks in the sample. The latter result is
consistent with Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2012) who find that the effects of dark
trading on price discovery are similar for both large and small stocks. This implies that
it is not sample-specific nor regression specific factors which are driving the results.
The IV regressions control for changes in the market quality metrics that are unrelated
to dark trading in two ways: (i) any general time trends in market quality are removed
by the control variable Timet; and (ii) a series of control variables (including volatility,
total traded dollar volume and others) account for possible effects of changing market
conditions on the market quality metrics. For robustness, a difference-in-differences
design is used as an alternative approach for controlling for changes in the market
quality metrics that may be unrelated to dark trading. This design exploits the fact
that although the minimum price improvement rules decreased the level of dark trading
in most stocks, some stocks did not experience a decrease on average after the rules
became effective. Such stocks are utilised as the control group (the “untreated” group)
and other stocks are designated as the “treated” group (stocks that were impacted
by the minimum price discovery rules). The difference-in-differences design measures
changes in the market quality metrics for the treated group, relative to changes for the
untreated stocks and thus removes the presence of changes in market quality through
time that are unrelated to the rule change. This following difference-in-differences model
is constructed in Equation 6.14:
yit = α+ β1D
PostPeriod
t + β2D
DarkReduction
i +
β3(D
PostPeriod
t D
DarkReduction
i ) +
5∑
j=1
γj(Controlj,it + it,
(6.14)
where: yit is a market quality metric, D
PostPeriod
t = 1 after the rule change and 0 before,
DDarkReductioni = 1 for stocks that experience a decline in the mean level of dark trading
after the rule change and 0 otherwise, and the set of control variables, Controlj,it,
is the same as in previous models ($V olumeit,MarketCapit, V olatilityit, P riceit, and
Constrainedit).
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Table 6.9: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of Dark Trading on
Market Quality
Table 6.9 reports estimates from the difference-in-differences model. The key variable,
(DPostPeriodt D
DarkReduction
i ), arises from the interaction of the two dummy variables.
This interaction term measures the effect of a reduction in dark trading, after controlling
for pre-post changes in market quality that are unrelated to dark trading (via the post
rule change dummy variable, DPostPeriodt ). Therefore, these coefficients are expected
to take the opposite sign to those on the variable D̂arkit in the IV regression (which
is increasing in the level of dark trading). The results are largely consistent with this
expectation - the point estimates of the coefficient on (DPostPeriodt D
DarkReduction
i ) are
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positive for all market quality metrics, with statistical significance for five of the eight
metrics at the 10% level. The reduced level of statistical significance compared to the
two-stage IV results is likely due to lower statistical power in the difference-in-differences
design.
Similar to the IV regressions, these results suggest that dark trading improves liquidity
and informational efficiency (reductions in dark trading are associated with increased
illiquidity and increased informational inefficiency), and the estimated magnitudes are
similar to the IV results. For example, for stocks that experienced a decline in dark
trading after the minimum price improvement rules came into effect, quoted, effective,
and realised spreads are respectively estimated to be 2.1 bps, 3.9 bps, and 0.50 bps larger
after the rule change as compared to stocks that did not experience a decline in dark
trading. Importantly, these results mitigate the potential concern that the findings of
the main analysis could be driven by unrelated changes in market conditions that occur
between the pre and post rule change periods and therefore allow for greater confidence
to be placed in the estimated effects of dark trading.
6.6.4 Regulatory Flight
One of the major concerns raised by market participants and marketplace operators
during the consultation process for the minimum price improvement legislation was the
potential for dark trading in the large number of cross-listed stocks to migrate to the
US. Such a “regulatory flight” could damage the quality of capital markets in Canada,
and potentially lead to a “race to the bottom” in terms of security market regulation.
This possibility is assessed using a difference-in-differences design that seeks to identify
decreases in Canadian dark trading for cross-listed stocks compared to dark trading
for stocks listed in Canada only, or increases in US dark trading of cross-listed stocks
compared to US stocks. Each cross-listed stock is matched to one stock listed only in
Canada and one stock listed only in the US, with the models comparing the cross-listed
stocks to Canadian stocks and the models comparing cross-listed stocks to US stocks
estimated separately.
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Table 6.10: Difference-in-Differences Tests for Migration of Dark Trading
Table 6.10 reports the results of the difference-in-differences models testing for reg-
ulatory flight. The first two specifications compare Canadian dark trading of cross-
listed stocks to Canadian dark trading of matched stocks that are listed in Canada
only (specification (1) controls for “treatment” and time effects with dummy variables,
whereas specification (2) uses stock and time fixed effects). If some dark trading in
cross-listed stocks were to migrate to the US following the introduction of the minimum
price improvement rules, a larger decline would be expected in Canadian dark trading of
cross-listed stocks than for stocks listed in Canada only, and therefore a negative coeffi-
cient would be expected on the interaction term (DPostPeriodt D
CrossListed
i ). The results,
however, do not support the hypothesis of regulatory flight; in fact, the coefficient of
(DPostPeriodt D
CrossListed
i ) is positive in specifications (1) and (2).
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The second two specifications provide an alternative way of examining the regulatory
flight hypothesis by comparing US dark trading of cross-listed stocks to US dark trading
of matched US stocks (similarly, specification (3) controls for “treatment” and time
effects with dummy variables, whereas specification (4) uses stock and time fixed effects).
If some dark trading in cross-listed stocks were to migrate to the US following the
introduction of the minimum price improvement rules, an increase would be expected
in US dark trading of cross-listed stocks relative to US dark trading of stocks listed in
the US only, and therefore a positive coefficient would be expected on the interaction
term (DPostPeriodt D
CrossListed
i ). Again, the results do not support the hypothesis of
regulatory flight, as the coefficient of (DPostPeriodt D
CrossListed
i ) is found to be negative
in specifications (3) and (4). Therefore, both sets of tests provide consistent evidence
against the hypothesis that some dark trading in Canada-US cross-listed stocks would
migrate to the US in order to circumvent the Canadian minimum price improvement
rules.
6.7 Conclusions
The results of this chapter suggest that dark trading has benefits for both price effi-
ciency and liquidity, at least at the levels seen in Canada. Using Canada’s introduction
of minimum price improvement rules as an exogenous instrument for dark trading, dark
trading is found to lower quoted, effective and realised spreads, reduce price impact
measures of illiquidity, make prices closer to the random walk process that would be
expected under informational efficiency, and reduce the delay with which stock prices
reflect market-wide information. These findings are robust to controlling for changes in
other market characteristics such as volume and volatility, controlling for time trends
in dark trading and in market quality, and to difference-in-differences estimation, which
provides an alternative way of controlling for changes in market quality that are unre-
lated to dark trading. The magnitude of the impact of dark trading is economically and
statistically meaningful.
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These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Boulatov and George
(2013) that hidden limit orders (dark trading) will encourage informed traders to in-
creasingly act as liquidity suppliers and to trade more aggressively on their information,
thereby increasing both liquidity and informational efficiency. Informed traders face a
trade-off between: (i) earning profits from providing liquidity but at the same time giv-
ing away some of their private information to traders that observe the liquidity-proving
orders; and (ii) paying to consume liquidity and thereby preventing disclosing their in-
formation before they trade. When trading occurs in the dark informed traders prefer
supplying liquidity because they can capture the rents from liquidity provision without
giving away their private information because their liquidity supplying orders are not
visible. It is this aggressive competition between informed traders for liquidity provision
when they can trade in the dark that benefits market quality. While Boulatov and
George (2013) do not model a setting in which a lit and a dark venue exist side by
side, the results suggest that strong competition among informed traders in providing
dark liquidity has positive spillover effects on the lit market. For example, if there is
strong competition among dark liquidity providers, liquidity demanding traders that
have a choice of trading in lit or dark venues would be attracted to the dark unless
the lit market liquidity providers can offer equally competitive liquidity. This causes
increasingly competitive lit market liquidity (i.e., narrower spreads) at the expense of lit
liquidity provider profits. This mechanism is made possible due to the lack of restrictions
on participation in Canadian dark pools due to the fair access provisions in Canadian
legislation.
Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2012) conclude that dark trading becomes harmful to
price discovery once it exceeds 10% of dollar volume in the Australian market. The
results of this chapter complement this finding by suggesting that dark trading levels
below this 10% threshold does not harm price discovery, but in fact appears to be
beneficial. Taken together these two studies provide support for the notion of a “tipping”
point - an optimal level of dark trading beyond which dark trading harms market quality.
The notion of a tipping point may prove to unify the apparent contradictions in the
extant empirical literature, especially if this point is unique to each marketplace.
This chapter also provides evidence on a potential form of regulatory arbitrage that
Chapter 6. The Impact of Continuous External Dark Pools 189
could undermine the effectiveness of dark trading restrictions. Prior to the introduction
of the minimum price improvement rules in Canada, a number of market participants
and marketplace operators raised the concern that dark trading in the large number of
Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the US would migrate to the US in order to
circumvent the Canadian rules. No evidence is found for such migration of dark trading.
The combination of regulatory decisions in Canada has achieved a balance between
dark and lit trading and provides lessons for other regulators and market operators.
The regulatory prohibition of restricted-access venues, the existence of broker preferenc-
ing, and price improvement requirements for broker internalization have impeded the
development of dealer-sponsored dark pools and systematic internalizers, which have
substantially contributed to the growth in dark volumes in the US, Europe, and Aus-
tralia. The immediate post-trade transparency mandated for both lit and dark markets
provides a useful mechanism for dark trades to contribute to price discovery, unlike the
30 second delay in dark trade reporting in the US. Finally, the recently introduced mini-
mum price improvement rules mandate a meaningful price improvement for dark trades
and thereby prevent the increasing use of fractional price levels, as often encountered in
the US. In arresting the increase in dark volumes, the minimum price improvement leg-
islation may help ensure that dark trading in Canada does not exceed the point beyond
which market quality is harmed.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
A number of new types of trading have been introduced over the last decade. These
new trade types have been driven by rapidly fragmenting market structures, resulting
in the establishment of dark pools and the wide-spread use of high-frequency trading.
This dissertation considers the effects of the microstructure of financial equity markets
on elements of market integrity and efficiency, specifically focusing on the behaviour
of interconnected, yet fragmented markets and their associated impact on key market
outcomes such as the degree of liquidity, the size of trading costs, the level of market
efficiency and the extent to which traders engage in prohibited conduct.
An efficient market comprises of of informed and uninformed (liquidity) traders. In-
formed traders are necessary for gathering costly information, and ensuring that prices
fundamentally reflect all publicly available information. Liquidity traders are necessary
to ensure that frequent trading occurs and to avoid the “market failure” that would oc-
cur if only informed participants exist. To ensure that both types of traders participate
in the market, it falls upon regulators to keep markets both “fair” and “efficient”. These
two goals are necessary to ensure that participants have confidence in the integrity of the
markets in which they trade. If markets are perceived to lack this “level playing field”,
there is a risk that investors in a globally connected market may move their trading to
other venues, or simply cease trading all together.
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One way that the perception of a level playing field can be damaged is when not all
traders have access to the same advantages. The development and growth of high-
frequency trading and dark pools risks creating a “two-tiered” market, where those with
access to these technologies benefit at the expense of those for whom such technologies
are too complex, expensive, or impractical. The removal of this level playing field,
whether it be due to integrity breaches such as insider trading and market manipulation,
or due to the lack of access to new technologies, risks alienating the liquidity traders
that are necessary for efficient markets to operate.
The recent emergence of these new forms of trading has left regulators, participants
and academics uncertain of the benefits of these trading innovations. The literature
survey (as presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation) identifies a significant amount of
literature devoted to examining issues of market microstructure and their implications
for market efficiency and integrity. The findings of these studies have often produced
conflicting results, and are not able to be generalised due to differing market structures,
time periods and approaches to the measurement of variables such as the level of high-
frequency and dark trading. This dissertation builds on the existing literature in a
number of areas. Specifically it examines the role of insider trading during the takeover
announcement period, the impact of high-frequency trading on market quality, and the
degree to which dark pools have changed and affected the market landscape. These
issues are examined in the four core essays that constitute this thesis.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation contributes to a greater understanding of the pre-announcement
price run-up observed around takeover events. A number of studies over the last few
decades have attributed such run-up to the role of insiders profiting from their knowledge
illegally. This result has been supported by studies of confirmed illegal insider traders
as well as by more general studies into the causes of the run-up. Chapter 3 examines the
determinants of the price run-up ahead of takeover announcements and focuses on the
role of toeholds established prior to this date. The finding that toeholds have significant
explanatory power provides new evidence about the extent to which insiders’ may be
trading prior to takeover events. Whilst insider trading cannot be discounted as an ex-
planation for the price run-up, this finding implies that existing studies may exaggerate
the extent of insider trading.
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The second essay in this dissertation, found in Chapter 4, examines the rise of high-
frequency trading in the LSE and Euronext Paris markets. The rise of high-frequency
trading and market fragmentation has resulted in a vast array of new, electronically-
executed, strategies. The increasing prevalence of high-frequency trading in the global
market has led many regulators, including those in Australia, Canada and Italy, to in-
troduce order-based “Tobin Taxes” to try to discourage the practice that has resulted in
increased message traffic. Proponents of high-frequency trading argue that the strategies
employed are simply faster versions of strategies that have existed for years. Detrac-
tors, however, argue that high-frequency trading creates a multi-tiered market, where
high-frequency traders are able to prey on orders placed by slower participants.
Whereas existing studies of high-frequency trading have focused on the impact of high-
frequency trading on efficiency, Chapter 4 examines the issues of efficiency and integrity
jointly. Assessing integrity and efficiency together is important as improvements in
efficiency may come at the expense of integrity. For example, a market with a significant
amount of insider trading may be “strong-form efficient”, but this efficiency comes at
the expense of the integrity of the market. As the conduct of HFT traders is largely
undocumented in the academic literature, their impact on integrity has not, as yet, been
analysed in any real depth.
The results presented in Chapter 4 show that high-frequency trading leads to increased
competition between liquidity suppliers for order-flow. This has decreased the trans-
action costs paid by market participants, as electronic liquidity suppliers narrow their
inventory holding and order processing costs. This improvement in efficiency is not
found to have had any adverse impacts on the level on integrity, with the level of insider
trading remaining unaffected. Indeed, high-frequency trading is found to improve the
integrity of the market by reducing the frequency of end-of-day manipulations. These
findings confirm the consensus in the literature that high-frequency trading does, in fact,
improve the liquidity supplied to markets. Additionally, the existence of high-frequency
trading is found to improve the integrity of the market as a whole.
Despite mounting evidence of the positive impacts that high-frequency trading has for
market quality, many regulators around the world have been implementing taxes and
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cost-recovery mechanisms designed specifically to limit the practice. The results of this
dissertation suggest that more research needs to be conducted, especially where these
taxes have been introduced, to identify what impact deterring high-frequency trading
has on market quality. An additional conclusion that can be drawn from these findings
is that, when assessing market quality, regulators should not focus solely on efficiency.
This dissertation has developed a framework to examine both integrity and efficiency
concurrently. Such a framework should assist regulators in meeting their mandate of
ensuring that future changes to market design improve both the fairness and efficiency
of the market.
Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation focus on the impact of dark trading on market
quality. While private block trading (which lacks pre-trade transparency) has existed
for many years, the development of venues that aggregate small orders in a continuous,
separate pool is a recent phenomenon. The existence of dark orders can be both bene-
ficial and detrimental to markets. On the one hand, providing (typically institutional)
traders with the ability to submit large orders without pre-trade transparency can en-
courage latent liquidity to be expressed on market. Without pre-trade transparency,
front-runners do not have an opportunity to “step in front” of the large traders’ or-
ders, reducing the cost of executing large orders. Once on-market, this liquidity may
be accessed by other traders, increasing total market liquidity. On the other hand, if
all traders use dark orders, the price discovery process breaks down, removing the very
prices that are necessary for the dark pools to function - such a situation results in
market failure.
Previous literature on dark pools has failed to reach a consensus as to whether the costs
or benefits of dark pool trading dominate. This failure to definitively identify the impacts
of dark trading on market quality is (at least) partially driven by the difficulties present
in the analysis of dark trading. These difficulties include: the difficulty of obtaining
sensitive data describing dark trading; the failure of previous studies to appropriately
account for endogeneity concerns; the relatively recent establishment of dark trading;
and the need for dark trading to be taken up by a substantial proportion of traders before
its’ impact can be ascertained. The final two chapters of this dissertation use unique
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experimental designs to overcome these limitations that have hindered the analysis of
this topic thus far.
Chapter 5 investigates the impact of the introduction of dark trading on the TSX with
regards to market quality and efficiency. The introduction of dark trading is found to
increase quoted, effective, and realised spreads, indicating that traders are initially wary
of how the introduction of hidden liquidity will impact trade executions. Once dark
orders are established on all securities, increased levels of continuous dark trading are
found to decrease transaction costs and improve measures of pricing efficiency. This
is consistent with the finding that dark orders facilitate increased competition between
market makers, allowing them to extract value from their knowledge of the true value
of securities without disseminating that information to the market. This results in an
increase in available liquidity without damaging the price discovery process.
In the final chapter of this dissertation, the introduction of rules to limit dark trading in
Canada - the so called “Minimum Price Improvement” regulations - are used to identify
the impact dark trading has on the market. The sharp decline in dark trading caused
by this exogenous shock creates a unique set-up that is not biased by the limitation of
endogenous dark movements, as is observed in previous studies. Consistent with the
findings in Chapter 5, increased levels of dark trading are found to improve measures of
transactions costs and market efficiency.
The findings of these two studies on dark pools are counter to previous empirical findings
in markets such as Australia and the US. One important factor in this contrary result
is that the levels of dark trading in Australia and the US are both around 15-20%, as
compared to the 5-10% found in Canada. Thus, the finding that low levels of dark trading
are beneficial while higher levels are detrimental is consistent with the idea that there
is a tipping point in the level of dark trading in a market, up to which dark trading
is beneficial, but beyond which dark trading becomes harmful to the price discovery
process. With the low level of dark trading that exists in Canada, it is likely that this
tipping point has not yet been reached in this market.
Taken together, Chapters 5 and 6 establish that low levels of dark trading are beneficial
for a market. This result does come with the caveat that the benefits to dark trading
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may erode as the impact on the price discovery process becomes more marked. Further
research should be conducted to establish the hypothesised tipping point at which dark
trading becomes detrimental. Once established, this tipping point can be used as a
reference point for regulation that aims to curb dark trading. Furthermore, the existence
of a minimum price increment appears to have reduced the extent of undesirable conduct,
including dark market-making. Overall, this has increased competition between market
makers, resulting in improved liquidity in the lit Canadian market.
The recent introduction of minimum price improvement regulations by the Australian
regulator should be carefully analysed to provide further evidence of the impacts such
regulation has, especially in countries with high levels of dark trading, such as the
US. Similarly, the compulsory immediate post-trade transparency required in Canada
facilitates the study of dark pools, and efforts by national regulators to increase the
transparency of dark pools for academic purposes should be encouraged.
This thesis shows that the recent developments in market microstructure have largely
been beneficial for the quality of equity markets. While there is likely to always be some
resistance to change, it is essential to utilise evidence to assess how new types of trading
impact the market before regulation is introduced.
Appendix A
Trading in Canada
A.1 Trading on the TSX
Trading on the TSX is organized in an upstairs-downstairs structure. Orders can be filled
by upstairs brokers (usually these are very large orders), who have price improvement
obligations, or they can be cleared via the consolidated (electronic) limit order book.
The TSX limit order book generally follows the so called price, visibility, broker, time
priority. This implies that the book is constructed by sorting incoming limit orders
lexicographically: first by their price (“price priority”) and then, in case of equality,
by their visibility (visible orders have priority), then by broker (brokers enjoy priority
for clearing against orders from the same brokerage), and finally by the time of the
order arrival. Broker priority also applies, in the sense that active and passive client
(not proprietary) orders submitted by the same broker at the same price and visibility
have priority over earlier submitted orders at the same price and visibility.68 Visibility
priority implies that for the same price, dark orders, or the hidden portions of iceberg
orders, have lower priority than visible orders. The limit order book relies on its users
to voluntarily supply liquidity by posting limit orders. Transactions in the limit order
book occur when active orders, that is, market orders (e.g., an order to buy at the best
available ask price) or marketable limit orders (e.g., a buy limit order with a price higher
68To invoke broker referencing, both orders must be client orders, implying that the broker cannot
internalize an order in the sense of trading on its own inventory and invoke broker priority. Broker
preferencing is, however, immaterial to the analysis. Notably, traders can also tag their order to switch
off broker preferencing.
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than the current best ask), are entered into the system. Unpriced market orders occur
very infrequently on the TSX. The marketable portion of an order is commonly referred
to as an “active order”, and a “passive order” refers to a standing limit order that is hit
by an active order. Active orders may “walk the book”, that is, if the order size exceeds
the number of shares available at the best bid or offer price, then the order continues
to clear at the next best price, provided that order protection is maintained (i.e., no
other visible marketplace posts at better prices).69 All orders must be sent to the TSX
by registered brokers (the Participating Organizations or POs), though direct market
access by clients is possible by using a PO’s broker number.
Dark orders can be entered in one of two ways. Firstly, they can be entered as standard
limit orders, expect that the order is simply not displayed (aka “dark”). Alternatively,
they can be entered as midpoint orders where these orders “floated” with the midpoint
of the national best bid and offer price. Traders can also specify a number of additional
options, including a limit price.70 Passive dark orders that execute invoke no fee (and no
rebate). Active visible orders that trade against a dark order invoke a fee of $0.001 per
share. Active dark orders that trade against passive visible orders (these would not be
midpointpegged orders) invoke a fee of $0.0035 per share. For comparison, “standard”
fees for lit market transactions are as follows: active orders involve a fee between $0.0033
and $0.0035 per share (depending on the discount tier that the broker falls into), passive
orders receive a rebate between $0.0031 to $0.0032 per share. Dark orders are excluded
from the so-called ELP program which gives special deals to electronic (high-frequency)
market makers.
A.2 Dealer Crosses
Dealer crosses, which are excluded from the analysis, are usually one-on-one arranged
trades that have no pre-trade transparency, and can thus be considered “dark” trades.
There are a number of regulations in Canada’s Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR)
69The onus is generally on the brokers to ensure order protection, however, all visible marketplaces,
including the TSX, offer order routing services to ensure order protection; they also allow brokers to
specify that orders are to be executed only on the TSX.
70Details are available at: http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/TSX TSXV Dark Liquidity Guide v1-1.pdf.
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that relate to dealer crosses. Namely, the order exposure rule, UMIR 6.3, together
with the client-principal trading rule, UMIR 8.1, specify that all orders of less than
50 standard trading units (henceforth, 5,000 shares) must be exposed to the market,
unless the dealer provides meaningful (i.e., 1 tick) price improvement relative to the
NBBO. Furthermore, the best execution rule, UMIR 5.1, ensures that dealer crosses
for more than 5,000 shares are in the interest of the client. Finally, the best price (or,
no trade-through) rule, UMIR 5.2, specifies that an order cannot trade through better-
priced orders. Dealer crosses incur no exchange fees. Smith, Turnbull and White (2001)
have shown that the upstairs market fulfills an important role by allowing, in particular,
institutional investors to clear large orders in one trade.
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